Export limit exceeded: 30000 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Export limit exceeded: 421004 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.
Search
Search Results (421004 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-82705 | 1 Apache | 1 Wicket | 2026-11-06 | N/A |
| Missing authorization in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.authorization.IAuthorizationStrategy declares isResourceAuthorized(), and that method has a single enforcement point in the framework: org.apache.wicket.request.handler.resource.ResourceRequestHandler, the handler that serves a resource reached through a mounted or shared ResourceReference. Components that are handed an org.apache.wicket.request.resource.IResource instance instead call IResource#respond() themselves from their own request listener and never construct that handler. In wicket-core these are org.apache.wicket.markup.html.link.ResourceLink, org.apache.wicket.markup.html.image.Image and org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.ImageButton; in wicket-extensions it is org.apache.wicket.extensions.ajax.AjaxDownloadBehavior. A resource restricted by a custom isResourceAuthorized() implementation, or by an @AuthorizeResource annotation from wicket-auth-roles, is therefore enforced when it is requested through its own resource URL and is not enforced when the same instance is served through the component that holds it. Which of the two happens is decided by the constructor the application used, and not by anything the application can see in the rendered page. ResourceLink(String, ResourceReference) renders a resource URL and the request is authorized; ResourceLink(String, IResource) renders a component listener URL and it is not. Image, ImageButton and AjaxDownloadBehavior each offer the same pair of constructors and behave the same way. Image and ImageButton write that listener URL into the src attribute of the tag they render, so a browser requests it without any action by the user, and the resource an Image serves may also come from the component's model. An application is affected where it restricts a resource through IAuthorizationStrategy#isResourceAuthorized() or an @AuthorizeResource annotation and then hands that same resource to one of those components as an IResource. An application that does not restrict resources at all is not affected, and neither is a resource that is only mounted or registered as a shared resource. The pattern does not have to be written by the application itself: org.apache.wicket.extensions.markup.html.repeater.data.table.export.ExportToolbar builds each of its export links from an IResource instance, so the exported contents of a data table are served without the resource check in any application that adds that toolbar. As a workaround, register the resource in the application's shared resources and pass the resulting ResourceReference to the component instead of the IResource, so that the request is routed through the handler that consults the authorization strategy. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82704 | 1 Apache | 1 Wicket | 2026-11-06 | N/A |
| Missing authorization in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.core.request.handler.ListenerRequestHandler invokes an IRequestListener only when org.apache.wicket.Component#canCallListener() allows it, and that method is isEnabledInHierarchy() && isVisibleInHierarchy(). The visibility half reads a flag that carries the outcome of IAuthorizationStrategy#isActionAuthorized() for the Component.RENDER action, and that flag is written in one place only, Component#configure(), during the render phase. A listener URL built by a subclass of org.apache.wicket.core.request.mapper.AbstractBookmarkableMapper carries the page identifier and the component path in a single parameter, and the page identifier may be empty. When it is, a new page instance is constructed, PageProvider#wasExpired() is false because no identifier was supplied, and PageAndComponentProvider#getComponent() finds the component directly on the new instance, so neither a render pass nor Component#configure() runs before the listener is invoked. The flag therefore still holds its constructor default, the component counts as visible, and the listener of a component the authorization strategy denied RENDER for is executed. The same request also skips Component#onConfigure(), so visibility and enablement an application sets there are not applied either. There are two ways to reach this, and neither requires anything but a request. On a page that is stateful, the caller omits the page identifier from a listener URL that would otherwise carry it. On a page that Wicket considers stateless, nothing has to be altered at all: Wicket itself writes listener URLs without a page identifier for such pages, and a component the strategy denies RENDER for is treated as stateless and therefore does not keep the page stateful, so denying RENDER can itself produce the page-id-less form. The second route has never been refused. The ENABLE decision of IAuthorizationStrategy is consulted on every invocation and still refuses, as does a request that supplies the real identifier of a page instance that has already been rendered; a component the application disabled in Component#onConfigure() is protected by neither, because that callback has not run. An application is affected where it withholds an individual component from the caller, either by denying the RENDER action through IAuthorizationStrategy, including through the MetaDataRoleAuthorizationStrategy and AuthorizeAction facilities of wicket-auth-roles, or by setting the component's visibility or enabled flag in Component#onConfigure(), the callback Wicket's own documentation directs applications to use for both. The page carrying such a component has to be constructible from a bookmarkable or mounted URL, which requires a public constructor taking either no arguments or a PageParameters argument. Behaviours pass through the same gate, so an AJAX behaviour attached to such a component is equally exposed. Separately, and whether or not any component is withheld, a listener on a page Wicket considers stateful is invoked on an instance the request itself constructed, so it acts on models built from page parameters the caller supplied rather than on the state the application last rendered. Instantiation authorization is unaffected: IAuthorizationStrategy#isInstantiationAuthorized() is still consulted when the new page instance is created, so a guard placed on the page rather than on the individual component continues to hold. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82559 | 1 Apache | 1 Wicket | 2026-11-06 | N/A |
| Insufficient session expiration in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.protocol.ws.WebSocketSettings#newWebSocketRequest() wraps the WebSocket upgrade request in an org.apache.wicket.protocol.ws.api.ServletRequestCopy, which is kept for the life of the connection and used to build the request for every frame that arrives on it. Copying the request is deliberate and is documented as such, because the container recycles the upgrade request once the handshake is over. The container session is copied along with it, into an org.apache.wicket.protocol.ws.api.HttpSessionCopy holding the session attributes as they stood when the connection was opened. That second copy is not necessary, because a session, unlike a request, is not discarded at the end of a request. Every frame afterwards resolves its Wicket session through ISessionStore#lookup(), which reads it out of the copy, so the connection is detached from the live container session for as long as it stays open. Ending the session through the container therefore does not end the connection. After an idle timeout, an HttpSession#invalidate() call made from a filter or from a security framework, a container-managed logout, or a session replacement, the connection goes on resolving the org.apache.wicket.Session instance that existed when it was opened, together with that session's attributes and, for applications built on wicket-auth-roles, the signed-in state held on that same instance, so an authorization decision taken inside a WebSocket callback is taken against an identity that has already been revoked. The copy is also what the connection writes through: a Session#invalidateNow() issued from inside a WebSocket callback invalidates the copy and leaves the container session valid, and session attributes set over the connection are written to the copy rather than to the session. An application is affected where it uses Wicket's native WebSocket support on pages or shared resources that require an authenticated session, and where sessions are ended by the container rather than by Wicket. Session#invalidateNow(), and AuthenticatedWebSession#invalidate() and #signOut() which call it, remain effective for a WebSocketBehavior on a page: they clear the page manager, and the connection can then no longer resolve the page it was opened for. A WebSocketResource is not limited in that way, because a frame naming a resource is served against a throwaway page and never consults the page manager, so such a connection outlives Wicket's own sign-out as well. Some containers close WebSocket connections themselves when the HTTP session they were opened under is destroyed, in which case the connection ends regardless; that is a property of the container rather than of Wicket. Applications that do not use the native WebSocket support are not affected. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Older, unsupported releases from 6.0.0 onwards are also affected. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82558 | 1 Apache | 1 Wicket | 2026-11-06 | N/A |
| Missing authorization in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.protocol.ws.api.WebSocketBehavior, through which Wicket's native WebSocket support hands a message sent by the client to the application, calls its onMessage() callbacks without checking whether the client may invoke the component the behavior is attached to. Wicket opens a single WebSocket connection per page, and a message received on it is delivered to every WebSocketBehavior of that page. For an Ajax behavior Wicket makes this check before invoking it, through Behavior#canCallListener(Component), which refuses a component that is not visible or not enabled, including one for which the IAuthorizationStrategy denies the RENDER or ENABLE action. A WebSocketBehavior attached to such a component, or to a child of one, therefore receives the client's text and binary messages, together with a WebSocketRequestHandler that writes back to that client, where an Ajax behavior on the same component would be refused. An application is affected where it attaches a WebSocketBehavior that overrides onMessage() to a component that it hides, disables, or restricts through its IAuthorizationStrategy, for example with MetaDataRoleAuthorizationStrategy or the AuthorizeAction annotation. The client needs a session of their own and a page of their own that contains such a component: messages are delivered only to pages in the page store of the client's own session, so this gives no access to another user's session, page or connection. Messages pushed by the server are not affected. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Older, unsupported releases from 6.0.0 onwards are also affected. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82557 | 1 Apache | 1 Wicket | 2026-11-06 | N/A |
| Missing authorization in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.Form resolves the component that submitted a form from the request parameters in Form#onRequest() and passes the result directly to Form#onFormSubmitted(IFormSubmitter). The check that the submitting component is visible and enabled in its hierarchy runs only when onFormSubmitted() is given no submitter, so it no longer runs for an ordinary form submission, and it is the only point at which Wicket verifies that the application actually offered the named control to the caller. Form#findSubmitter() matches on the request parameter name alone and applies no visibility or enablement filter, and the request handler checks only the form itself, which is visible and enabled. A request that names a submit button the application withheld therefore reaches that button's onSubmit() and onAfterSubmit(), and its onError() when form validation fails; where the button sets setDefaultFormProcessing(false) it reaches onSubmit() and onAfterSubmit() without any form validation. An application is affected where a form submitting component, such as a Button or a SubmitLink, is unavailable to the caller while the enclosing form remains available. How the component was made unavailable does not matter: the component's own setVisible(false), setEnabled(false) or setVisibilityAllowed(false), an overridden isVisible() or isEnabled(), an invisible or disabled parent container anywhere above it, and a RENDER or ENABLE denial from IAuthorizationStrategy — for example through MetaDataRoleAuthorizationStrategy or the AuthorizeAction annotation — are all enforced by that one check, and all of them are bypassed. A component that renders as disabled carries its own input name in the markup the caller already holds. Submissions made through AjaxFormSubmitBehavior, and therefore through AjaxButton and AjaxSubmitLink, are not affected: those are invoked as a behaviour on the button itself, the behaviour's invocation is authorized against that button, and the non-Ajax callbacks of those two classes do nothing. Restrictions applied to the form or to the page rather than to the submitting component are unaffected. The 9.x and 8.x release lines, and the unsupported lines before them, are not affected; the behaviour was introduced in 10.3.0. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 10.3.0 through 10.11.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 10.12.0, which fixes the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-82115 | 1 Apache | 1 Wicket | 2026-11-06 | N/A |
| Missing authorization in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.protocol.ws.api.WebSocketMessageBroadcastHandler, the request handler Wicket's native WebSocket support uses to deliver an incoming frame, resolves the shared resource named by the client's handshake parameter and calls WebSocketResource#onPayload() on it directly, without consulting IAuthorizationStrategy#isResourceAuthorized(). That method has a single enforcement point in the framework, org.apache.wicket.request.handler.resource.ResourceRequestHandler, which the WebSocket transport does not pass through, and WebSocketResource#respond() is final and empty. No route to a WebSocketResource therefore asks the configured authorization strategy whether the caller may use it, and an @AuthorizeResource annotation on such a class has no effect. A caller needs a bound Wicket session and the name of the resource. The name is not a secret: Wicket writes it into the page that opens the connection. No page of the application is otherwise involved, because a request naming a resource is served with a throwaway page. All of the resource's callbacks are reached this way, including onConnect() and both onMessage() overloads, and what a callback pushes back through WebSocketRequestHandler goes to the caller's own connection. An application is affected where it registers a WebSocketResource as a shared resource and relies on the authorization strategy to restrict it. What the caller gains is whatever that resource's callbacks do with a text or binary message of the caller's choosing. The connection is registered under the caller's own session, so it gives no access to another user's connection. As a workaround, reject unauthorized connections with an IWebSocketConnectionFilter registered through WebSocketSettings#setConnectionFilter(), or repeat the authorization check at the start of each callback. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Older, unsupported releases from 7.0.0 onwards are also affected. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-39744 | 2026-11-06 | 7.1 High | ||
| Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in WC Lovers WCFM Membership wc-multivendor-membership allows Stored XSS.This issue affects WCFM Membership: from n/a through 2.12.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-13575 | 1 Tokuhirom | 1 Http::session2 | 2026-11-06 | N/A |
| HTTP::Session versions before 0.54 for Perl allow memcached command injection via unfiltered session ids in HTTP::Session::Store::CHI. The session id from the client's cookie reaches the CHI cache unchanged. The sibling HTTP::Session::Store::Memcached rejects ids that contain control characters, but the CHI store has no such check, and CHI does not escape keys for its memcached drivers. With a memcached driver, a CR and LF in the session id end the cache command early, and the server reads the bytes after them as further commands. | ||||
| CVE-2026-123655 | 1 Moodle | 1 Moodle | 2026-11-06 | 7.5 High |
| A flaw was found in Moodle. Insufficient access control checks on H5P content files allow unauthenticated remote attackers to view restricted materials, including content stored in the system context and files belonging to hidden or unavailable course modules. This issue results in unauthorized information disclosure of protected content. | ||||
| CVE-2026-122222 | 2026-11-06 | 6.4 Medium | ||
| The Permalink Manager Lite plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'slug' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 2.6.1 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with author-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. An Author-level attacker can submit a percent-encoded HTML/JavaScript payload as a post slug via the REST API, which survives sanitization intact and executes in an administrator's browser session when the URI Editor admin page is loaded. | ||||
| CVE-2026-120843 | 2026-11-06 | 6.5 Medium | ||
| Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Barn2 Plugins Posts Table with Search & Sort posts-data-table allows Stored XSS.This issue affects Posts Table with Search & Sort: from n/a through 1.4.14. | ||||
| CVE-2026-120671 | 2026-11-06 | 6.4 Medium | ||
| The UsersWP – Front-end login form, User Registration, User Profile & Members Directory plugin for WP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'badge' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.80 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. The exploit is particularly effective against higher-privileged users — such as editors and administrators — who preview a Contributor's pending post containing the malicious shortcode. | ||||
| CVE-2026-120550 | 2 Wordpress-extensions, Wpusermanager | 2 Wp User Manager, Wp User Manager | 2026-11-06 | 6.4 Medium |
| The WP User Manager – Registration Form, Login Form, User Profile Builder & Member Directory plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'name (REST users endpoint) -> wp_users.display_name' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 2.10.2 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. The payload is stored via the WordPress core REST endpoint POST /wp-json/wp/v2/users/me, which bypasses the plugin's own wpum_sanitize_text sanitizer applied on its front-end account form, making the save-time sanitization ineffective as a mitigation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-120035 | 2026-11-06 | 5.4 Medium | ||
| The RSS Aggregator by Feedzy – Feed to Post, Autoblogging, News & YouTube Video Feeds Aggregator plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'item_title (parsed from feed <item><title>)' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 5.2.13 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. This requires an administrator to have previously configured a Feed-to-Post import pointing at an attacker-controlled feed URL, after which the attacker can rotate payloads at will without any further interaction with the site. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119627 | 1 Gitea | 1 Gitea | 2026-11-06 | 4.3 Medium |
| The web profile and RSS/Atom feed routes of users and organizations checked only whether a signed-in viewer could see a limited-visibility owner, without considering the `public-only` restriction of the personal access token used to authenticate. Any user holding a public-only token could send it over HTTP Basic authentication to read the profile and activity feed of limited-visibility users and organizations, which are hidden from anonymous visitors and refused on the equivalent API routes. The disclosure covers existence, profile metadata and public activity; it does not grant write access. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119625 | 1 Gitea | 1 Gitea | 2026-11-06 | 4.3 Medium |
| The `/{username}` web route accepted personal access tokens over HTTP Basic authentication without checking their scope. A token confined to an unrelated scope, such as `read:issue`, could read its owner's private activity through the user RSS/Atom feed and the profile activity tab, and other members' activity in a private organization through the organization feed; a public-only token could list the owner's private repositories and organizations and render private profile READMEs. For a site administrator's token this applied to every account. Tokens are now accepted on this route only for feeds, which require `read:user` or `read:organization`. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119521 | 2 Cozmoslabs, Wordpress-extensions | 2 Paid Member Subscriptions, Paid Member Subscriptions | 2026-11-06 | 6.5 Medium |
| Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Cozmoslabs Paid Member Subscriptions paid-member-subscriptions allows Stored XSS.This issue affects Paid Member Subscriptions: from n/a through 3.1.3. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119488 | 2 Shamim Rajani, Wordpress-extensions | 2 Pie Register, Pie Register | 2026-11-06 | 7.1 High |
| Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Shamim Rajani Pie Register pie-register allows Stored XSS.This issue affects Pie Register: from n/a through 3.8.4.15. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119472 | 2 Davidanderson, Wordpress-extensions | 2 Redux Framework, Redux Framework | 2026-11-06 | 6.5 Medium |
| Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in David Anderson Redux Framework redux-framework allows Stored XSS.This issue affects Redux Framework: from n/a through 4.5.16. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119211 | 2026-11-06 | 4.9 Medium | ||
| The AAA Autoload Optimizer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'option_page' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 1.7.0 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. Exploitation requires the plugin's Option Tracking setting to be configured to 'Legacy' mode, and succeeds despite WordPress ultimately returning HTTP 403 to the low-privileged caller because the vulnerable 'all' filter fires before the capability check in wp-admin/options.php. | ||||