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Mon, 31 Aug 2026 22:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
Tornadoweb
Tornadoweb tornado |
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| Vendors & Products |
Tornadoweb
Tornadoweb tornado |
Mon, 31 Aug 2026 21:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Tornado is a Python web framework and asynchronous networking library. Prior to 6.5.8, Tornado parses application/x-www-form-urlencoded request bodies with urllib.parse.parse_qs in tornado/escape.py without passing max_num_fields. RequestHandler._execute in tornado/web.py parses the body before handler dispatch through HTTPServerRequest._parse_body and parse_body_arguments in tornado/httputil.py, so an unauthenticated request body containing millions of separator-delimited fields can synchronously stall the single-threaded event loop and delay every connection. The body is bounded only by max_buffer_size, which defaults to 104857600 bytes. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.8. | |
| Title | Tornado: Urlencoded body parsing omits max_num_fields, so one request can stall the event loop | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-1284 CWE-400 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-31T21:28:13.958Z
Reserved: 2026-08-28T22:00:43.512Z
Link: CVE-2026-82397
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-08-31T22:17:22.920
Modified: 2026-08-31T22:17:22.920
Link: CVE-2026-82397
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-08-31T22:30:06Z