Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of current_key on reconnect to another peer
tcp_inbound_ao_hash() is called before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken,
with only rcu_read_lock() held. On the fast path for established
sockets, if the rnext_keyid sent by the peer differs from
current_key->sndid, the key the peer asked for is looked up and stored
in current_key. The lookup is inside the RCU read side, but current_key
outlives it.
When the socket is disconnected and connect() is called again for
another peer, tcp_ao_connect_init() unlinks every key that does not
match the new peer and frees it with call_rcu(). If current_key points
at such a key, it is cleared to NULL.
The fast path reads sk_state only once on entry, so a softirq that got
into it while the socket was still established can update current_key
after that loop has already run. The update is inside the RCU read side,
so it comes before the call_rcu() callback, and once the callback frees
the key, current_key is left pointing at freed memory.
The next transmission picks that pointer up in tcp_get_current_key().
tcp_ao_transmit_skb() then reads the traffic key from the freed object,
which is the use-after-free.
Wait for one grace period before unlinking, and only if a key is going
to be removed. By the time tcp_connect() runs the socket is already in
TCP_SYN_SENT, and TCP_AO_ESTABLISHED does not contain TCPF_SYN_SENT, so
a softirq entering after the wait cannot reach the fast path, and the
ones already in it have finished. The existing NULL handling in the loop
is then enough.
net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of current_key on reconnect to another peer
tcp_inbound_ao_hash() is called before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken,
with only rcu_read_lock() held. On the fast path for established
sockets, if the rnext_keyid sent by the peer differs from
current_key->sndid, the key the peer asked for is looked up and stored
in current_key. The lookup is inside the RCU read side, but current_key
outlives it.
When the socket is disconnected and connect() is called again for
another peer, tcp_ao_connect_init() unlinks every key that does not
match the new peer and frees it with call_rcu(). If current_key points
at such a key, it is cleared to NULL.
The fast path reads sk_state only once on entry, so a softirq that got
into it while the socket was still established can update current_key
after that loop has already run. The update is inside the RCU read side,
so it comes before the call_rcu() callback, and once the callback frees
the key, current_key is left pointing at freed memory.
The next transmission picks that pointer up in tcp_get_current_key().
tcp_ao_transmit_skb() then reads the traffic key from the freed object,
which is the use-after-free.
Wait for one grace period before unlinking, and only if a key is going
to be removed. By the time tcp_connect() runs the socket is already in
TCP_SYN_SENT, and TCP_AO_ESTABLISHED does not contain TCPF_SYN_SENT, so
a softirq entering after the wait cannot reach the fast path, and the
ones already in it have finished. The existing NULL handling in the loop
is then enough.
Published:
2026-09-04
Score:
n/a
EPSS:
n/a
KEV:
No
Impact:
n/a
Action:
n/a
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Remediation
No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.
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Tracking
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Advisories
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References
History
Fri, 04 Sep 2026 16:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of current_key on reconnect to another peer tcp_inbound_ao_hash() is called before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken, with only rcu_read_lock() held. On the fast path for established sockets, if the rnext_keyid sent by the peer differs from current_key->sndid, the key the peer asked for is looked up and stored in current_key. The lookup is inside the RCU read side, but current_key outlives it. When the socket is disconnected and connect() is called again for another peer, tcp_ao_connect_init() unlinks every key that does not match the new peer and frees it with call_rcu(). If current_key points at such a key, it is cleared to NULL. The fast path reads sk_state only once on entry, so a softirq that got into it while the socket was still established can update current_key after that loop has already run. The update is inside the RCU read side, so it comes before the call_rcu() callback, and once the callback frees the key, current_key is left pointing at freed memory. The next transmission picks that pointer up in tcp_get_current_key(). tcp_ao_transmit_skb() then reads the traffic key from the freed object, which is the use-after-free. Wait for one grace period before unlinking, and only if a key is going to be removed. By the time tcp_connect() runs the socket is already in TCP_SYN_SENT, and TCP_AO_ESTABLISHED does not contain TCPF_SYN_SENT, so a softirq entering after the wait cannot reach the fast path, and the ones already in it have finished. The existing NULL handling in the loop is then enough. | |
| Title | net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of current_key on reconnect to another peer | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-04T15:54:59.412Z
Reserved: 2026-08-26T14:34:25.797Z
Link: CVE-2026-80849
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-04T16:18:13.683
Modified: 2026-09-04T16:18:13.683
Link: CVE-2026-80849
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.