Description
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.126 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates webhook_url when a job request is parsed and again when the internal Job object is constructed. That validation blocks direct loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network request. When a job completes, _send_webhook() passes the original hostname to httpx.AsyncClient.post() with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded transport. An attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during Pydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata infrastructure during webhook delivery. This bypasses the intended SSRF guard in current supported releases. This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59.
Published: 2026-10-23
Score: 7.2 High
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
AI Analysis

Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.

Remediation

No vendor fix or workaround currently provided.

Additional remediation guidance may be available on OpenCVE Cloud.

Tracking

Sign in to view the affected projects.

Advisories
Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-rjvw-7vvw-549v PraisonAI: Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding
History

Thu, 29 Oct 2026 14:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Fri, 23 Oct 2026 14:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Mervinpraison
Mervinpraison praisonai
Vendors & Products Mervinpraison
Mervinpraison praisonai

Fri, 23 Oct 2026 12:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.126 to before version 4.6.59, PraisonAI's Async Jobs API validates webhook_url when a job request is parsed and again when the internal Job object is constructed. That validation blocks direct loopback/private targets, but it is not bound to the later network request. When a job completes, _send_webhook() passes the original hostname to httpx.AsyncClient.post() with no send-time validation, IP pinning, or guarded transport. An attacker-controlled hostname can therefore resolve to a public IP during Pydantic validation and later resolve to loopback/private/cloud-metadata infrastructure during webhook delivery. This bypasses the intended SSRF guard in current supported releases. This appears to be an incomplete fix / patch bypass for GHSA-8frj-8q3m-xhgm. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59.
Title PraisonAI: Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding
Weaknesses CWE-367
CWE-918
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N'}


Subscriptions

Mervinpraison Praisonai
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-10-29T13:09:28.257Z

Reserved: 2026-06-24T00:33:17.706Z

Link: CVE-2026-57114

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-10-29T13:09:18.400Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Deferred

Published: 2026-10-23T13:17:10.533

Modified: 2026-10-29T14:17:57.487

Link: CVE-2026-57114

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-10-23T14:15:06Z

Weaknesses
  • CWE-367

    Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

  • CWE-918

    Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)