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Search Results (22833 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-80636 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: conntrack: revert ct extension genid infrastructure This infrastructure is not used anymore after moving ct timeout and helper to use datapath refcount to track object use. Revert commit c56716c69ce1 ("netfilter: extensions: introduce extension genid count") this patch disables all ct extensions (leading to NULL) for unconfirmed conntracks, when this is only targeted at ct helper and ct timeout. There is also codebase that dereferences the ct extension without checking for NULL which could lead to crash. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80641 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wlcore: enable the right set of ciphers The firmware version number check for IGTK introduced in commit c34dbc5900b0 ("wifi: wlcore: Add support for IGTK key") lets the amount of ciphers decrease on every boot of a too old firmware and that is practically happening. It also does not take into account other chips than the wl18xx. On some wl128x, the following can be observed when connecting via nm to a common ap: [ 484.113311] wlcore: WARNING could not set keys [ 484.117828] wlcore: ERROR Could not add or replace key [ 484.123016] wlan0: failed to set key (5, ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) to hardware (-5) [ 484.123046] wlcore: Hardware recovery in progress. FW ver: Rev 7.3.10.0.142 [ 484.139923] wlcore: pc: 0x0, hint_sts: 0x00000048 count: 1 [ 484.145721] wlcore: down [ 484.148986] ieee80211 phy0: Hardware restart was requested [ 484.610473] wlcore: firmware booted (Rev 7.3.10.0.142) [ 484.633758] wlcore: Association completed. [ 484.690490] wlcore: ERROR command execute failure 14 [ 484.690490] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 484.700195] WARNING: drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/main.c:872 at wl12xx_queue_recovery_work+0x64/0x74 [wlcore], CPU#0: kworker/0:0/892 This repeats endlessly. Always disable IGTK on wl12xx and fix the decrementing mess. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80658 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/rockchip: dw_dp: Fix null-ptr-deref in dw_dp_remove() Attempting to access driver data in the platform driver ->remove() callback may lead to a null pointer dereference since there is no guaranty that the component ->bind() callback invoking platform_set_drvdata() was executed. A common scenario is when Rockchip DRM driver didn't manage to run component_bind_all() because of an (unrelated) error causing early return from rockchip_drm_bind(). Drop the unnecessary call to platform_get_drvdata() and, instead, reference the target device structure via platform_device. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80715 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: igc: remove napi_synchronize() in igc_down() When an AF_XDP zero-copy application is killed abruptly, the XSK pool is torn down but NAPI keeps polling. igc_clean_rx_irq_zc() then returns the full budget on every poll, so napi_complete_done() never clears NAPI_STATE_SCHED. igc_down() calls napi_synchronize() before napi_disable(), so it spins forever waiting for that bit and the interface never goes down. Drop the napi_synchronize() and let napi_disable() do the job -- it sets NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, which forces the stuck poll to complete. Reorder it ahead of igc_set_queue_napi() so the NAPI mapping is cleared only after polling has stopped, matching the recent igb fix b1e067240379. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80697 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: ensure valid f_path for page cache sharing Previously, backing files for page cache sharing were set up with f_path left as NULL (only f_inode was valid). It worked, but a recent mincore fix relies on f_path.mnt and crashes (found by "erofs/028" on 7.2-rc4): BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 675528 Comm: fincore Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4-00002-g[]-dirty #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.16.0-4.al8 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__do_sys_mincore+0xc0/0x2c0 ... Specify valid paths using valid disconnected dentries together with erofs_ishare_mnt instead of leaving f_path empty, so they are more like real backing files in a pseudo filesystem and standard backing_file_open() can be used directly. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80567 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - propagate F54 worker errors to V4L2 queue Previously, rmi_f54_buffer_queue() waited for the worker thread to finish but ignored whether it succeeded. If the worker failed (e.g., due to a timeout or register read failure), the queue thread would silently return success, delivering stale or uninitialized memory to userspace. Add a 'report_error' field to struct f54_data to store the worker's exit status. Check this field in rmi_f54_buffer_queue() after the worker finishes, and mark the buffer as VB2_BUF_STATE_ERROR if an error occurred. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80571 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/pseries: papr-phy-attest - validate cmd.length, plug mem leak In papr_phy_attest_create_handle(), the params->cmd.length is not validated before use, which can result in a buffer overlow. Check it and return -EINVAL if it is either 0 or exceeds sizeof(params->cmd). Also, params is freed on the success path but not error. Free it on errors after memory allocation. And free it on negative fd. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80575 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space cs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect straight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without requiring it to hold anything: work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic->custom_data, periodic->custom_len, sizeof(s16)); work_data.custom_len = periodic->custom_len; The driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the waveform bank in cs40l50_effect_bank_set(), and custom_data[1] as the index within the bank in cs40l50_effect_index_set(). Neither read is covered by a length check, and custom_len is fully user controlled: - custom_len == 0 makes memdup_array_user() call memdup_user() with a length of zero, which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR rather than an error, so custom_data[0] dereferences it. - custom_len == 1 allocates two bytes. A bank of ROM or RAM keeps effect->type out of the OWT case, and custom_data[1] is then read one word past the allocation. The bank value itself is also mishandled. It is masked with CS40L50_CUSTOM_DATA_MASK (0xffff) but stored in an s16, so a custom_data[0] of 0x8000 or above wraps to a negative value that passes the "bank_type >= CS40L50_WVFRM_BANK_NUM" test. cs40l50_effect_index_set() indexes vib->dsp.banks[] with it before the switch statement's default case gets a chance to reject it: base_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].base_index; max_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].max_index; Require the two words the driver reads to be present, and hold the masked bank in a u32 so the existing upper-bound test covers the whole range. The da7280 haptic driver already range checks custom_len this way. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80579 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: clear fb_info->mode before deleting a videomode fb_set_var() can delete a mode from info->modelist when userspace passes FB_ACTIVATE_INV_MODE through FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO. The code checks that the mode being deleted is not the current info->var and that fbcon is not using it, but it does not check fb_info->mode. fb_info->mode may still point into the modelist entry being deleted. If the entry is freed, later mode sysfs reads through show_mode() can dereference a stale pointer. Clear fb_info->mode before calling fb_delete_videomode() when it matches the mode being removed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80582 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/shmem_helper: Check VMA boundaries for PMD mappings In the ->huge_fault handler do not install a PMD huge page mapping if the huge page exceeds the boundaries of the VMA. All other ->huge_fault handlers have similar checks and the resulting mapping will trigger a VM_BUG_ON_VMA() if it ever reaches copy_pmd_range(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-80587 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: avoid combining some incoming suboptions Some MPTCP suboptions are mutually exclusive according to the RFC8684, but also because in different places, the code doesn't expect some combinations to be present. That's specially true for suboptions that would be present twice, but with different attributes. The new restrictions are the same as the ones applied on the output side, with mptcp_write_options. The same rules can be reused with a small fix: an MP_FASTCLOSE can be used with a DSS when the sender picks this option [1], which is not the case on Linux. Here are the rules: Which options can be used together? X: mutually exclusive O: often used together C: can be used together in some cases P: could be used together but we prefer not to (optimisations) | Opt: | MPC | MPJ | DSS | ADD | RM | PRIO | FAIL | FC | |------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| | MPC |------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| | MPJ | X |------|------|------|------|------|------|------| | DSS | X | X |------|------|------|------|------|------| | ADD | X | X | P |------|------|------|------|------| | RM | C | C | C | P |------|------|------|------| | PRIO | X | C | C | C | C |------|------|------| | FAIL | X | X | C | X | X | X |------|------| | FC | X | X | P | X | X | X | X |------| | RST | X | X | X | X | X | X | O | O | |------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| The only difference is with the 'P': another stack could send and ADD_ADDR with other suboptions (DSS, RM_ADDR), and this should be allowed. A few points of attention: - In theory, an MP_CAPABLE could be used with a RM_ADDR, but there is no reason to add it with a SYN. Note that even with a 4th ACK, it doesn't seem to be useful, except when IDs are known in advance via another channel. Better not to break that. - Now, combining both an MP_CAPABLE and an MP_JOIN will no longer result to a reject of the two options, but only the second suboption is ignored. That seems OK to do that for this unexpected error. At least now all inconsistent combinations are handled the same way. This could change later in next. This also means the explicit checks for having both MPC + MPJ in subflow.c will now be unreachable. That's fine, they will be removed in a follow-up patch. - In case of conflicting combinations, the extra suboption(s) is/are ignored: having such combinations either means the remote peer is buggy, or is evil. The simplest action is then taken in this case: stop processing the current suboption. - In mp_opt->suboptions, there is also a bit reserved to the checksum, which can be used in an MP_CAPABLE and a DSS. Each time a DSS option can be used in parallel with another option, the checksum can be set, so the verification is combined into a new OPTIONS_MPTCP_DSS macro. - An MP_CAPABLE ACK can carry a Data-Level Length, and an optional Checksum: they are the same as the ones found in a DSS, because a DSS cannot be used in parallel to an MP_CAPABLE. Similarly, even if there is room, a DSS cannot be used with an MP_JOIN. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80539 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: disallow multiple FENCE chunks in one submit amdgpu_cs_pass1() dispatches on chunk_id once per chunk without rejecting repeated ids. p->uf_bo is a single-slot field, so a submission carrying two AMDGPU_CHUNK_ID_FENCE chunks runs amdgpu_cs_p1_user_fence() twice, and the second run overwrites p->uf_bo with a freshly referenced BO without dropping the reference taken by the first. amdgpu_cs_parser_fini() only unrefs the final p->uf_bo, so every FENCE chunk but the last leaks a BO reference. The leaked BO outlives handle close and process exit. Reject duplicate FENCE chunks the same way commit fec5f8e8c6bc ("drm/amdgpu: disallow multiple BO_HANDLES chunks in one submit") did for p->bo_list. (cherry picked from commit 665b1fc2a1845206408f9a2c6da67101789edb82) | ||||
| CVE-2026-80540 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fix UVD decode image min size calculation This needs to use pitch instead of width. Also reject pitch over 4096 to avoid overflow. (cherry picked from commit b41c8cb12e202b220353332ab87dc01a11f69304) | ||||
| CVE-2026-80541 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: validate GEM_CREATE domain combinations AMDGPU_GEM_CREATE checked domain bits against AMDGPU_GEM_DOMAIN_MASK, but did not validate domain combinations. Userspace could combine CPU|GTT|VRAM with DOORBELL, GDS, GWS, or OA, making amdgpu_bo_placement_from_domain() exceed AMDGPU_BO_MAX_PLACEMENTS and hit BUG_ON(). Allow combinations only within CPU/GTT/VRAM, and require non-CPU/GTT/ VRAM domains to be specified one at a time. Return -EINVAL for invalid combinations in amdgpu_gem_create_ioctl(). v2: Rename helper from amdgpu_gem_domain_valid() to amdgpu_gem_are_domains_valid() (Christian) (cherry picked from commit db39852d0c39843cb02048dfb47e4b8c703e9080) | ||||
| CVE-2026-80643 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: EDAC/igen6: Fix call trace due to missing release() When unloading the igen6_edac driver, there is a call trace: Device '(null)' does not have a release() function, it is broken and must be fixed. See Documentation/core-api/kobject.rst. WARNING: drivers/base/core.c:2567 at device_release+0x84/0x90, CPU#5: rmmod/127209 ... RIP: 0010:device_release+0x84/0x90 Call Trace: <TASK> kobject_put+0x8c/0x220 put_device+0x17/0x30 igen6_unregister_mcis+0xa2/0xe0 [igen6_edac] igen6_remove+0x82/0xb0 [igen6_edac] ... Fix the call trace by providing empty release() functions for the memory controller devices. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80551 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 9.3 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/vfio_ccw: Ensure first IDAW remains constant The first IDAW in a list does not need to be on a 2K/4K boundary like all others, and so is read separately to accurately calculate the size of the buffer needed to read the full IDAL. Verify that the address found in the first IDAW is unchanged between reads, to ensure a consistent set of IDAWs being worked with. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80554 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 9.3 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/vfio_ccw: Limit the number of channel program segments The processing of channel programs, and the CCWs within them, is done recursively. As such, there is an arbitrary (but not architectural) limit to the number of CCWs that can exist in a single channel program. The vfio-ccw logic breaks these channel programs into segments whenever it encounters a Transfer-In-Channel (TIC) CCW, and the combined number of segments count towards the global limit. Impose an equivalent limit to the number of segments until such logic can be made non-recursive. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80563 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: sloppy-logic-analyzer: fix use-after-free via debugfs trigger on unbind The "trigger" debugfs file has a hand-rolled ->write handler (trigger_write()) that dereferences the per-device gpio_la_poll_priv. The file is created with debugfs_create_file_unsafe(), and the handler never takes a debugfs reference. Nothing keeps the object alive while the handler runs. priv is allocated with devm_kzalloc(). devres frees it when the platform device is unbound. debugfs_create_file_unsafe() installs no full_proxy wrapper, so debugfs_remove_recursive() in gpio_la_poll_remove() does not wait for an in-flight trigger_write(). The blob_lock taken there does not help, because trigger_write() never takes it. A write that races an unbind therefore writes into freed memory: trigger_write() gpio_la_poll_remove() priv = m->private buf = memdup_user() [may sleep] mutex_lock(&priv->blob_lock) debugfs_remove_recursive() [no wait] mutex_unlock(&priv->blob_lock) (remove returns; devres frees priv) priv->trig_data = buf <-- use-after-free write priv->trig_len = count The race is reachable by root via /sys/bus/platform/drivers/gpio-sloppy-logic-analyzer/unbind. Create "trigger" with debugfs_create_file() instead. Its full_proxy wrapper makes debugfs_remove_recursive() drain any in-flight ->write before it returns. The use-after-free is confirmed under KASAN with a minimal reproducer of the same debugfs_create_file_unsafe() plus devm_kzalloc() pattern (available on request); it produces a slab-use-after-free write in the handler. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80566 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: hynitron_cstxxx - validate touch count and finger IDs The driver allocates max_touch_num input slots, which are indexed from zero through max_touch_num - 1. The current check allows a finger ID equal to max_touch_num to reach cst3xx_report_contact(). While the input core ignores out-of-range slot indices, reporting touch data without a valid slot change corrupts the touch state of the previously active slot. The touch count is read from the controller's report and is used to index the fixed-size report buffer without first checking its range. Reject counts larger than the supported number of touch slots before checking the trailing byte or parsing touch data. Reject finger IDs equal to or greater than max_touch_num, and return immediately when an invalid finger ID is encountered so that corrupt touch frames are discarded instead of reporting partial contact state. The V821 Avaota F1 board configures the vendor driver with one touch slot, so finger ID 1 is already invalid on that device. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80569 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-28 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F54 report size to the allocated buffer rmi_f54_work() reads a diagnostics report from the device into f54->report_data, sizing the transfer with rmi_f54_get_report_size(): report_size = rmi_f54_get_report_size(f54); ... for (i = 0; i < report_size; i += F54_REPORT_DATA_SIZE) { int size = min(F54_REPORT_DATA_SIZE, report_size - i); ... rmi_read_block(.., f54->report_data + i, size); } report_data is allocated once at probe from F54's own electrode counts (array3_size(f54->num_tx_electrodes, f54->num_rx_electrodes, sizeof(u16))), but rmi_f54_get_report_size() computes the size from drv_data->num_*_electrodes when those are set, i.e. from the F55 function's electrode counts. Both counts come straight from device queries (F54 and F55 each report up to 255 electrodes) and nothing constrains the F55 counts to the F54 ones. A malicious or malfunctioning RMI4 device that reports larger F55 electrode counts than its F54 counts makes report_size exceed the allocation, so the read loop writes past report_data (and the V4L2 dequeue memcpy() then reads past it). On conforming hardware the F55 configured electrodes are a subset of the F54 physical electrodes, so report_size never exceeds the buffer and well-behaved devices are unaffected. Record the allocation size and reject a report that does not fit, mirroring the existing zero-size check. | ||||