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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-68431 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate minimum PDU size for transform requests The receive path applies the minimum SMB2 PDU size check only when ProtocolId is SMB2_PROTO_NUMBER. A packet carrying SMB2_TRANSFORM_PROTO_NUM bypasses the check even when the negotiated dialect does not provide transform handling. On an SMB 2.1 connection, a short transform packet therefore reaches init_smb2_rsp_hdr(), which interprets the request as a full SMB2 header and reads beyond the request allocation. The copied fields can then be returned to the unauthenticated client. Compression transforms are converted to ordinary SMB2 messages before protocol validation. After that conversion, validate ordinary SMB2 requests against SMB2_MIN_SUPPORTED_PDU_SIZE and require encryption transform requests to contain both a transform header and an SMB2 header. This rejects truncated requests before work allocation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68279 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 5.0 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/dp/mst: fix OOB reads in remote DPCD/I2C sideband reply parsers drm_dp_sideband_parse_remote_dpcd_read() reads num_bytes from the raw message and then unconditionally does: memcpy(bytes, &raw->msg[idx], num_bytes); without checking that idx + num_bytes <= raw->curlen. raw->msg[] is 256 bytes; if a malicious or misbehaving MST hub sets num_bytes larger than the remaining payload, the memcpy reads past the received data into whatever follows in raw->msg[]. drm_dp_sideband_parse_remote_i2c_read_ack() has the same flaw (noted with a /* TODO check */ comment since the code was introduced). Fix both functions by using a single combined check (idx + num_bytes > curlen) before each memcpy. Since num_bytes is u8, it is always >= 0, so this strictly subsumes the simpler idx > curlen form and no separate step is needed. [added missing fixes tag] | ||||
| CVE-2026-68278 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 6.0 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/dp/mst: fix buffer overflows in sideband chunk accumulation drm_dp_sideband_append_payload() has three related bugs when processing device-provided sideband reply data: 1. Zero-length curchunk_len underflow: msg_len is a 6-bit field taken directly from the DP sideband header. If a device sends msg_len=0, curchunk_len is set to zero. The condition (curchunk_idx >= curchunk_len) is immediately true, and curchunk_len-1 wraps to 255 (u8 underflow). drm_dp_msg_data_crc4() reads 255 bytes from chunk[48], then memcpy() writes 255 bytes into msg[], both far out of bounds. 2. chunk[48] overflow: curchunk_len can reach 63 (6-bit field). chunk[] is only 48 bytes. Multi-iteration payload assembly appends 16-byte blocks until curchunk_idx reaches curchunk_len, writing up to 15 bytes past the end of chunk[] into msg[]. 3. msg[256] overflow: each chunk contributes (curchunk_len-1) bytes to msg[]. No check ensures curlen + (curchunk_len-1) stays within msg[256], so the memcpy can spill into adjacent struct fields. All three are reachable from any DP MST device that can forge sideband reply messages on a physical connection. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68277 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/dp/mst: fix OOB reads on 2-byte fields in sideband reply parsers Three sideband reply parsers read 16-bit fields as: val = (raw->msg[idx] << 8) | (raw->msg[idx+1]); and check bounds only after the fact. When idx == raw->curlen, raw->msg[idx+1] reads one byte past the received message data into the following struct fields (curchunk_len, curchunk_idx, curlen). Affected functions: - drm_dp_sideband_parse_enum_path_resources_ack() full_payload_bw_number and avail_payload_bw_number fields - drm_dp_sideband_parse_allocate_payload_ack() allocated_pbn field - drm_dp_sideband_parse_query_payload_ack() allocated_pbn field Fix by using a single combined check (idx + 2 > curlen) before each 2-byte read. Since the check is strictly tighter than idx > curlen, no separate step is needed. [added fixes tag] | ||||
| CVE-2026-68255 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 7.7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the device-supplied resp->size field, never against the fixed-size resp->edid array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size together with a high block count and read far past the array into adjacent kernel memory, which is then surfaced in the parsed EDID (an out-of-bounds read / info leak). Also reject any read whose end exceeds the size of the edid array. Conforming EDID responses stay within the array and are unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68100 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl set_ntacl_dacl() copies each ACE from the attacker-controlled stored security descriptor verbatim into the response DACL without checking sid.num_subauth. The ACE bytes (including an unchecked num_subauth) originate from an authenticated SMB2_SET_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) that is stored raw via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(); parse_dacl() rejects a bad ACE with `break` rather than an error, so parse_sec_desc() still returns success and the malformed SD reaches the xattr intact. On a subsequent SMB2_QUERY_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) for an inode carrying a POSIX access ACL, build_sec_desc() -> set_ntacl_dacl() -> set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() walks the copied ACEs and reads ntace->sid.sub_auth[ntace->sid.num_subauth - 1] with num_subauth taken straight from the stored SD. Since sub_auth[] is fixed at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15), a crafted num_subauth (e.g. 255) drives an out-of-bounds heap read of ~1 KB with an offset fully controlled by an authenticated client. The sibling functions already gate this field: parse_dacl() -- num_subauth == 0 || > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES parse_sid() -- num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES smb_copy_sid() -- min_t(u8, num_subauth, SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES) set_ntacl_dacl() is the lone inconsistent path that omits the check. Add the same num_subauth validation in set_ntacl_dacl() before copying the ACE, matching the gate already enforced by parse_dacl(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68099 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 5.9 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid malformed ACL check_add_overflow() unconditionally writes the truncated sum into *d even on overflow, per its contract in include/linux/overflow.h. The four check_add_overflow() guards in set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() and set_ntacl_dacl() break out of the ACE-building loops on overflow, but the truncated *size is then consumed downstream at the end of set_ntacl_dacl(): pndacl->size = cpu_to_le16(le16_to_cpu(pndacl->size) + size); This produces an on-wire NT ACL whose pndacl->size under-reports the bytes actually written by the preceding fill_ace_for_sid()/memcpy() calls, yielding a malformed ACL that can trigger out-of-bounds reads when re-parsed by clients or ksmbd itself. Restore *size to its pre-addition value on each overflow branch (via `*size -= ace_sz` / `size -= nt_ace_size`) so that after the break, *size once again holds the cumulative size of the successfully-written ACEs. The committed ACL is then truncated-but-self-consistent rather than malformed. The ksmbd DACL builders are the only check_add_overflow() sites found where an overflow path breaks out of a loop and the destination value is consumed afterward. The other nearby break-style cases either return -EINVAL on overflow (transport_ipc.c) or break without consuming the overflowed destination value afterward (buildid.c). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68082 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers() decode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds reads: 1. ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads 4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count. The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant. 2. ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct influence over the lock type field. Fix both by replacing bare operations with their safe variants: ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers, err_inval) ceph_decode_8(p) -> ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type, err_free_lockers) The goto targets differ intentionally: err_inval: is a new label returning -EINVAL directly. It is used for the pre-allocation failure path where *lockers is not yet allocated and must not be passed to ceph_free_lockers(). err_free_lockers: is the existing label. It is used for the post-allocation failure path where *lockers is allocated and must be freed. ret is set to -EINVAL before ceph_decode_8_safe() so that err_free_lockers returns the correct error code on bounds violation. Without this, err_free_lockers would return a stale ret value (0 from the successful decode_locker() loop), silently swallowing the error. -EINVAL is correct for both failure paths. The data received from the OSD is structurally malformed. -ENOMEM would misrepresent the failure class to callers and to stable@ backporters triaging error paths. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition). [ idryomov: trim changelog, formatting ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-64280 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fpga: dfl-afu: validate DMA mapping length in afu_dma_map_region() afu_ioctl_dma_map() accepts a 64-bit length from userspace via DFL_FPGA_PORT_DMA_MAP ioctl without an upper bound check. The value is passed to afu_dma_pin_pages() where npages is derived as length >> PAGE_SHIFT and passed to pin_user_pages_fast() which takes int nr_pages, causing implicit truncation if length is very large. Validate map.length at the ioctl entry point before calling afu_dma_map_region(), rejecting values whose page count exceeds INT_MAX. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64272 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: mms114 - fix touch indexing for MMS134S and MMS136 The MMS134S and MMS136 touch controllers have an event size of 6 bytes rather than 8 bytes. When __mms114_read_reg() reads the touch data packet from the device into the touch buffer, the events are packed tightly at 6-byte intervals. However, the driver iterates through the events using standard C array indexing (touch[index]), where each element is sizeof(struct mms114_touch) (8 bytes) apart. As a result, any touch events beyond the first one are read from incorrect offsets and parsed improperly. Fix this by explicitly calculating the byte offset for each touch event based on the device's specific event size. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64269 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdma_write_sg When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor: plist->length = le32_to_cpu(id->rd_msg->desc[0].len); rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -> process_io_req() -> process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this change, was only rejected when zero. The source address is the fixed chunk start (dma_addr[msg_id]) and the source lkey is the PD-wide local_dma_lkey, which is not tied to the chunk's MR mapping, so the verbs layer does not constrain the transfer length to max_chunk_size. msg_id and off are bounded against queue_depth and max_chunk_size in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(), but desc[0].len is a separate field that was not checked against the chunk size. A peer that advertises desc[0].len larger than max_chunk_size can make the posted RDMA write read past the chunk's mapped region. The resulting behaviour depends on the IOMMU configuration: with no IOMMU or in passthrough mode the read may extend into memory adjacent to the chunk and be returned to the peer, which can disclose host memory; with a translating IOMMU the out-of-range access is expected to fault and abort the connection. In either case the transfer exceeds what the protocol permits and is driven by a remote peer. Reject a descriptor length above max_chunk_size, mirroring the existing off >= max_chunk_size bound in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(). Legitimate clients do not exceed it: the client sets desc[0].len to its MR length, which is capped at the negotiated max_io_size (max_chunk_size - MAX_HDR_SIZE). | ||||
| CVE-2024-38620 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: HCI: Remove HCI_AMP support Since BT_HS has been remove HCI_AMP controllers no longer has any use so remove it along with the capability of creating AMP controllers. Since we no longer need to differentiate between AMP and Primary controllers, as only HCI_PRIMARY is left, this also remove hdev->dev_type altogether. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74679 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_ncm: Use unsigned int for ndp_index The variable ndp_index is declared as a signed integer, but it stores the return value of get_ncm(), which is unsigned. A malicious host can supply a large offset that overflows the signed ndp_index, making it negative. Because ndp_index is compared against unsigned bounds, this negative value bypasses sanity checks and leads to an out-of-bounds read when calculating the address of the NDP block (ntb_ptr + ndp_index). Fix this by changing ndp_index to unsigned int to ensure consistent unsigned comparisons throughout the function. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45852 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Fix double free in rxe_srq_from_init In rxe_srq_from_init(), the queue pointer 'q' is assigned to 'srq->rq.queue' before copying the SRQ number to user space. If copy_to_user() fails, the function calls rxe_queue_cleanup() to free the queue, but leaves the now-invalid pointer in 'srq->rq.queue'. The caller of rxe_srq_from_init() (rxe_create_srq) eventually calls rxe_srq_cleanup() upon receiving the error, which triggers a second rxe_queue_cleanup() on the same memory, leading to a double free. The call trace looks like this: kmem_cache_free+0x.../0x... rxe_queue_cleanup+0x1a/0x30 [rdma_rxe] rxe_srq_cleanup+0x42/0x60 [rdma_rxe] rxe_elem_release+0x31/0x70 [rdma_rxe] rxe_create_srq+0x12b/0x1a0 [rdma_rxe] ib_create_srq_user+0x9a/0x150 [ib_core] Fix this by moving 'srq->rq.queue = q' after copy_to_user. | ||||
| CVE-2026-28896 | 1 Apple | 1 Macos | 2026-08-22 | 7.7 High |
| The issue was addressed with improved memory handling. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.4 and iPadOS 26.4, macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.4, tvOS 26.4, visionOS 26.4, watchOS 26.4. An attacker may be able to cause unexpected system termination or read kernel memory. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65795 | 1 Microsoft | 21 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 18 more | 2026-08-22 | 6.7 Medium |
| Relative path traversal in Windows DNS allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72149 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: tegra: Fix burst size calculation Currently, the Tegra GPC DMA hardware requires the transfer length to be a multiple of the max burst size configured for the channel. When a client requests a transfer where the length is not evenly divisible by the configured max burst size, the DMA hangs with partial burst at the end. Fix this by reducing the burst size to the largest power-of-2 value that evenly divides the transfer length. For example, a 40-byte transfer with a 16-byte max burst will now use an 8-byte burst (40 / 8 = 5 complete bursts) instead of causing a hang. This issue was observed with the PL011 UART driver where TX DMA transfers of arbitrary lengths were stuck. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72156 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fpga: microchip-spi: fix zero header_size OOB read in mpf_ops_parse_header() mpf_ops_parse_header() reads header_size from the bitstream at MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET (24). When header_size is zero, the expression *(buf + header_size - 1) reads one byte before the buffer start. Since initial_header_size is set to 71 in mpf_ops, the fpga-mgr core guarantees the buffer is large enough to reach MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET. The only real gap is the zero header_size case, which cannot be resolved by providing a larger buffer, so return -EINVAL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72165 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: rawnand: fix condition in 'nand_select_target()' 'cs' here must be in range [0:nanddev_ntargets[. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72204 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-22 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: centalize $INDEX_ROOT header validation Add a dedicated helper to perform stricter validation of $INDEX_ROOT and use it for both directory inodes and named index inodes. This keeps the root size and header geometry checks consistent across both read paths. | ||||