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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-80603 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-29 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conntrack_irc: fix parse_dcc() off-by-one OOB read parse_dcc() treats data_end as an inclusive end pointer, but its only caller passes data_limit = ib_ptr + datalen, which points one past the last valid byte. The newline search loop iterates while tmp <= data_end, so when no newline is present, *tmp is read at tmp == data_end, one byte beyond the region filled by skb_header_pointer(). irc_buffer is kmalloc'd as MAX_SEARCH_SIZE + 1 bytes and datalen is capped at MAX_SEARCH_SIZE, so the stray read does not fault. The byte is uninitialized or stale; if it contains an ASCII digit, simple_strtoul will consume it and produce a wrong DCC IP or port in the conntrack expectation. The extra allocation byte is also a fragile guard: if the cap or allocation size changes, this becomes a real out-of-bounds read. Change the loop and its post-loop check to use strict less-than, consistent with the caller's exclusive-end convention. Update the function comment accordingly. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80674 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-29 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator A base inode's $ATTRIBUTE_LIST is sanity-checked by load_attribute_list() only on the non-resident path; ntfs_read_locked_inode() copies a *resident* attribute list into ni->attr_list with a plain memcpy() and no validation at all. Every subsequent walk of ni->attr_list -- ntfs_external_attr_find(), ntfs_inode_attach_all_extents() and ntfs_attrlist_need() -- then trusts the entries are well-formed and reads attr_list_entry fixed-header fields (lowest_vcn at offset 8, mft_reference at offset 16, and the name) with bounds that assume validation already happened. A crafted resident attribute list therefore reaches those walks unvalidated and can drive out-of-bounds reads of the attribute-list buffer. load_attribute_list() itself reads ale->name_offset (offset 7), ale->mft_reference (offset 16) and the name length under only an "al < al_start + size" bound, so its own validation loop can over-read the fixed header of a truncated trailing entry by a few bytes. Factor the per-entry validation into ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid(), which requires each entry's fixed header (offsetof(struct attr_list_entry, name)) to be in range before any field is dereferenced, that ale->length is a multiple of 8 covering the fixed header plus the name, and that the entry is in use and carries a live MFT reference. ntfs_attr_list_is_valid() walks the buffer with it and checks the entries tile it exactly. Use the list validator in load_attribute_list() (replacing the open-coded loop, closing its own over-read) and on the resident path in ntfs_read_locked_inode() (which previously skipped validation entirely); patches 2/3 reuse the per-entry helper at the other two attribute-list walks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80604 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-29 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: core: Fix OOB read in hid_get_report for numbered reports When a caller passes a size of 0 to hid_report_raw_event() for a numbered report, the function originally called hid_get_report() before performing any size validation. Inside hid_get_report(), if the report is numbered (report_enum->numbered is true), it unconditionally dereferences data[0] to extract the report ID. With a size of 0, this results in an out-of-bounds read or kernel panic. Fix this by moving the numbered report size validation check before the call to hid_get_report(), ensuring that size is at least 1 before dereferencing the data pointer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80609 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-29 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: qede: fix out-of-bounds check for cqe->len_list[] Move index check before element access. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80696 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-29 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (ltc4282) Fix reading the minimum alarm voltage Coverity reports an out-of-bounds access when reading the minimum alarm voltage for the VGPIO channel. Add the missing return statement to fix the problem. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80662 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-29 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl: Fix CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to match RAS Capability size The CXL r4.0 8.2.4.17.7 RAS Capability Structure has total length 0x58 bytes (CXL_RAS_CAPABILITY_LENGTH); the Header Log occupies the trailing 64 bytes at offset 0x18. CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE was defined as SZ_512, eight times the actual on-device size. header_log_copy() reads CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (128) dwords from the RAS capability iomap, overrunning the 88-byte mapping by 448 bytes. The cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event memcpy()s CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE (512) bytes from its source. For the CPER caller the source is struct cxl_ras_capability_regs::header_log[16] (64 bytes) embedded in a stack-local cxl_cper_prot_err_work_data, so the memcpy reads 448 bytes of kernel stack into the trace event ring buffer where userspace can read it via tracefs. Set CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE to 64 and derive CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 from it, bringing all iomap readers into agreement on 16 dwords. Userspace tools such as rasdaemon have grown a dependency on the buggy 512-byte (128 u32) header_log layout in the cxl_aer_uncorrectable_error trace event. Add CXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32 = 128 and use it for the trace event __array and its memcpy to preserve that ABI. Both callers now pass a zero-filled u32[CXL_HEADERLOG_TRACE_SIZE_U32] staging buffer with only the first CXL_HEADERLOG_SIZE_U32 (16) entries populated from hardware; the remaining 112 u32s are zero-padded, keeping the 512-byte trace ring buffer layout intact. [ dj: Replaced 64 with SZ_64 per RichardC ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-80709 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-29 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/zcrypt: Fix wrong domain value verification with EP11 CPRBs There is a wrong upper limit check for the domain value when an EP11 CPRB is processed for sending to a crypto card. This check is only active on custom device nodes but may lead to access heap memory behind perms->adm when an administrative CPRB is sent. Add correct limit (AP_DOMAINS = 256) checking to fix this. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80672 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-29 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: fix u16 truncation of restart-area length check ntfs_check_restart_area() validates that the $LogFile restart area and its trailing log client record array fit within the system page size: u16 ra_ofs, ra_len, ca_ofs; ... ra_len = ca_ofs + le16_to_cpu(ra->log_clients) * sizeof(struct log_client_record); if (ra_ofs + ra_len > le32_to_cpu(rp->system_page_size) || ...) return false; ra_len is u16, but the right-hand side is computed in size_t (sizeof(struct log_client_record) == 160). Both ca_ofs and log_clients come straight from the on-disk restart area. With an on-disk log_clients of 410 the product 410 * 160 = 65600; adding ca_ofs and storing into the u16 ra_len truncates modulo 65536 (e.g. ca_ofs 64 gives ra_len 128), so the "fits in the page" check passes even though the client array described by log_clients extends far beyond the page. ntfs_check_log_client_array() then walks the array bounded only by the on-disk log_clients count: cr = ca + idx; if (cr->prev_client != LOGFILE_NO_CLIENT) ... For log_clients 410 it dereferences records up to ca + 409 * 160, ~64 KiB past the kvzalloc(system_page_size) restart-page buffer -- an out-of-bounds read of attacker-controlled extent, reachable when a crafted NTFS image is mounted (load_and_check_logfile() at mount time). This is the in-kernel analogue of CVE-2022-30789, fixed in the ntfs-3g userspace driver but never in this revived classic driver. Compute the restart-area length in a u32 so the existing bounds check rejects an over-large client array instead of being defeated by the truncation. Widen ra_ofs and ca_ofs to u32 as well: both are loaded from __le16 on-disk fields and every comparison already promotes to int/size_t, so this changes no result and keeps the declaration uniform. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80649 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-29 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_scmi: Fix OOB in scmi_power_name_get() scmi_power_name_get() does not validate the domain number passed by the external caller, which may lead to an out-of-bounds access. Fix this by returning "unknown" for invalid domains, like scmi_reset_name_get() does. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80670 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-29 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve() machine__resolve() accesses env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id after checking al->cpu >= 0 and env->cpu != NULL, but without validating al->cpu against env->nr_cpus_avail. Since al->cpu comes from the untrusted perf.data sample, a crafted file with a large CPU index causes an out-of-bounds heap read. Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() which validates both NULL and bounds. Also bounds-check al->cpu before the cast to struct perf_cpu (int16_t): without this, values like 65536 silently truncate to 0, bypassing the accessor's internal check and returning CPU 0's topology. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80673 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-29 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: bound the look-ahead attribute-list entry in ntfs_external_attr_find() When resolving an attribute lookup with a non-zero @lowest_vcn, ntfs_external_attr_find() peeks at the next $ATTRIBUTE_LIST entry to decide whether to keep searching, but bounds that not-yet-validated entry only with "(u8 *)next_al_entry + 6 < al_end" (which proves just bytes 0..6 are in range) and "(u8 *)next_al_entry + length <= al_end" with an attacker-controlled, non-8-aligned length. It then reads next_al_entry->lowest_vcn (an __le64 at offset 8) and the name at next_al_entry->name_offset, both of which can lie past al_end -- the exact end of the kvmalloc'd attribute-list buffer (allocated at the on-disk attr_list_size, no rounding). A crafted on-disk $ATTRIBUTE_LIST whose last entry sits a few bytes before al_end therefore yields a slab out-of-bounds read when the inode is read. Validate the look-ahead entry with ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid() (added in patch 1/3) before dereferencing lowest_vcn and the name, so the same fixed-header, length and name bounds the main attribute-list walk uses now guard this read too. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59317 | 1 Spring | 1 Spring For Apache Kafka | 2026-08-29 | 6.5 Medium |
| DeadLetterPublishingRecovererFactory reads the retry_topic-original-timestamp header from an inbound ConsumerRecord and passes its raw bytes directly to new BigInteger(header.value()) with no length or format validation. Spring for Apache Kafka 4.1.0 Spring for Apache Kafka 4.0.0 - 4.0.6 Spring for Apache Kafka 3.0.0 - 3.3.16 Spring for Apache Kafka 2.9.0 - 2.9.14 Spring for Apache Kafka 2.8.12 and earlier | ||||
| CVE-2026-81532 | 1 Mongodb | 1 Bi Connector Odbc Driver | 2026-08-29 | 8.8 High |
| A user able to submit SQL through an application using the MongoDB Connector for BI ODBC driver can supply a positioned-cursor statement whose cursor name exceeds the size of an internal fixed-length buffer. Because the name length is not bounded before the driver builds its diagnostic message, memory adjacent to that buffer is overwritten with user-supplied content. This can terminate the hosting application process and may allow unintended code to run within it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81533 | 1 Mongodb | 1 Bi Connector Odbc Driver | 2026-08-29 | 7.1 High |
| An application using the MongoDB BI Connector ODBC Driver may encounter a memory-safety issue when a submitted SQL statement contains an unusually long run of digits following a LIMIT clause. The issue occurs only on connections where the driver's optional prefetch setting is enabled, and stems from the driver copying the digit sequence into a fixed-size internal buffer without checking its length. A user able to influence the numeric portion of a LIMIT clause could cause the hosting application process to terminate unexpectedly or corrupt adjacent memory in that process. | ||||
| CVE-2026-79241 | 1 Google | 1 Chrome | 2026-08-29 | 6.5 Medium |
| Out of bounds read in GPU in Google Chrome on on Android prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker to read memory outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) | ||||
| CVE-2026-56136 | 1 Tuxera | 1 Ntfs-3g | 2026-08-28 | 4.7 Medium |
| In NTFS-3G through 2026.2.25, an out-of-bounds read exists in ntfs_ir_nill() in libntfs-3g/index.c that allows an attacker to read possibly confidential information in an ntfs-3g process by crafting a malicious NTFS image. This read operation is triggered by creation of a file with a crafted name. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68513 | 2026-08-28 | 7.1 High | ||
| OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. Versions 3.3.0 through 3.3.12 and 3.4.0 through 3.4.13 contain a heap buffer overflow in PyOpenEXR triggered by a channel-name key collision between literal and prefixed RGB channels. When separate_channels=false, PyOpenEXR maps each physical channel name through channelNameToRGBA() and coalesces the results into a shared RGB array. A crafted flat scanline EXR that contains both a literal channel such as left and prefixed channels such as left.R, left.G, and left.B causes these names to collide, so the wrapper reuses an undersized two-dimensional NumPy array for the coalesced RGB slices and writes out of bounds when OpenEXR.File(path) decodes the pixels. This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.13 and 3.4.14. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59981 | 2026-08-28 | 7.1 High | ||
| OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image file format, widely used in the motion picture industry. In versions through 3.2.10, 3.3.0 through 3.3.12, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.13, the OpenEXRUtil library returns an out-of-bounds pointer from the SampleCountChannel::row() API when a deep image has a non-zero dataWindow origin. The row() accessor is documented as 0-based and computes its address from an internal base that is offset for absolute pixel coordinates, so the two coordinate models conflict whenever dataWindow.min is non-zero. For a deep image whose data window has a large negative vertical origin, row(0) points far outside the allocated sample-count buffer. An application that opens an attacker-controlled deep EXR file and accesses sample counts through row() performs an out-of-bounds read, which can crash the process or, under a controlled heap layout, return adjacent heap memory as sample-count values. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.11, 3.3.13, and 3.4.14. | ||||
| CVE-2026-75368 | 2026-08-28 | 7.5 High | ||
| A stack overflow in the loadRawData function of SpaceDot AcubeSAT OBC software commit eaf90ec allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted ECSS TC message. | ||||
| CVE-2026-75369 | 2026-08-28 | 7.1 High | ||
| An out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the CAN::Application::parsePerformFunctionMessage component of SpaceDot AcubeSAT OBC software commit eaf90ec allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted CAN message. | ||||