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Search Results (3 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-82454 | 1 Omnivore-app | 1 Omnivore | 2026-08-29 | 9.1 Critical |
| The Omnivore API (packages/api) before the fix in commit abf53d6 contains an authentication bypass in Apple sign-in token verification. The decodeAppleToken function extracted the 'alg' field from the attacker-supplied JWT header and passed it as the sole allowed algorithm to jwt.verify(). Using jsonwebtoken v8 (which does not validate key/algorithm compatibility), an attacker can set alg=HS256 and sign a forged token using Apple's publicly available RSA public key as the HMAC secret, bypassing signature verification and impersonating any Apple-linked account. | ||||
| CVE-2026-77066 | 1 Omnivore-app | 1 Omnivore | 2026-08-21 | 5 Medium |
| The scanFeedsResolver in packages/api/src/resolvers/subscriptions/index.ts passes the caller-supplied url straight to axios.get(url, rssParserConfig()) with no address validation. The same file guards the subscribe path with validateUrl(), which rejects private and reserved ranges through the private-ip library, and createPageSaveRequest applies the same check, so the omission is specific to this resolver. An authenticated user can direct the server to request arbitrary internal endpoints. The response is parsed as a feed or as HTML and the resolver returns the resulting url, title, description and type fields, so disclosure is limited to feed-shaped metadata and to link elements advertising RSS or Atom feeds; requests that do not parse still distinguish reachable ports from unreachable ones through the resulting error. | ||||
| CVE-2026-77067 | 1 Omnivore-app | 1 Omnivore | 2026-08-21 | 5 Medium |
| The setWebhookResolver in packages/api/src/resolvers/webhooks/index.ts stores the caller-supplied url without any address validation, and the file imports no validation helper. When a subscribed event fires, callWebhook in packages/api/src/jobs/call_webhook.ts issues axios.request with that url, the method and Content-Type recorded on the webhook, and a JSON body carrying the event data, so an authenticated user can make the server send repeated attacker-shaped requests to internal endpoints, including link-local metadata addresses. The request is blind: callWebhook discards the result and writes only a success line or the axios error to the server log, so the response is not returned through the API. | ||||
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