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Search Results (4 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-68507 | 1 3xpyth0n | 1 Ideon | 2026-11-13 | N/A |
| ideon is a self-hosted visual workspace. Prior to version 0.9.5, ideon's link-preview endpoint requires no authentication at all and forwards any URL a caller supplies straight into a server-side fetch. The app does have a general-purpose SSRF guard (safeFetch/validateSafeUrl in src/app/lib/ssrf.ts), but this route sits behind no login check whatsoever, making it a fully open, anonymous URL-fetch relay - and the guard's IP blocklist itself has a gap that lets it reach the server's own loopback interface via the 0.0.0.0 "any address" bypass, a well-documented SSRF-filter evasion technique on Linux. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.5. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65965 | 1 3xpyth0n | 1 Ideon | 2026-11-13 | N/A |
| ideon is a self-hosted visual workspace. Prior to version 0.9.4, several project mutation endpoints under /api/projects/[id]/* resolve the caller's project role but never enforce it, so a user who was granted only the read-only viewer role on a project can perform write operations on that project. The most severe is POST /api/projects/[id]/graph, which deletes every block and link in the project and re-inserts client-supplied ones. A viewer can silently rewrite or wipe the entire canvas of a project they were invited to read. The application clearly intends viewer to be read-only: the collaborators endpoint, the automation endpoints, and the realtime Yjs sync path all reject write attempts from viewers. These specific HTTP handlers simply omit the guard their siblings enforce. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.4. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65968 | 1 3xpyth0n | 1 Ideon | 2026-11-13 | N/A |
| ideon is a self-hosted visual workspace. Prior to version 0.9.4, validateUrlForSSRF() / safeFetch() in lib/oauth/ssrf-protection.ts (and the parallel validateMcpUrl() in lib/security/validators.ts) perform SSRF host-blocking by string/regex matching on new URL(url).hostname. Their IPv6 branch only recognises the textual forms ::1, fe80:/fc00:/fd00: prefixes, and the dotted-decimal IPv4-mapped form ::ffff:127.x. It does not recognise the WHATWG-canonical IPv4-mapped-IPv6 host that Node emits for a mapped address, which is hex-compressed and bracket-wrapped: [::ffff:7f00:1] for 127.0.0.1, [::ffff:a9fe:a9fe] for 169.254.169.254. An authenticated user who registers a STREAMABLE_HTTP / SSE MCP server with URL http://[::ffff:7f00:1]:PORT/ (loopback) or http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]/ (cloud metadata) passes both guards, and the server-side OAuth-discovery action then fetches that host, yielding server-side request forgery to loopback and to the cloud metadata service. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.4. | ||||
| CVE-2026-103980 | 1 3xpyth0n | 1 Ideon | 2026-11-12 | N/A |
| ideon is a self-hosted visual workspace. Prior to version 0.9.6, the SSRF protection in safeFetch is bypassed by IPv6 transition addresses that embed private IPv4 addresses. The isPrivateIP function in src/app/lib/ssrf.ts checks only a narrow set of IPv6 ranges (loopback ::1, ULA fc/fd, link-local fe80) but does not recognize IPv4-mapped (::ffff:), NAT64 well-known (64:ff9b::/96, RFC 6052), NAT64 local-use (64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215), 6to4 (2002::/16, RFC 3056), or Teredo (2001::/32, RFC 4380) encodings. An authenticated user can supply these addresses in link URLs to reach cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), localhost services, and RFC 1918 internal networks through the link preview metadata fetcher. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.6. | ||||
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