| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu: disable SVA when CONFIG_X86 is set
Patch series "Fix stale IOTLB entries for kernel address space", v7.
This proposes a fix for a security vulnerability related to IOMMU Shared
Virtual Addressing (SVA). In an SVA context, an IOMMU can cache kernel
page table entries. When a kernel page table page is freed and
reallocated for another purpose, the IOMMU might still hold stale,
incorrect entries. This can be exploited to cause a use-after-free or
write-after-free condition, potentially leading to privilege escalation or
data corruption.
This solution introduces a deferred freeing mechanism for kernel page
table pages, which provides a safe window to notify the IOMMU to
invalidate its caches before the page is reused.
This patch (of 8):
In the IOMMU Shared Virtual Addressing (SVA) context, the IOMMU hardware
shares and walks the CPU's page tables. The x86 architecture maps the
kernel's virtual address space into the upper portion of every process's
page table. Consequently, in an SVA context, the IOMMU hardware can walk
and cache kernel page table entries.
The Linux kernel currently lacks a notification mechanism for kernel page
table changes, specifically when page table pages are freed and reused.
The IOMMU driver is only notified of changes to user virtual address
mappings. This can cause the IOMMU's internal caches to retain stale
entries for kernel VA.
Use-After-Free (UAF) and Write-After-Free (WAF) conditions arise when
kernel page table pages are freed and later reallocated. The IOMMU could
misinterpret the new data as valid page table entries. The IOMMU might
then walk into attacker-controlled memory, leading to arbitrary physical
memory DMA access or privilege escalation. This is also a
Write-After-Free issue, as the IOMMU will potentially continue to write
Accessed and Dirty bits to the freed memory while attempting to walk the
stale page tables.
Currently, SVA contexts are unprivileged and cannot access kernel
mappings. However, the IOMMU will still walk kernel-only page tables all
the way down to the leaf entries, where it realizes the mapping is for the
kernel and errors out. This means the IOMMU still caches these
intermediate page table entries, making the described vulnerability a real
concern.
Disable SVA on x86 architecture until the IOMMU can receive notification
to flush the paging cache before freeing the CPU kernel page table pages. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: lkkbd - disable pending work before freeing device
lkkbd_interrupt() schedules lk->tq via schedule_work(), and the work
handler lkkbd_reinit() dereferences the lkkbd structure and its
serio/input_dev fields.
lkkbd_disconnect() and error paths in lkkbd_connect() free the lkkbd
structure without preventing the reinit work from being queued again
until serio_close() returns. This can allow the work handler to run
after the structure has been freed, leading to a potential use-after-free.
Use disable_work_sync() instead of cancel_work_sync() to ensure the
reinit work cannot be re-queued, and call it both in lkkbd_disconnect()
and in lkkbd_connect() error paths after serio_open(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: alps - fix use-after-free bugs caused by dev3_register_work
The dev3_register_work delayed work item is initialized within
alps_reconnect() and scheduled upon receipt of the first bare
PS/2 packet from an external PS/2 device connected to the ALPS
touchpad. During device detachment, the original implementation
calls flush_workqueue() in psmouse_disconnect() to ensure
completion of dev3_register_work. However, the flush_workqueue()
in psmouse_disconnect() only blocks and waits for work items that
were already queued to the workqueue prior to its invocation. Any
work items submitted after flush_workqueue() is called are not
included in the set of tasks that the flush operation awaits.
This means that after flush_workqueue() has finished executing,
the dev3_register_work could still be scheduled. Although the
psmouse state is set to PSMOUSE_CMD_MODE in psmouse_disconnect(),
the scheduling of dev3_register_work remains unaffected.
The race condition can occur as follows:
CPU 0 (cleanup path) | CPU 1 (delayed work)
psmouse_disconnect() |
psmouse_set_state() |
flush_workqueue() | alps_report_bare_ps2_packet()
alps_disconnect() | psmouse_queue_work()
kfree(priv); // FREE | alps_register_bare_ps2_mouse()
| priv = container_of(work...); // USE
| priv->dev3 // USE
Add disable_delayed_work_sync() in alps_disconnect() to ensure
that dev3_register_work is properly canceled and prevented from
executing after the alps_data structure has been deallocated.
This bug is identified by static analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ptp: ocp: fix use-after-free bugs causing by ptp_ocp_watchdog
The ptp_ocp_detach() only shuts down the watchdog timer if it is
pending. However, if the timer handler is already running, the
timer_delete_sync() is not called. This leads to race conditions
where the devlink that contains the ptp_ocp is deallocated while
the timer handler is still accessing it, resulting in use-after-free
bugs. The following details one of the race scenarios.
(thread 1) | (thread 2)
ptp_ocp_remove() |
ptp_ocp_detach() | ptp_ocp_watchdog()
if (timer_pending(&bp->watchdog))| bp = timer_container_of()
timer_delete_sync() |
|
devlink_free(devlink) //free |
| bp-> //use
Resolve this by unconditionally calling timer_delete_sync() to ensure
the timer is reliably deactivated, preventing any access after free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix UAF on smcsk after smc_listen_out()
BPF CI testing report a UAF issue:
[ 16.446633] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000003 0
[ 16.447134] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mod e
[ 16.447516] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present pag e
[ 16.447878] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 16.448063] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPT I
[ 16.448409] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G OE 6.13.0-rc3-g89e8a75fda73-dirty #4 2
[ 16.449124] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODUL E
[ 16.449502] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/201 4
[ 16.450201] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_wor k
[ 16.450531] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0
[ 16.452158] RSP: 0018:ffffb5ab40053d98 EFLAGS: 0001024 6
[ 16.452526] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000030 0
[ 16.452994] RDX: 0000000000000280 RSI: 00003513840053f0 RDI: 000000000000000 0
[ 16.453492] RBP: ffffa097808e3800 R08: ffffa09782dba1e0 R09: 000000000000000 5
[ 16.453987] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0978274640 0
[ 16.454497] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa09782d4092 0
[ 16.454996] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa097bbc00000(0000) knlGS:000000000000000 0
[ 16.455557] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003 3
[ 16.455961] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000102788004 CR4: 0000000000770ef 0
[ 16.456459] PKRU: 5555555 4
[ 16.456654] Call Trace :
[ 16.456832] <TASK >
[ 16.456989] ? __die+0x23/0x7 0
[ 16.457215] ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c 0
[ 16.457508] ? __lock_acquire+0x3e6/0x249 0
[ 16.457801] ? exc_page_fault+0x68/0x20 0
[ 16.458080] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x3 0
[ 16.458389] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0
[ 16.458689] ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159 0
[ 16.458987] ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x10 0
[ 16.459284] process_one_work+0x1ea/0x6d 0
[ 16.459570] worker_thread+0x1c3/0x38 0
[ 16.459839] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x1 0
[ 16.460144] kthread+0xe0/0x11 0
[ 16.460372] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0
[ 16.460640] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x5 0
[ 16.460896] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1 0
[ 16.461166] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x3 0
[ 16.461453] </TASK >
[ 16.461616] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE) ]
[ 16.462134] CR2: 000000000000003 0
[ 16.462380] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 16.462710] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x1590
The direct cause of this issue is that after smc_listen_out_connected(),
newclcsock->sk may be NULL since it will releases the smcsk. Therefore,
if the application closes the socket immediately after accept,
newclcsock->sk can be NULL. A possible execution order could be as
follows:
smc_listen_work | userspace
-----------------------------------------------------------------
lock_sock(sk) |
smc_listen_out_connected() |
| \- smc_listen_out |
| | \- release_sock |
| |- sk->sk_data_ready() |
| fd = accept();
| close(fd);
| \- socket->sk = NULL;
/* newclcsock->sk is NULL now */
SMC_STAT_SERV_SUCC_INC(sock_net(newclcsock->sk))
Since smc_listen_out_connected() will not fail, simply swapping the order
of the code can easily fix this issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf()
As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another
thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is
returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland
race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we
follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be
destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed
by its ->release()), we have a UAF.
dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install().
habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the
objects destroyed on close. In particular, it grabs an extra reference to
another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours;
that "will be" is actually "might have already been".
Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install()
only when everything had been set up. As a side benefit, we no longer
have the failure exit with file already created, but reference to
underlying file (as well as ->dmabuf_export_cnt, etc.) not grabbed yet;
unlike dma_buf_fd(), fd_install() can't fail. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen: fix UAF in dmabuf_exp_from_pages()
[dma_buf_fd() fixes; no preferences regarding the tree it goes through -
up to xen folks]
As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another
thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is
returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland
race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we
follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be
destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed
by its ->release()), we have a UAF.
dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install().
gntdev dmabuf_exp_from_pages() calls it and then proceeds to access the
objects destroyed on close - starting with gntdev_dmabuf itself.
Fix that by doing reserving descriptor before anything else and do
fd_install() only when everything had been set up. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/hns: Fix double destruction of rsv_qp
rsv_qp may be double destroyed in error flow, first in free_mr_init(),
and then in hns_roce_exit(). Fix it by moving the free_mr_init() call
into hns_roce_v2_init().
list_del corruption, ffff589732eb9b50->next is LIST_POISON1 (dead000000000100)
WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 1047115 at lib/list_debug.c:53 __list_del_entry_valid+0x148/0x240
...
Call trace:
__list_del_entry_valid+0x148/0x240
hns_roce_qp_remove+0x4c/0x3f0 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hns_roce_v2_destroy_qp_common+0x1dc/0x5f4 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hns_roce_v2_destroy_qp+0x22c/0x46c [hns_roce_hw_v2]
free_mr_exit+0x6c/0x120 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hns_roce_v2_exit+0x170/0x200 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hns_roce_exit+0x118/0x350 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
__hns_roce_hw_v2_init_instance+0x1c8/0x304 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hns_roce_hw_v2_reset_notify_init+0x170/0x21c [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hns_roce_hw_v2_reset_notify+0x6c/0x190 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
hclge_notify_roce_client+0x6c/0x160 [hclge]
hclge_reset_rebuild+0x150/0x5c0 [hclge]
hclge_reset+0x10c/0x140 [hclge]
hclge_reset_subtask+0x80/0x104 [hclge]
hclge_reset_service_task+0x168/0x3ac [hclge]
hclge_service_task+0x50/0x100 [hclge]
process_one_work+0x250/0x9a0
worker_thread+0x324/0x990
kthread+0x190/0x210
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: mcast: Fix use-after-free during router port configuration
The bridge maintains a global list of ports behind which a multicast
router resides. The list is consulted during forwarding to ensure
multicast packets are forwarded to these ports even if the ports are not
member in the matching MDB entry.
When per-VLAN multicast snooping is enabled, the per-port multicast
context is disabled on each port and the port is removed from the global
router port list:
# ip link add name br1 up type bridge vlan_filtering 1 mcast_snooping 1
# ip link add name dummy1 up master br1 type dummy
# ip link set dev dummy1 type bridge_slave mcast_router 2
$ bridge -d mdb show | grep router
router ports on br1: dummy1
# ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_vlan_snooping 1
$ bridge -d mdb show | grep router
However, the port can be re-added to the global list even when per-VLAN
multicast snooping is enabled:
# ip link set dev dummy1 type bridge_slave mcast_router 0
# ip link set dev dummy1 type bridge_slave mcast_router 2
$ bridge -d mdb show | grep router
router ports on br1: dummy1
Since commit 4b30ae9adb04 ("net: bridge: mcast: re-implement
br_multicast_{enable, disable}_port functions"), when per-VLAN multicast
snooping is enabled, multicast disablement on a port will disable the
per-{port, VLAN} multicast contexts and not the per-port one. As a
result, a port will remain in the global router port list even after it
is deleted. This will lead to a use-after-free [1] when the list is
traversed (when adding a new port to the list, for example):
# ip link del dev dummy1
# ip link add name dummy2 up master br1 type dummy
# ip link set dev dummy2 type bridge_slave mcast_router 2
Similarly, stale entries can also be found in the per-VLAN router port
list. When per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled, the per-{port, VLAN}
contexts are disabled on each port and the port is removed from the
per-VLAN router port list:
# ip link add name br1 up type bridge vlan_filtering 1 mcast_snooping 1 mcast_vlan_snooping 1
# ip link add name dummy1 up master br1 type dummy
# bridge vlan add vid 2 dev dummy1
# bridge vlan global set vid 2 dev br1 mcast_snooping 1
# bridge vlan set vid 2 dev dummy1 mcast_router 2
$ bridge vlan global show dev br1 vid 2 | grep router
router ports: dummy1
# ip link set dev br1 type bridge mcast_vlan_snooping 0
$ bridge vlan global show dev br1 vid 2 | grep router
However, the port can be re-added to the per-VLAN list even when
per-VLAN multicast snooping is disabled:
# bridge vlan set vid 2 dev dummy1 mcast_router 0
# bridge vlan set vid 2 dev dummy1 mcast_router 2
$ bridge vlan global show dev br1 vid 2 | grep router
router ports: dummy1
When the VLAN is deleted from the port, the per-{port, VLAN} multicast
context will not be disabled since multicast snooping is not enabled
on the VLAN. As a result, the port will remain in the per-VLAN router
port list even after it is no longer member in the VLAN. This will lead
to a use-after-free [2] when the list is traversed (when adding a new
port to the list, for example):
# ip link add name dummy2 up master br1 type dummy
# bridge vlan add vid 2 dev dummy2
# bridge vlan del vid 2 dev dummy1
# bridge vlan set vid 2 dev dummy2 mcast_router 2
Fix these issues by removing the port from the relevant (global or
per-VLAN) router port list in br_multicast_port_ctx_deinit(). The
function is invoked during port deletion with the per-port multicast
context and during VLAN deletion with the per-{port, VLAN} multicast
context.
Note that deleting the multicast router timer is not enough as it only
takes care of the temporary multicast router states (1 or 3) and not the
permanent one (2).
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in br_multicast_add_router.part.0+0x3f1/0x560
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888004a67328 by task ip/384
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: endpoint: pci-epf-test: Fix double free that causes kernel to oops
Fix a kernel oops found while testing the stm32_pcie Endpoint driver
with handling of PERST# deassertion:
During EP initialization, pci_epf_test_alloc_space() allocates all BARs,
which are further freed if epc_set_bar() fails (for instance, due to no
free inbound window).
However, when pci_epc_set_bar() fails, the error path:
pci_epc_set_bar() ->
pci_epf_free_space()
does not clear the previous assignment to epf_test->reg[bar].
Then, if the host reboots, the PERST# deassertion restarts the BAR
allocation sequence with the same allocation failure (no free inbound
window), creating a double free situation since epf_test->reg[bar] was
deallocated and is still non-NULL.
Thus, make sure that pci_epf_alloc_space() and pci_epf_free_space()
invocations are symmetric, and as such, set epf_test->reg[bar] to NULL
when memory is freed.
[kwilczynski: commit log] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: Fix UAF in __close_file_table_ids
A use-after-free is possible if one thread destroys the file
via __ksmbd_close_fd while another thread holds a reference to
it. The existing checks on fp->refcount are not sufficient to
prevent this.
The fix takes ft->lock around the section which removes the
file from the file table. This prevents two threads acquiring the
same file pointer via __close_file_table_ids, as well as the other
functions which retrieve a file from the IDR and which already use
this same lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpi3mr: Synchronous access b/w reset and tm thread for reply queue
When the task management thread processes reply queues while the reset
thread resets them, the task management thread accesses an invalid queue ID
(0xFFFF), set by the reset thread, which points to unallocated memory,
causing a crash.
Add flag 'io_admin_reset_sync' to synchronize access between the reset,
I/O, and admin threads. Before a reset, the reset handler sets this flag to
block I/O and admin processing threads. If any thread bypasses the initial
check, the reset thread waits up to 10 seconds for processing to finish. If
the wait exceeds 10 seconds, the controller is marked as unrecoverable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix UAF in decryption with multichannel
After commit f7025d861694 ("smb: client: allocate crypto only for
primary server") and commit b0abcd65ec54 ("smb: client: fix UAF in
async decryption"), the channels started reusing AEAD TFM from primary
channel to perform synchronous decryption, but that can't done as
there could be multiple cifsd threads (one per channel) simultaneously
accessing it to perform decryption.
This fixes the following KASAN splat when running fstest generic/249
with 'vers=3.1.1,multichannel,max_channels=4,seal' against Windows
Server 2022:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881046c18a0 by task cifsd/986
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 986 Comm: cifsd Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1 #1
PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41
04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
print_report+0x156/0x528
? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110
? __virt_addr_valid+0x145/0x300
? __phys_addr+0x46/0x90
? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110
kasan_report+0xdf/0x1a0
? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110
gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110
ghash_update+0x189/0x210
shash_ahash_update+0x295/0x370
? __pfx_shash_ahash_update+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_shash_ahash_update+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_extract_iter_to_sg+0x10/0x10
? ___kmalloc_large_node+0x10e/0x180
? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50
crypto_ahash_update+0x3c/0xc0
gcm_hash_assoc_remain_continue+0x93/0xc0
crypt_message+0xe09/0xec0 [cifs]
? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40
? __pfx_cifs_readv_from_socket+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
decrypt_raw_data+0x229/0x380 [cifs]
? __pfx_decrypt_raw_data+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? __pfx_cifs_read_iter_from_socket+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
smb3_receive_transform+0x837/0xc80 [cifs]
? __pfx_smb3_receive_transform+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_smb3_is_transform_hdr+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x692/0x1570 [cifs]
? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50
? rcu_lockdep_current_cpu_online+0x62/0xb0
? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x11/0x20
? local_clock_noinstr+0xd/0xd0
? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xa8/0xe0
? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
kthread+0x1fe/0x380
? kthread+0x10f/0x380
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
? local_clock_noinstr+0xd/0xd0
? ret_from_fork+0x1b/0x60
? local_clock+0x15/0x30
? lock_release+0x29b/0x390
? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x60
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ibmveth: make veth_pool_store stop hanging
v2:
- Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store
- Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text
Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself,
ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to
napi_disable.
Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through
writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily
with a little shell script. This causes a hang.
I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new
kernel. I ran this test again and saw:
Setting pool0/active to 0
Setting pool1/active to 1
[ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
Setting pool1/active to 1
Setting pool1/active to 0
[ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
[ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete
[ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting
[ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
[ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
[ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
[ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8
[ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000
[ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace:
[ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable)
[ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0
[ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0
[ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210
[ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50
[ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0
[ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60
[ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc
[ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270
[ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0
[ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0
[ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650
[ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150
[ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340
[ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
...
[ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system:
[ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123:
[ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248
[ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365:
[ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
[ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
[ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
[ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60
[ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366:
[ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
[ 243.
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix slab-use-after-free Read in l2cap_send_cmd
After the hci sync command releases l2cap_conn, the hci receive data work
queue references the released l2cap_conn when sending to the upper layer.
Add hci dev lock to the hci receive data work queue to synchronize the two.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in l2cap_send_cmd+0x187/0x8d0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:954
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880271a4000 by task kworker/u9:2/5837
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5837 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Workqueue: hci1 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602
l2cap_build_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:2964 [inline]
l2cap_send_cmd+0x187/0x8d0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:954
l2cap_sig_send_rej net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5502 [inline]
l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5538 [inline]
l2cap_recv_frame+0x221f/0x10db0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6817
hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3797 [inline]
hci_rx_work+0x508/0xdb0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4040
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa66/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Allocated by task 5837:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x243/0x390 mm/slub.c:4329
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:901 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1037 [inline]
l2cap_conn_add+0xa9/0x8e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6860
l2cap_connect_cfm+0x115/0x1090 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7239
hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2057 [inline]
hci_remote_features_evt+0x68e/0xac0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3726
hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7473 [inline]
hci_event_packet+0xac2/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7525
hci_rx_work+0x3f3/0xdb0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4035
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa66/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
Freed by task 54:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:582
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2353 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4613 [inline]
kfree+0x196/0x430 mm/slub.c:4761
l2cap_connect_cfm+0xcc/0x1090 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7235
hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2057 [inline]
hci_conn_failed+0x287/0x400 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1266
hci_abort_conn_sync+0x56c/0x11f0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5603
hci_cmd_sync_work+0x22b/0x400 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa66/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entr
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free in ksmbd_free_work_struct
->interim_entry of ksmbd_work could be deleted after oplock is freed.
We don't need to manage it with linked list. The interim request could be
immediately sent whenever a oplock break wait is needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: fix race between cancel_hw_scan and hw_scan completion
The rtwdev->scanning flag isn't protected by mutex originally, so
cancel_hw_scan can pass the condition, but suddenly hw_scan completion
unset the flag and calls ieee80211_scan_completed() that will free
local->hw_scan_req. Then, cancel_hw_scan raises null-ptr-deref and
use-after-free. Fix it by moving the check condition to where
protected by mutex.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000088-0x000000000000008f]
CPU: 2 PID: 6922 Comm: kworker/2:2 Tainted: G OE
Hardware name: LENOVO 2356AD1/2356AD1, BIOS G7ETB6WW (2.76 ) 09/10/2019
Workqueue: events cfg80211_conn_work [cfg80211]
RIP: 0010:rtw89_fw_h2c_scan_offload_be+0xc33/0x13c3 [rtw89_core]
Code: 00 45 89 6c 24 1c 0f 85 23 01 00 00 48 8b 85 20 ff ff ff 48 8d
RSP: 0018:ffff88811fd9f068 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88811fd9f258 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000011 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000089
RBP: ffff88811fd9f170 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff88811fd9f108 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88810e47f960
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881d6f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007531dfca55b0 CR3: 00000001be296004 CR4: 00000000001706e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x61/0x73
? __die_body+0x20/0x73
? die_addr+0x4f/0x7b
? exc_general_protection+0x191/0x1db
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30
? rtw89_fw_h2c_scan_offload_be+0xc33/0x13c3 [rtw89_core]
? rtw89_fw_h2c_scan_offload_be+0x458/0x13c3 [rtw89_core]
? __pfx_rtw89_fw_h2c_scan_offload_be+0x10/0x10 [rtw89_core]
? do_raw_spin_lock+0x75/0xdb
? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
rtw89_hw_scan_offload+0xb5e/0xbf7 [rtw89_core]
? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x24
? __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x40c/0x471
? __pfx_rtw89_hw_scan_offload+0x10/0x10 [rtw89_core]
? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x13/0x1f
? mutex_lock+0xa2/0xdc
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
rtw89_hw_scan_abort+0x58/0xb7 [rtw89_core]
rtw89_ops_cancel_hw_scan+0x120/0x13b [rtw89_core]
ieee80211_scan_cancel+0x468/0x4d0 [mac80211]
ieee80211_prep_connection+0x858/0x899 [mac80211]
ieee80211_mgd_auth+0xbea/0xdde [mac80211]
? __pfx_ieee80211_mgd_auth+0x10/0x10 [mac80211]
? cfg80211_find_elem+0x15/0x29 [cfg80211]
? is_bss+0x1b7/0x1d7 [cfg80211]
ieee80211_auth+0x18/0x27 [mac80211]
cfg80211_mlme_auth+0x3bb/0x3e7 [cfg80211]
cfg80211_conn_do_work+0x410/0xb81 [cfg80211]
? __pfx_cfg80211_conn_do_work+0x10/0x10 [cfg80211]
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x1f
? psi_group_change+0x8bc/0x944
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x22
? mutex_lock+0x8e/0xdc
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___radix_tree_lookup+0x10/0x10
cfg80211_conn_work+0x245/0x34d [cfg80211]
? __pfx_cfg80211_conn_work+0x10/0x10 [cfg80211]
? update_cfs_rq_load_avg+0x3bc/0x3d7
? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x1a
? sched_clock+0x10/0x24
? sched_clock_cpu+0x7e/0x42e
? newidle_balance+0x796/0x937
? __pfx_sched_clock_cpu+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_newidle_balance+0x10/0x10
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x1f
? psi_group_change+0x8bc/0x944
? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x24
? raw_spin_rq_unlock+0x47/0x54
? raw_spin_rq_unlock_irq+0x9/0x1f
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x347/0x586
? __schedule+0x27bf/0x2892
? mutex_unlock+0x80/0xd0
? do_raw_spin_lock+0x75/0xdb
? __pfx___schedule+0x10/0x10
process_scheduled_works+0x58c/0x821
worker_thread+0x4c7/0x586
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x1f
kthread+0x285/0x294
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x29/0x6f
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix implicit ODP use after free
Prevent double queueing of implicit ODP mr destroy work by using
__xa_cmpxchg() to make sure this is the only time we are destroying this
specific mr.
Without this change, we could try to invalidate this mr twice, which in
turn could result in queuing a MR work destroy twice, and eventually the
second work could execute after the MR was freed due to the first work,
causing a user after free and trace below.
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 12178 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x12b/0x130
Modules linked in: bonding ib_ipoib vfio_pci ip_gre geneve nf_tables ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 ipip tunnel4 ib_umad rdma_ucm mlx5_vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 mlx5_ib vfio ib_uverbs mlx5_core iptable_raw openvswitch nsh rpcrdma ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: ib_uverbs]
CPU: 2 PID: 12178 Comm: kworker/u20:5 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1_net_next_mlx5_58c644e #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound free_implicit_child_mr_work [mlx5_ib]
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x12b/0x130
Code: 48 c7 c7 38 95 2a 82 c6 05 bc c6 fe 00 01 e8 0c 66 aa ff 0f 0b 5b c3 48 c7 c7 e0 94 2a 82 c6 05 a7 c6 fe 00 01 e8 f5 65 aa ff <0f> 0b 5b c3 90 8b 07 3d 00 00 00 c0 74 12 83 f8 01 74 13 8d 50 ff
RSP: 0018:ffff8881008e3e40 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000027
RDX: ffff88852c91b5c8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88852c91b5c0
RBP: ffff8881dacd4e00 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 0000000000000019
R10: 000000000000072e R11: 0000000063666572 R12: ffff88812bfd9e00
R13: ffff8881c792d200 R14: ffff88810011c005 R15: ffff8881002099c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88852c900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f5694b5e000 CR3: 00000001153f6003 CR4: 0000000000370ea0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? refcount_warn_saturate+0x12b/0x130
free_implicit_child_mr_work+0x180/0x1b0 [mlx5_ib]
process_one_work+0x1cc/0x3c0
worker_thread+0x218/0x3c0
kthread+0xc6/0xf0
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix double free of TCP_Server_Info::hostname
When shutting down the server in cifs_put_tcp_session(), cifsd thread
might be reconnecting to multiple DFS targets before it realizes it
should exit the loop, so @server->hostname can't be freed as long as
cifsd thread isn't done. Otherwise the following can happen:
RIP: 0010:__slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
Code: 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 4c 89 de 4c 89 cf 44 89 44 24 08 4c 89
1c 24 e8 fb cf 8e 00 44 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 1c 24 e9 5f fe ff ff <0f>
0b 41 f7 45 08 00 0d 21 00 0f 85 2d ff ff ff e9 1f ff ff ff 80
RSP: 0018:ffffb26180dbfd08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffff8ea34728e510 RBX: ffff8ea34728e500 RCX: 0000000000800068
RDX: 0000000000800068 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ea340042400
RBP: ffffe112041ca380 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 6170732e31303000 R11: 70726f632e786563 R12: ffff8ea34728e500
R13: ffff8ea340042400 R14: ffff8ea34728e500 R15: 0000000000800068
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ea66fd80000(0000)
000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffc25376080 CR3: 000000012a2ba001 CR4:
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
? __reconnect_target_unlocked+0x3e/0x160 [cifs]
? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
? die+0x2b/0x50
? do_trap+0xce/0x120
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? __slab_free+0x223/0x3c0
? extract_hostname+0x5c/0xa0 [cifs]
? extract_hostname+0x5c/0xa0 [cifs]
? __kmalloc+0x4b/0x140
__reconnect_target_unlocked+0x3e/0x160 [cifs]
reconnect_dfs_server+0x145/0x430 [cifs]
cifs_handle_standard+0x1ad/0x1d0 [cifs]
cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x592/0x730 [cifs]
? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
kthread+0xdd/0x100
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: zynqmp_kms: Unplug DRM device before removal
Prevent userspace accesses to the DRM device from causing
use-after-frees by unplugging the device before we remove it. This
causes any further userspace accesses to result in an error without
further calls into this driver's internals. |
