| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| DBD::Pg version 3.21.0 for Perl has a heap out-of-bounds write in quote_float.
quote_float() allocates the length of the string + 1, which is the size of the bare numeric symbol plus NULL. But for special literals NaN, Inf, +Inf, -Inf, Infinity, +Infinity, -Infinity it emits the literal surrounded by quotes plus NULL, which is length + 3 bytes. Every recognised literal (case-insensitive) overflows by 2 bytes, a single quote and a NULL.
This can be reached by the $dbh->quote method, for example
$dbh->quote( "Infinity", DBI::SQL_NUMERIC ).
This regression was introduced in 3.21.0 by the quote.c rewrite. |
| OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. OpenEXR versions before 3.2.11, 3.3.0 through 3.3.12, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.13 can return an out-of-bounds pointer from TypedDeepImageChannel::row() when a crafted deep EXR has a nonzero dataWindow origin. This vulnerability occurs because the API combines zero-based row access with an absolute-coordinate-adjusted base pointer, allowing a crash or limited information disclosure. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.11, 3.3.13, and 3.4.14. |
| OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. Versions before 3.2.11, 3.3.0 through 3.3.12, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.13 allow a crafted EXR with a nonzero dataWindow.min to make TypedFlatImageChannel::row() return an invalid heap pointer, causing out-of-bounds or use-after-free writes. This occurs when an application writes rows through FlatHalfChannel::row(). Affected consumers are tools, converters, render pipeline components, or image-processing services that accept untrusted EXR files and use FlatHalfChannel::row() on loaded images. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.11, 3.3.13, and 3.4.14. |
| The virtio PCI driver (drivers/virtio/virtio_pci.c) parses a device's PCI capability list during driver initialization. In virtio_pci_read_cap() the device-supplied capability length byte cap_len (read from PCI config space via pcie_conf_read()) was only checked with assert(tmp.cap_len == cap_struct_size). That assert resolves to __ASSERT_NO_MSG(), gated by CONFIG_ASSERT, which defaults off in production builds, so the value reached the copy logic completely unvalidated.
The length then drives a loop that copies extra capability dwords into a fixed-size stack buffer supplied by the caller. A cap_len below the 24-byte base struct virtio_pci_cap underflows the unsigned extra_data_words count to a near-SIZE_MAX value, producing an effectively unbounded stack write; a cap_len above the caller's buffer (up to 255) writes up to roughly 228 bytes of device-controlled data past the buffer. Both are out-of-bounds writes of attacker-controlled content executed in kernel mode during boot-time device probe.
The input originates from the virtio device. In the common deployment where Zephyr runs as a guest under a hypervisor, the device backend is the host, which already fully outranks the guest, so the bug yields no privilege escalation. The exploitable case is a virtio device that is untrusted relative to the Zephyr kernel — an untrusted or physical/passthrough virtio PCIe device on a bare-metal system, or a confidential-computing posture where the guest must defend against the host — where a malicious device can corrupt the kernel stack and potentially achieve code execution or a crash.
The fix replaces the compiled-out assert with a runtime range check rejecting cap_len outside [sizeof(struct virtio_pci_cap), cap_struct_size] before any arithmetic or copy. |
| Substance3D - Sampler is affected by an out-of-bounds write vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. Exploitation of this issue requires user interaction in that a victim must open a malicious file. |
| OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. OpenEXR versions 3.1.0 through 3.2.10, 3.3.0 through 3.3.12, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.13 are vulnerable on ILP32 builds to an out-of-bounds write. When a crafted B44-compressed scanline EXR causes the logical scratch size to truncate before allocation and uncompress_b44_impl() writes using the attacker-controlled channel width, allowing denial of service and memory corruption. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.11, 3.3.13, and 3.4.14. |
| OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. In versions before 3.2.11, 3.3.0 through 3.3.12, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.13, a crafted tiled EXR can trigger a heap out-of-bounds write on 32-bit/ILP32 builds when read through the public TiledRgbaInputFile RGBA API. The file uses a small 40x40 dataWindow but a 65537x65537 tile size. On ILP32, the Array2D<Rgba> tile-conversion buffer size calculation overflows, allocates a much smaller heap buffer, and tile decode writes past that allocation. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.11, 3.3.13, and 3.4.14. |
| IBM AIX 7.2, and 7.3 and IBM PowerVM VIOS 4.1 could allow a local attacker to gain elevated privileges due to an out-of-bounds write. |
| An out-of-bounds (OOB) memory write flaw was found in the NFSD in the Linux kernel. Missing sanity may lead to a write beyond bmval[bmlen-1] in nfsd4_decode_bitmap4 in fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c. In this flaw, a local attacker with user privilege may gain access to out-of-bounds memory, leading to a system integrity and confidentiality threat. |
| There is a memory corruption vulnerability recently
discovered in NI LabVIEW that may result in information disclosure or arbitrary
code execution. Successful exploitation requires an attacker to get a
user to open a specially crafted VI. This vulnerability affects NI
LabVIEW 2026 Q3 (26.3.0) and prior versions. |
| OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. OpenEXR versions 3.3.0 through 3.3.12 and 3.4.0 through 3.4.13 are vulnerable to a heap out-of-bounds write when exrmetrics reads a crafted deep scanline EXR. This occurs with pixel conversion options such as --pixelmode float or --bench because DeepSlice requests FLOAT output while the backing sample buffers are allocated using the input HALF element size. The issue is fixed in versions 3.3.13 and 3.4.14. |
| There is a memory corruption vulnerability recently
discovered in NI LabVIEW that may result in information disclosure or arbitrary
code execution. Successful exploitation requires an attacker to get a
user to open a specially crafted VI. This vulnerability affects NI
LabVIEW 2026 Q3 (26.3.0) and prior versions. |
| Issue summary: OpenSSL CMS decryption sizes the key-unwrap output buffer based
on querying the unwrapped key size, but the AES-WRAP-PAD unwrap primitive
can write and cleanse more bytes than that query reports, causing an 8-byte
out-of-bounds heap write.
Impact summary: An attacker who supplies a crafted CMS message can trigger a
deterministic 8-byte out-of-bounds heap write when the victim decrypts it
with CMS_decrypt(), corrupting the heap and typically resulting in a Denial
of Service.
CWE: CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write
Description: The key-wrap OID is potentially attacker-controlled on the wire.
CMS unwrapping allows both id-aesNNN-wrap-pad and id-aesNNN-wrap ciphers.
An attacker can take a legitimate message and change a single OID byte to
select the padded variant while leaving the message otherwise valid. Since
the unwrap key is derived from the recipient's private operation (ECDH key
agreement or ML-KEM decapsulation), the RFC 5649 integrity check cannot
pass, and the decryption fails with integrity failure.
The write is a fixed-size (8-byte), fixed-value (zero) heap overflow
immediately past the allocation, requires no special configuration, and is
reachable from the public CMS_decrypt() function. The consequence is
a heap corruption leading to a Denial of Service. The fix in the CMS code
sizes the unwrap output buffer for the worst case so a failed unwrap cannot
write past the allocation.
FIPS impact: no
As the CMS code lives outside the FIPS module boundary, no FIPS
modules are affected by this CVE. |
| Missing minimum size validation in secure context allocation in FreeRTOS-Kernel before 11.3.1 might allow local users to corrupt secure-world heap metadata via an out-of-bounds write with an undersized stack size parameter. To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 11.3.1 or later. |
| hank-ai/darknet sizes a convolutional layer's weight and output heap buffers by multiplying configuration fields taken from a .cfg file in unchecked 32-bit int arithmetic. In src-lib/convolutional_layer.cpp, l.nweights is computed as (c / groups) * n * size * size and l.outputs as l.out_h * l.out_w * l.out_c, and both feed xcalloc directly. A .cfg whose true dimension product exceeds INT_MAX wraps to a small or zero value, so the allocation is undersized; for example width and height of 256 with filters of 65536 gives 2^32, which wraps to 0. forward_convolutional_layer then re-derives the GEMM dimensions with a different operand order, computing k as l.size*l.size*l.c / l.groups where the allocation divided before multiplying, and reads and writes through the undersized buffer. Loading the crafted .cfg for inference or training is sufficient and no valid .weights file is required. The reported proof of concept observed a heap buffer overflow read in gemm_nn_fast under AddressSanitizer and glibc allocator metadata corruption in a release build of the same input, indicating an out-of-bounds write. |
| Libevent is an event notification library. Prior to 2.1.13 and 2.2.2-alpha, libevent has an off-by-one stack buffer overflow in evdns.c when dnsname_to_labels formats a name-bearing DNS record at the end of the 64 KB stack buffer allocated by evdns_server_request_format_response. The final-label check permits j plus label_len plus one to equal buf_len, after which the terminating null byte is written to buf[buf_len]. A crafted DNS server response containing PTR, CNAME, MX, NS, or SOA data can trigger the one-byte out-of-bounds write and crash or corrupt the process. This issue is fixed in versions 2.1.13 and 2.2.2-alpha. |
| Nokogiri before 1.18.3 contains a stack buffer overflow vulnerability in libxml2 when reporting DTD validation errors with long QName prefixes, and a use-after-free vulnerability during validation against untrusted XML Schemas. Attackers can trigger these vulnerabilities by providing malicious DTD content or untrusted XSD files to cause denial of service or potential code execution. |
| OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. From version 3.4.0 through 3.4.13, a crafted HTJ2K-compressed EXR can crash OpenEXR during normal decode. An HTJ2K-compressed EXR whose JPEG 2000 SIZ fields place the first tile outside the visible image can reach invalid tile and codeblock geometry in the vendored OpenJPH AVX2 decoder, causing a stack out-of-bounds write and denial of service. OpenEXR's HTJ2K path validates the decoded codestream dimensions against the EXR chunk size, but it does not reject SIZ image-offset/tile-grid geometry where the first tile does not intersect the image. This issue is fixed in version 3.4.14. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write on Type II inbound URBs
data_ep_set_params() sizes each URB transfer buffer before it adds the
Format Type II transfer delimiter:
u->packets = urb_packs;
u->buffer_size = maxsize * u->packets;
if (fmt->fmt_type == UAC_FORMAT_TYPE_II)
u->packets++; /* for transfer delimiter */
u->urb = usb_alloc_urb(u->packets, GFP_KERNEL);
buffer_size is computed from the pre-increment packet count and never
recomputed, so for a Type II endpoint the buffer is one packet short of
the packet count the URB is built with.
prepare_inbound_urb() then lays out one iso frame per packet and never
consults buffer_size:
offs = 0;
for (i = 0; i < urb_ctx->packets; i++) {
urb->iso_frame_desc[i].offset = offs;
urb->iso_frame_desc[i].length = ep->curpacksize;
offs += ep->curpacksize;
}
urb->transfer_buffer_length = offs;
urb->number_of_packets = urb_ctx->packets;
The last descriptor therefore points one packet past the end of the
transfer buffer, where the host controller writes device data on every
inbound transfer. prepare_silent_urb() and prepare_playback_urb() bound
their fill loops by ctx->buffer_size, so only capture is affected.
fmt_type comes from the device's audio streaming descriptors, so any
device advertising a Type II capture format hits this once userspace sets
hw_params on the stream.
KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64) with a dummy_hcd/raw-gadget device, one report
per inbound transfer:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dummy_timer
Write of size 64 at addr ffff0000186171c0 by task cons02/166
__asan_memcpy
dummy_timer
hrtimer_run_softirq
Allocated by task 166:
usb_alloc_coherent
snd_usb_endpoint_set_params
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 64-byte region [ffff000018617180, ffff0000186171c0)
Compute buffer_size after the delimiter packet has been accounted for,
and bound the fill loop by buffer_size, as prepare_silent_urb() already
does on the outbound side. This grows every Type II URB allocation by
one maxsize packet.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: don't leave a full plaintext sk_msg ring unpushed
When the copy path in tls_sw_sendmsg_locked() adds the fragment that fills
the plaintext sk_msg ring, it does not set full_record, so the record is
left full and unpushed. A later splice() then adds to an already full
ring: sk_msg_page_add() has no fullness check of its own, so sg.end wraps
onto sg.start and the ring appears empty. Fragments added after that
overwrite live entries, and sg.size no longer matches what is reachable
between sg.start and sg.end, so pushing the record runs the scatterwalk off
the end of the scatterlist.
An unprivileged user can trigger this on a loopback TCP socket with the
"tls" ULP attached:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
RIP: 0010:memcpy_from_scatterwalk+0x32/0xc0
Call Trace:
skcipher_walk_next+0x1d1/0x2c0
gcm_encrypt_aesni_avx+0x1e9/0x220
bpf_exec_tx_verdict+0x3bb/0x860
tls_sw_sendmsg+0xa1a/0xca0
__sys_sendto+0x1da/0x1f0
Set full_record in the copy path when the ring becomes full, and push a
record that is already full on entry to the sendmsg loop. |
