| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: qcom: scm: Cleanup global '__scm' on probe failures
If SCM driver fails the probe, it should not leave global '__scm'
variable assigned, because external users of this driver will assume the
probe finished successfully. For example TZMEM parts ('__scm->mempool')
are initialized later in the probe, but users of it (__scm_smc_call())
rely on the '__scm' variable.
This fixes theoretical NULL pointer exception, triggered via introducing
probe deferral in SCM driver with call trace:
qcom_tzmem_alloc+0x70/0x1ac (P)
qcom_tzmem_alloc+0x64/0x1ac (L)
qcom_scm_assign_mem+0x78/0x194
qcom_rmtfs_mem_probe+0x2d4/0x38c
platform_probe+0x68/0xc8 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "libfs: fix infinite directory reads for offset dir"
The current directory offset allocator (based on mtree_alloc_cyclic)
stores the next offset value to return in octx->next_offset. This
mechanism typically returns values that increase monotonically over
time. Eventually, though, the newly allocated offset value wraps
back to a low number (say, 2) which is smaller than other already-
allocated offset values.
Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> reports that, after commit 64a7ce76fb90
("libfs: fix infinite directory reads for offset dir"), if a
directory's offset allocator wraps, existing entries are no longer
visible via readdir/getdents because offset_readdir() stops listing
entries once an entry's offset is larger than octx->next_offset.
These entries vanish persistently -- they can be looked up, but will
never again appear in readdir(3) output.
The reason for this is that the commit treats directory offsets as
monotonically increasing integer values rather than opaque cookies,
and introduces this comparison:
if (dentry2offset(dentry) >= last_index) {
On 64-bit platforms, the directory offset value upper bound is
2^63 - 1. Directory offsets will monotonically increase for millions
of years without wrapping.
On 32-bit platforms, however, LONG_MAX is 2^31 - 1. The allocator
can wrap after only a few weeks (at worst).
Revert commit 64a7ce76fb90 ("libfs: fix infinite directory reads for
offset dir") to prepare for a fix that can work properly on 32-bit
systems and might apply to recent LTS kernels where shmem employs
the simple_offset mechanism. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: Fix max SGEs for the Work Request
Gen P7 supports up to 13 SGEs for now. WQE software structure
can hold only 6 now. Since the max send sge is reported as
13, the stack can give requests up to 13 SGEs. This is causing
traffic failures and system crashes.
Use the define for max SGE supported for variable size. This
will work for both static and variable WQEs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: fix page fault due to max surface definition mismatch
DC driver is using two different values to define the maximum number of
surfaces: MAX_SURFACES and MAX_SURFACE_NUM. Consolidate MAX_SURFACES as
the unique definition for surface updates across DC.
It fixes page fault faced by Cosmic users on AMD display versions that
support two overlay planes, since the introduction of cursor overlay
mode.
[Nov26 21:33] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000051d0f08b
[ +0.000015] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ +0.000006] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ +0.000005] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ +0.000007] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ +0.000006] CPU: 4 PID: 71 Comm: kworker/u32:6 Not tainted 6.10.0+ #300
[ +0.000006] Hardware name: Valve Jupiter/Jupiter, BIOS F7A0131 01/30/2024
[ +0.000007] Workqueue: events_unbound commit_work [drm_kms_helper]
[ +0.000040] RIP: 0010:copy_stream_update_to_stream.isra.0+0x30d/0x750 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000847] Code: 8b 10 49 89 94 24 f8 00 00 00 48 8b 50 08 49 89 94 24 00 01 00 00 8b 40 10 41 89 84 24 08 01 00 00 49 8b 45 78 48 85 c0 74 0b <0f> b6 00 41 88 84 24 90 64 00 00 49 8b 45 60 48 85 c0 74 3b 48 8b
[ +0.000010] RSP: 0018:ffffc203802f79a0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ +0.000009] RAX: 0000000051d0f08b RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: ffff9f964f0a8070
[ +0.000004] RDX: ffff9f9710f90e40 RSI: ffff9f96600c8000 RDI: ffff9f964f000000
[ +0.000004] RBP: ffffc203802f79f8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000005] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9f96600c8000
[ +0.000004] R13: ffff9f9710f90e40 R14: ffff9f964f000000 R15: ffff9f96600c8000
[ +0.000004] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f9970000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ +0.000005] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ +0.000005] CR2: 0000000051d0f08b CR3: 00000002e6a20000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[ +0.000005] Call Trace:
[ +0.000011] <TASK>
[ +0.000010] ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
[ +0.000012] ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x2d0
[ +0.000014] ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180
[ +0.000009] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
[ +0.000013] ? copy_stream_update_to_stream.isra.0+0x30d/0x750 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000739] ? dc_commit_state_no_check+0xd6c/0xe70 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000470] update_planes_and_stream_state+0x49b/0x4f0 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000450] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000009] ? commit_minimal_transition_state+0x239/0x3d0 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000446] update_planes_and_stream_v2+0x24a/0x590 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000464] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000009] ? sort+0x31/0x50
[ +0.000007] ? amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail+0x159f/0x3a30 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000508] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000009] ? amdgpu_crtc_get_scanout_position+0x28/0x40 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000377] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000009] ? drm_crtc_vblank_helper_get_vblank_timestamp_internal+0x160/0x390 [drm]
[ +0.000058] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000005] ? dma_fence_default_wait+0x8c/0x260
[ +0.000010] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000005] ? wait_for_completion_timeout+0x13b/0x170
[ +0.000006] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000005] ? dma_fence_wait_timeout+0x108/0x140
[ +0.000010] ? commit_tail+0x94/0x130 [drm_kms_helper]
[ +0.000024] ? process_one_work+0x177/0x330
[ +0.000008] ? worker_thread+0x266/0x3a0
[ +0.000006] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000004] ? kthread+0xd2/0x100
[ +0.000006] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000006] ? ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
[ +0.000004] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000005] ? ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ +0.000011] </TASK>
(cherry picked from commit 1c86c81a86c60f9b15d3e3f43af0363cf56063e7) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_packet: fix vlan_get_tci() vs MSG_PEEK
Blamed commit forgot MSG_PEEK case, allowing a crash [1] as found
by syzbot.
Rework vlan_get_tci() to not touch skb at all,
so that it can be used from many cpus on the same skb.
Add a const qualifier to skb argument.
[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8a8da482 len:32 put:14 head:ffff88807a1d5800 data:ffff88807a1d5810 tail:0x14 end:0x140 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5880 Comm: syz-executor172 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-00762-g9268abe611b0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216
Code: 0b 8d 48 c7 c6 9e 6c 26 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 3a 5a 79 f7 48 83 c4 20 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003baf5b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 8565c1eec37aa000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88802616fb50 R08: ffffffff817f0a4c R09: 1ffff92000775e50
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52000775e51 R12: 0000000000000140
R13: ffff88807a1d5800 R14: ffff88807a1d5810 R15: 0000000000000014
FS: 00007fa03261f6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffd65753000 CR3: 0000000031720000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636
vlan_get_tci+0x272/0x550 net/packet/af_packet.c:565
packet_recvmsg+0x13c9/0x1ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3616
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x22f/0x280 net/socket.c:1066
____sys_recvmsg+0x1c6/0x480 net/socket.c:2814
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2856 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x426/0xab0 net/socket.c:2951
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3025 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3048 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3041
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_packet: fix vlan_get_protocol_dgram() vs MSG_PEEK
Blamed commit forgot MSG_PEEK case, allowing a crash [1] as found
by syzbot.
Rework vlan_get_protocol_dgram() to not touch skb at all,
so that it can be used from many cpus on the same skb.
Add a const qualifier to skb argument.
[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8a8ccd05 len:29 put:14 head:ffff88807fc8e400 data:ffff88807fc8e3f4 tail:0x11 end:0x140 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5892 Comm: syz-executor883 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00054-gd6ef8b40d075 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216
Code: 0b 8d 48 c7 c6 86 d5 25 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 5a 69 79 f7 48 83 c4 20 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc900038d7638 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 609ffd18ea660600
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88802483c8d0 R08: ffffffff817f0a8c R09: 1ffff9200071ae60
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200071ae61 R12: 0000000000000140
R13: ffff88807fc8e400 R14: ffff88807fc8e3f4 R15: 0000000000000011
FS: 00007fbac5e006c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fbac5e00d58 CR3: 000000001238e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636
vlan_get_protocol_dgram+0x165/0x290 net/packet/af_packet.c:585
packet_recvmsg+0x948/0x1ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3552
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1033 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x22f/0x280 net/socket.c:1055
____sys_recvmsg+0x1c6/0x480 net/socket.c:2803
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x426/0xab0 net/socket.c:2940
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3014 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3037 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3030 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3030
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix mbss changed flags corruption on 32 bit systems
On 32-bit systems, the size of an unsigned long is 4 bytes,
while a u64 is 8 bytes. Therefore, when using
or_each_set_bit(bit, &bits, sizeof(changed) * BITS_PER_BYTE),
the code is incorrectly searching for a bit in a 32-bit
variable that is expected to be 64 bits in size,
leading to incorrect bit finding.
Solution: Ensure that the size of the bits variable is correctly
adjusted for each architecture.
Call Trace:
? show_regs+0x54/0x58
? __warn+0x6b/0xd4
? ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0xcc/0xd4 [mac80211]
? report_bug+0x113/0x150
? exc_overflow+0x30/0x30
? handle_bug+0x27/0x44
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x50
? handle_exception+0xf6/0xf6
? exc_overflow+0x30/0x30
? ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0xcc/0xd4 [mac80211]
? exc_overflow+0x30/0x30
? ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0xcc/0xd4 [mac80211]
? ieee80211_mesh_work+0xff/0x260 [mac80211]
? cfg80211_wiphy_work+0x72/0x98 [cfg80211]
? process_one_work+0xf1/0x1fc
? worker_thread+0x2c0/0x3b4
? kthread+0xc7/0xf0
? mod_delayed_work_on+0x4c/0x4c
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x14/0x14
? ret_from_fork+0x24/0x38
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x14/0x14
? ret_from_fork_asm+0xf/0x14
? entry_INT80_32+0xf0/0xf0
[restore no-op path for no changes] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: set ATTR_CTIME flags when setting mtime
David reported that the new warning from setattr_copy_mgtime is coming
like the following.
[ 113.215316] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 113.215974] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 31 at fs/attr.c:300 setattr_copy+0x1ee/0x200
[ 113.219192] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 31 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1+ #234
[ 113.220127] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
[ 113.221530] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ksmbd]
[ 113.222220] RIP: 0010:setattr_copy+0x1ee/0x200
[ 113.222833] Code: 24 28 49 8b 44 24 30 48 89 53 58 89 43 6c 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 48 89 df e8 77 d6 ff ff e9 cd fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 be fe ff ff 66 0
[ 113.225110] RSP: 0018:ffffaf218010fb68 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 113.225765] RAX: 0000000000000120 RBX: ffffa446815f8568 RCX: 0000000000000003
[ 113.226667] RDX: ffffaf218010fd38 RSI: ffffa446815f8568 RDI: ffffffff94eb03a0
[ 113.227531] RBP: ffffaf218010fb90 R08: 0000001a251e217d R09: 00000000675259fa
[ 113.228426] R10: 0000000002ba8a6d R11: ffffa4468196c7a8 R12: ffffaf218010fd38
[ 113.229304] R13: 0000000000000120 R14: ffffffff94eb03a0 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 113.230210] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa44739d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 113.231215] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 113.232055] CR2: 00007efe0053d27e CR3: 000000000331a000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[ 113.232926] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 113.233812] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 113.234797] Call Trace:
[ 113.235116] <TASK>
[ 113.235393] ? __warn+0x73/0xd0
[ 113.235802] ? setattr_copy+0x1ee/0x200
[ 113.236299] ? report_bug+0xf3/0x1e0
[ 113.236757] ? handle_bug+0x4d/0x90
[ 113.237202] ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60
[ 113.237689] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 113.238185] ? setattr_copy+0x1ee/0x200
[ 113.238692] btrfs_setattr+0x80/0x820 [btrfs]
[ 113.239285] ? get_stack_info_noinstr+0x12/0xf0
[ 113.239857] ? __module_address+0x22/0xa0
[ 113.240368] ? handle_ksmbd_work+0x6e/0x460 [ksmbd]
[ 113.240993] ? __module_text_address+0x9/0x50
[ 113.241545] ? __module_address+0x22/0xa0
[ 113.242033] ? unwind_next_frame+0x10e/0x920
[ 113.242600] ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
[ 113.243268] notify_change+0x2c2/0x4e0
[ 113.243746] ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x27/0x730
[ 113.244339] ? set_file_basic_info+0x130/0x2b0 [ksmbd]
[ 113.244993] set_file_basic_info+0x130/0x2b0 [ksmbd]
[ 113.245613] ? process_scheduled_works+0xbe/0x310
[ 113.246181] ? worker_thread+0x100/0x240
[ 113.246696] ? kthread+0xc8/0x100
[ 113.247126] ? ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x40
[ 113.247606] ? ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 113.248132] smb2_set_info+0x63f/0xa70 [ksmbd]
ksmbd is trying to set the atime and mtime via notify_change without also
setting the ctime. so This patch add ATTR_CTIME flags when setting mtime
to avoid a warning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: RCU protect disk->conv_zones_bitmap
Ensure that a disk revalidation changing the conventional zones bitmap
of a disk does not cause invalid memory references when using the
disk_zone_is_conv() helper by RCU protecting the disk->conv_zones_bitmap
pointer.
disk_zone_is_conv() is modified to operate under the RCU read lock and
the function disk_set_conv_zones_bitmap() is added to update a disk
conv_zones_bitmap pointer using rcu_replace_pointer() with the disk
zone_wplugs_lock spinlock held.
disk_free_zone_resources() is modified to call
disk_update_zone_resources() with a NULL bitmap pointer to free the disk
conv_zones_bitmap. disk_set_conv_zones_bitmap() is also used in
disk_update_zone_resources() to set the new (revalidated) bitmap and
free the old one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mpi3mr: Fix corrupt config pages PHY state is switched in sysfs
The driver, through the SAS transport, exposes a sysfs interface to
enable/disable PHYs in a controller/expander setup. When multiple PHYs
are disabled and enabled in rapid succession, the persistent and current
config pages related to SAS IO unit/SAS Expander pages could get
corrupted.
Use separate memory for each config request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dlm: fix dlm_recover_members refcount on error
If dlm_recover_members() fails we don't drop the references of the
previous created root_list that holds and keep all rsbs alive during the
recovery. It might be not an unlikely event because ping_members() could
run into an -EINTR if another recovery progress was triggered again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: fix TSO DMA API usage causing oops
Commit 66600fac7a98 ("net: stmmac: TSO: Fix unbalanced DMA map/unmap
for non-paged SKB data") moved the assignment of tx_skbuff_dma[]'s
members to be later in stmmac_tso_xmit().
The buf (dma cookie) and len stored in this structure are passed to
dma_unmap_single() by stmmac_tx_clean(). The DMA API requires that
the dma cookie passed to dma_unmap_single() is the same as the value
returned from dma_map_single(). However, by moving the assignment
later, this is not the case when priv->dma_cap.addr64 > 32 as "des"
is offset by proto_hdr_len.
This causes problems such as:
dwc-eth-dwmac 2490000.ethernet eth0: Tx DMA map failed
and with DMA_API_DEBUG enabled:
DMA-API: dwc-eth-dwmac 2490000.ethernet: device driver tries to +free DMA memory it has not allocated [device address=0x000000ffffcf65c0] [size=66 bytes]
Fix this by maintaining "des" as the original DMA cookie, and use
tso_des to pass the offset DMA cookie to stmmac_tso_allocator().
Full details of the crashes can be found at:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/d8112193-0386-4e14-b516-37c2d838171a@nvidia.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/klkzp5yn5kq5efgtrow6wbvnc46bcqfxs65nz3qy77ujr5turc@bwwhelz2l4dw/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: protect link down work from execute after lgr freed
link down work may be scheduled before lgr freed but execute
after lgr freed, which may result in crash. So it is need to
hold a reference before shedule link down work, and put the
reference after work executed or canceled.
The relevant crash call stack as follows:
list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffffb638c9c0fe20,
but was 0000000000000000
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:51!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 6 PID: 978112 Comm: kworker/6:119 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G #1
Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 2221b89 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events smc_link_down_work [smc]
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid.cold+0x31/0x47
RSP: 0018:ffffb638c9c0fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010086
RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff942fb75e5128 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff943520930aa0 RSI: ffff94352091fc80 RDI: ffff94352091fc80
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb638c9c0fc38
R10: ffffb638c9c0fc30 R11: ffffffffa015eb28 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: ffffb638c9c0fe20 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff942f9cd051c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff943520900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f4f25214000 CR3: 000000025fbae004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x17e/0x470
smc_link_down_work+0x3c/0x60 [smc]
process_one_work+0x1ac/0x350
worker_thread+0x49/0x2f0
? rescuer_thread+0x360/0x360
kthread+0x118/0x140
? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mscc: ocelot: fix incorrect IFH SRC_PORT field in ocelot_ifh_set_basic()
Packets injected by the CPU should have a SRC_PORT field equal to the
CPU port module index in the Analyzer block (ocelot->num_phys_ports).
The blamed commit copied the ocelot_ifh_set_basic() call incorrectly
from ocelot_xmit_common() in net/dsa/tag_ocelot.c. Instead of calling
with "x", it calls with BIT_ULL(x), but the field is not a port mask,
but rather a single port index.
[ side note: this is the technical debt of code duplication :( ]
The error used to be silent and doesn't appear to have other
user-visible manifestations, but with new changes in the packing
library, it now fails loudly as follows:
------------[ cut here ]------------
Cannot store 0x40 inside bits 46-43 - will truncate
sja1105 spi2.0: xmit timed out
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 102 at lib/packing.c:98 __pack+0x90/0x198
sja1105 spi2.0: timed out polling for tstamp
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 102 Comm: felix_xmit
Tainted: G W N 6.13.0-rc1-00372-gf706b85d972d-dirty #2605
Call trace:
__pack+0x90/0x198 (P)
__pack+0x90/0x198 (L)
packing+0x78/0x98
ocelot_ifh_set_basic+0x260/0x368
ocelot_port_inject_frame+0xa8/0x250
felix_port_deferred_xmit+0x14c/0x258
kthread_worker_fn+0x134/0x350
kthread+0x114/0x138
The code path pertains to the ocelot switchdev driver and to the felix
secondary DSA tag protocol, ocelot-8021q. Here seen with ocelot-8021q.
The messenger (packing) is not really to blame, so fix the original
commit instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: check if iowq is killed before queuing
task work can be executed after the task has gone through io_uring
termination, whether it's the final task_work run or the fallback path.
In this case, task work will find ->io_wq being already killed and
null'ed, which is a problem if it then tries to forward the request to
io_queue_iowq(). Make io_queue_iowq() fail requests in this case.
Note that it also checks PF_KTHREAD, because the user can first close
a DEFER_TASKRUN ring and shortly after kill the task, in which case
->iowq check would race. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mailbox: mtk-cmdq: fix wrong use of sizeof in cmdq_get_clocks()
It should be size of the struct clk_bulk_data, not data pointer pass to
devm_kcalloc(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: bcm - add error check in the ahash_hmac_init function
The ahash_init functions may return fails. The ahash_hmac_init should
not return ok when ahash_init returns error. For an example, ahash_init
will return -ENOMEM when allocation memory is error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Fix aggregation ID mask to prevent oops on 5760X chips
The 5760X (P7) chip's HW GRO/LRO interface is very similar to that of
the previous generation (5750X or P5). However, the aggregation ID
fields in the completion structures on P7 have been redefined from
16 bits to 12 bits. The freed up 4 bits are redefined for part of the
metadata such as the VLAN ID. The aggregation ID mask was not modified
when adding support for P7 chips. Including the extra 4 bits for the
aggregation ID can potentially cause the driver to store or fetch the
packet header of GRO/LRO packets in the wrong TPA buffer. It may hit
the BUG() condition in __skb_pull() because the SKB contains no valid
packet header:
kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:2766!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.12.0-rc2+ #7
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R760/0VRV9X, BIOS 1.0.1 12/27/2022
RIP: 0010:eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140
Code: 80 00 00 00 eb c1 8b 47 70 2b 47 74 48 8b 97 d0 00 00 00 83 f8 01 7e 1b 48 85 d2 74 06 66 83 3a ff 74 09 b8 00 04 00 00 eb a5 <0f> 0b b8 00 01 00 00 eb 9c 48 85 ff 74 eb 31 f6 b9 02 00 00 00 48
RSP: 0018:ff615003803fcc28 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: 00000000000022d2 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: ff2e8c25da334040
RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: ff2e8c25c1ce8000 RDI: ff2e8c25869f9000
RBP: ff2e8c258c31c000 R08: ff2e8c25da334000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ff2e8c25da3342c0 R11: ff2e8c25c1ce89c0 R12: ff2e8c258e0990b0
R13: ff2e8c25bb120000 R14: ff2e8c25c1ce89c0 R15: ff2e8c25869f9000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff2e8c34be300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055f05317e4c8 CR3: 000000108bac6006 CR4: 0000000000773ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? die+0x33/0x90
? do_trap+0xd9/0x100
? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140
? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140
? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140
bnxt_tpa_end+0x10b/0x6b0 [bnxt_en]
? bnxt_tpa_start+0x195/0x320 [bnxt_en]
bnxt_rx_pkt+0x902/0xd90 [bnxt_en]
? __bnxt_tx_int.constprop.0+0x89/0x300 [bnxt_en]
? kmem_cache_free+0x343/0x440
? __bnxt_tx_int.constprop.0+0x24f/0x300 [bnxt_en]
__bnxt_poll_work+0x193/0x370 [bnxt_en]
bnxt_poll_p5+0x9a/0x300 [bnxt_en]
? try_to_wake_up+0x209/0x670
__napi_poll+0x29/0x1b0
Fix it by redefining the aggregation ID mask for P5_PLUS chips to be
12 bits. This will work because the maximum aggregation ID is less
than 4096 on all P5_PLUS chips. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: do not defer rule destruction via call_rcu
nf_tables_chain_destroy can sleep, it can't be used from call_rcu
callbacks.
Moreover, nf_tables_rule_release() is only safe for error unwinding,
while transaction mutex is held and the to-be-desroyed rule was not
exposed to either dataplane or dumps, as it deactives+frees without
the required synchronize_rcu() in-between.
nft_rule_expr_deactivate() callbacks will change ->use counters
of other chains/sets, see e.g. nft_lookup .deactivate callback, these
must be serialized via transaction mutex.
Also add a few lockdep asserts to make this more explicit.
Calling synchronize_rcu() isn't ideal, but fixing this without is hard
and way more intrusive. As-is, we can get:
WARNING: .. net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:5515 nft_set_destroy+0x..
Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work
RIP: 0010:nft_set_destroy+0x3fe/0x5c0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x6b7/0xad0
process_one_work+0x64a/0xce0
worker_thread+0x613/0x10d0
In case the synchronize_rcu becomes an issue, we can explore alternatives.
One way would be to allocate nft_trans_rule objects + one nft_trans_chain
object, deactivate the rules + the chain and then defer the freeing to the
nft destroy workqueue. We'd still need to keep the synchronize_rcu path as
a fallback to handle -ENOMEM corner cases though. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix using rcu_read_(un)lock while iterating
The usage of rcu_read_(un)lock while inside list_for_each_entry_rcu is
not safe since for the most part entries fetched this way shall be
treated as rcu_dereference:
Note that the value returned by rcu_dereference() is valid
only within the enclosing RCU read-side critical section [1]_.
For example, the following is **not** legal::
rcu_read_lock();
p = rcu_dereference(head.next);
rcu_read_unlock();
x = p->address; /* BUG!!! */
rcu_read_lock();
y = p->data; /* BUG!!! */
rcu_read_unlock(); |
