| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A user who can read an existing remote VCS repository can replace its configured origin or supply an absolute VCS data URL. |
| Under specific circumstances, low-level user can run request to remote CocoaPods repos via JFrog Artifactory External Dependency. |
| oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.1, registry/remote/repository.go in blobStore.completePushAfterInitialPost follows a registry-controlled Location header during monolithic blob upload and reuses the Authorization header from the initial POST request for the subsequent PUT request, allowing a malicious registry to return a cross-host Location and receive the caller's credentials at an attacker-controlled endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.1. |
| A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was found in multiple AWX notification backends. The webhook, Mattermost, Rocket.Chat, and Grafana notification backends use notification template URLs as direct HTTP request targets without validating the target address against private, loopback, or reserved IP ranges. An organization notification administrator can create notification templates pointing to internal or loopback addresses, causing the AWX control node to issue HTTP requests to services that are not externally accessible. Additionally, the webhook notification backend follows HTTP redirects and resends configured Basic Authentication credentials to redirect targets regardless of host change, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate notification credentials by redirecting to an attacker-controlled host. The Grafana backend sends its API key in the Authorization header to the configured target URL. |
| Adminer before 5.5.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the login form's server field validator, which only inspects leading integers for privileged ports and fails to reject non-numeric port values. Attackers can inject PDO DSN keys like host= and port= into the server parameter to bypass the privileged-port restriction and establish TCP connections to arbitrary internal hosts and ports before authentication. |
| A Server-Side Request Forgery and supply chain flaw was found in the OpenShift Console Helm catalog proxy. A namespace tenant can plant a ProjectHelmChartRepository with an arbitrary URL that the console pod fetches server-side, bypassing tenant egress restrictions. Combined with catalog metadata poisoning and admin-mediated chart installation, this enables privilege escalation. |
| An authenticated SSRF flaw was found in the OpenShift Console Dev Console webhook helpers. User-supplied target URLs are fetched server-side without validation, with path neutralization enabling arbitrary endpoint targeting and full response reflection from the console pod's privileged network position. |
| A flaw was found in the OpenShift Router. A user with EndpointSlice write access can exploit this vulnerability by creating a Service backed by an FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) EndpointSlice that resolves to a cloud metadata endpoint. This allows the router to proxy requests to the cloud metadata endpoint, leading to the disclosure of instance credentials and other sensitive metadata. This bypasses previous security measures for validating IP addresses. |
| Compliance-trestle (Trestle) is a tooling platform for managing compliance as code. In versions before 3.12.4 and versions 4.0.0 through 4.0.3, the URLSecurityValidator that guards trestle's remote-fetch paths against server-side request forgery can be bypassed to reach loopback, link-local, cloud-metadata, and internal network endpoints it was designed to block. The blocklist does not canonicalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals such as [::ffff:169.254.169.254], which resolve to IPv6Address objects that never match the blocked IPv4 ranges, and it does not block the unspecified address 0.0.0.0, which routes to local services on Linux and inside containers. An attacker who can supply or influence an OSCAL artifact that trestle fetches, such as a malicious profile whose imports reference one of these bypass URLs, can cause the HTTPSFetcher and SFTPFetcher paths to contact cloud instance-metadata services, loopback interfaces, or internal hosts. This issue is fixed in versions 3.12.4 and 4.1.0. |
| Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Azure Virtual Machines allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| OneUptime's webhook target check rejects private and loopback addresses given in IPv4 form and a small set of IPv6 forms, but has no case for the IPv4-mapped IPv6 range. The webhook delivery path calls SSRFProtection.validateWebhookTargetIsSafe, and the host-literal screening inside Common/Server/Utils/SSRFProtection.ts, performed by isBlockedHostnameLiteral, rejects private and loopback IPv4 ranges and tests an IPv6 value against the unspecified address, the loopback, the link-local prefix and the unique-local prefixes. A value such as [::ffff:127.0.0.1] matches none of them. The value is also recognised as an address literal rather than a name, so the path that re-checks addresses obtained from resolution is not taken. The HTTP client treats the mapped form as the embedded IPv4 address and connects to it, so an authenticated project member who can configure a webhook can direct the server at loopback services, private network ranges and link-local metadata endpoints, and the response is recorded where the webhook result can be read. Version 12.0.7 adds handling for the mapped range. |
| A flaw was found in the `cluster-proxy-addon` component of Multicluster Engine for Kubernetes. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker, who can access the user-facing route, to bypass authentication and authorization checks. By manipulating URL path segments, the attacker can proxy requests to arbitrary services across any managed cluster. This enables unauthorized access to internal services that would otherwise be protected, potentially leading to information disclosure or further compromise of the cluster environment. |
| jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. Prior to versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1 on their respective release lines, the java.net.InetAddress branch of FromStringDeserializer.Std._deserialize() calls InetAddress.getByName() on attacker-controlled input, causing eager DNS resolution during deserialization and enabling DNS-based server-side request forgery and internal-host enumeration. This issue is fixed in versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.58, spider_tools._host_is_blocked() does not resolve ordinary hostnames before scrape_page fetches them. A hostname such as 127.0.0.1.nip.io passes validation and resolves to loopback, permitting internal HTTP access. The fix uses socket.getaddrinfo and fails closed on DNS errors. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.58. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.58, the Jobs API validate_webhook_url() path fails open on socket.gaierror and does not bind the validated address to the later request. An attacker webhook_url can later resolve to 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, or another internal address. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.58, JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url() accepts webhook_url when resolution raises socket.gaierror because the exception path uses except socket.gaierror: pass. JobExecutor._send_webhook() later performs a fresh lookup, allowing DNS changes to direct the request to an internal service. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58. |
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.58, the web_crawl function validates only the initial URL before _crawl_with_httpx uses httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True). Redirect targets are not revalidated, so an attacker who influences a crawl target can redirect a public URL to loopback, private network, or cloud metadata services while ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL remains disabled. The fetched internal response is returned to the agent context. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.58. |
| Geyser is a bridge between Minecraft: Bedrock Edition and Minecraft: Java Edition. Prior to 2.9.3, a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in Geyser’s handling of Bedrock player head texture data. By supplying a crafted Base64-encoded skin texture URL via the /give command, an attacker can cause the Minecraft server to issue arbitrary HTTP GET requests to attacker-controlled or internal endpoints. This occurs server-side, without proper URL validation, and can be triggered by a Bedrock client. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.9.3. |
| NLTK before 3.10.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in nltk.pathsec.urlopen (and callers nltk.data.load, nltk.downloader.Downloader.index/download) when an HTTP proxy is configured. pathsec.urlopen validates the requested hostname locally, but proxy-handler inheritance disables the safe HTTP/HTTPS handlers so the actual fetch is performed by the proxy against a destination that is never re-validated. An attacker can supply a validated public URL that the proxy forwards to an internal loopback-only service, allowing disclosure of internal HTTP resources, loading of forged downloader indexes, and installation of attacker-chosen package content. |
| The POST /api/provider-nodes/validate route in 9router takes a caller-supplied baseUrl and issues server-side HTTP requests to it, guarding the destination with assertPublicUrl from src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js. That guard compares hostname strings only: it resolves no DNS, does not revalidate after a redirect, and its IPv4-mapped IPv6 branch is unreachable. The branch matches ^::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$, but the WHATWG URL parser canonicalizes such literals to hextets before the guard runs, so new URL("http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/").hostname yields [::ffff:7f00:1] and the pattern is tested against a string it is never handed. Every IPv4-mapped address therefore passes, and http://[::ffff:7f00:1] and http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe] reach loopback and link-local metadata addresses; a hostname whose A record points at an internal address passes as well because no resolution occurs. In the custom-embedding branch the upstream response body is truncated to 200 bytes and returned to the caller whenever the upstream status is neither 2xx nor 401 nor 403, which discloses the beginning of internal responses, and the other validation types remain usable for blind internal port scanning through status and timing differences. The caller-supplied apiKey is forwarded to the internal destination as an Authorization Bearer header. A dashboard session is required by default, and none is required when requireLogin is disabled. |
