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Search Results (429068 CVEs found)

CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2026-99352 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: trace an accepted transport before publishing it svc_handle_xprt() publishes a newly accepted transport before tracing it. svc_add_new_temp_xprt() places the transport on sv_tempsocks and clears XPT_BUSY, so another nfsd thread can dequeue it at once. If the peer has already closed the connection, that thread runs svc_delete_xprt(), which drops the list reference, the only reference the new transport holds. trace_svc_xprt_accept() then reads the transport's addresses and network namespace from freed memory. Before publication the accepting thread owns the transport exclusively: XPT_BUSY is still set from svc_xprt_init() and the transport is on no list. Emit the tracepoint there. [ cel: trace before publication instead of taking an extra reference ]
CVE-2026-99351 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: treat empty auth.unix.gid replies as negative entries When rpc.mountd cannot resolve a uid (getpwuid() or getgrouplist() failure, e.g. while winbind or sssd is briefly unreachable), it answers the auth.unix.gid upcall with zero groups. unix_gid_parse() installs that as a valid positive entry, and svcauth_unix_set_client() then replaces the credential's group list with the empty one on every request, RPCSEC_GSS included via svcauth_gss_set_client(). One failed lookup strips that uid of all supplementary groups on every export for up to mountd's configured TTL (30 minutes by default), long after the NSS backend has recovered. mountd cannot send an empty list for a successful lookup, since getgrouplist(3) always includes at least the user's primary group, so a zero-group reply can only mean the lookup failed. Record it as a negative entry: unix_gid_find() then returns -ENOENT and svcauth_unix_set_client() keeps the groups the RPC credential already carries. This is the fallback that commit 3fc605a2aa38 ("[PATCH] knfsd: allow the server to provide a gid list when using AUTH_UNIX authentication") promised when no answer is available, and the same state try_to_negate_entry() already creates when no listener holds the channel open.
CVE-2026-99350 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix update of call->tx_pending without holding lock Currently, rxrpc_send_data() updates call->tx_pending just before it returns - but it won't be holding the call->user_mutex when it does this if a wait was interrupted by a signal. This would allow a parallel sendmsg() to race. Further, both the callers of rxrpc_send_data() call it with the lock held, and then it returns an indication through the parameter list to say whether it has dropped the lock or not - after which the callers both just drop the lock if it's still held. Fix this by: (1) Moving the release of call->user_mutex down into rxrpc_send_data() and get rid of the indicator parameter. This makes it easier to see where the lock is held. (2) After waiting, if the attempt to reacquire the mutex is interrupted, just return directly there rather than going to out_unlock (3) Restricting the txb variable to inside the buffering loop and leaving ->tx_pending set until we've queued the buffer. Note that there's a slight change in behaviour in that wait_for_space failure now doesn't check for completion because it doesn't hold the call user_mutex. The caller, however, should re-issue the send and pick up any error at a second attempt.
CVE-2026-99349 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix lack of short-send handling in rxrpc_kernel_send_data() Fix rxrpc_kernel_send_data() to loop around if it detects a short send. David Laight suggested doing it here rather than wrapping all the calls in loops. Further, remove the len argument and use the iterator count instead and return 0 on success, not the amount copied. Note this is also a prerequisite for changing the way rxrpc_send_data() works to return a short send rather than an error if some data was buffered.
CVE-2026-99348 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Fix afs to abort the rxrpc call on send error Fix afs_send_empty_reply() and afs_send_simple_reply() to always try to abort the rxrpc call rather than just aborting on -ENOMEM and otherwise abandoning it. If the call is already complete due to network failure or a received abort, this will do nothing. Also make afs_make_call() always abort on send error; again, it does nothing if the rxrpc call is already dead.
CVE-2026-99347 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: x86: hdmi: fix chmap array missing terminator entry had_build_channel_allocation_map() allocates a single struct snd_pcm_chmap_elem via kzalloc() and stores it as intelhaddata->chmap->chmap. struct snd_pcm_chmap.chmap is expected to be a zero-terminated array (see snd_pcm_std_chmaps[]), but had_register_chmap_ctls() never overrides the TLV callback installed by snd_pcm_add_chmap_ctls(), so the generic pcm_chmap_ctl_tlv() from ALSA core is left in place. pcm_chmap_ctl_tlv() is reachable by any local user via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_TLV_READ on the "Playback Channel Map" control and walks the array with "for (map = info->chmap; map->channels; map++)". Since the driver's single element is never terminated, this walks past the allocation. The same pointer is also freed on hot-unplug and rebuilt on hot-plug under intelhaddata->mutex, while the TLV callback runs under card->controls_rwsem without that mutex, so the walk can also race a concurrent free of the array. Fix this by allocating a second, zeroed element so the array is properly terminated, and by dropping the inherited TLV callback entirely at registration time, since the driver never implements one of its own.
CVE-2026-99346 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: Trigger new ASID allocation in both VMCBs on pCPU switch When the pCPU where the VMCB was most recently used is switched, reset the ASID generation in both VMCBs, triggering new ASID allocation for the immediate VMRUN as well as the next VMRUN on the other VMCB. The ASID is shared between vmcb01 and vmcb02, and gets flushed on every nested transition. However, since pCPU tracking is done per VMCB, it is possible for one VMCB to allocate a new ASID when migrated to a new pCPU, and then the other VMCB reuses that ASID on the old pCPU. This can result in the same ASID being used by multiple vCPUs on the old pCPU. Example scenario: - vCPU runs on pCPU A, vmcb01 is active, asid=1. - vCPU migrates to pCPU B, vmcb01 pCPU changes, new asid=2. - Another vCPU runs on pCPU A and allocates asid=2 as well. - vCPU migrates back to pCPU A, and then switches to vmcb02 before it runs again with vmcb01. - No pCPU switch is detected for vmcb02, so VMRUN is done with asid=2. - Two vCPUs end up using asid=2 on the same pCPU. Keep the VMCB dirtying to the active VMCB only. Clean bits are tracked by a pCPU for each VMCB, so do not unnecessarily dirty a VMCB if its pCPU does not change. Additionally, initialize the tracked pCPU for vmcb02 to -1 on nested enablement as hardening, so that a new ASID allocation is always triggered when nested is disabled and re-enabled. No performance regression was noticed when overcommitting L1 vCPUs in L0 (to force rescheduling), pinning L1 <-> L2 vCPUs, and running CPUID in a tight loop bouncing between 2 vCPUs in L2. An alternative (and perhaps more proper) fix would be tracking the ASID per-VMCB instead (e.g. [1]). However, that's a more involved change, and it would result in having different ASIDs for L1 and L2 without actually properly maintaining them. It would probably work because all TLB flushes target the current VMCB, and the other VMCB is always flushed on nested transitions, but the code ends up in an arguably more fragile state. Punt a proper clean fix to an incoming (and overdue) overhaul of SVM's ASID usage [2]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250205182402.2147495-2-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev [2] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20260728003557.1136583-1-yosry@kernel.org
CVE-2026-99345 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nSVM: Reject KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE if L1 has EFER.LMA=1 && EFER.LME=0 Reject KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE if the incoming L1 host state has what is effectively an impossible EFER combination of LMA=1 but LME=0, i.e. if the state says long mode is active but not enabled. Unlike VMX, SVM doesn't have an explicit consistent check for the illegal combination; presumably hardware simply ignores EFER.LMA if EFER.LME=0. Unfortunately, KVM doesn't ignore EFER.LMA in this case and consumes the illegal state when constructing the shadow MMU for L2. E.g. if userspace also clears CR4.PAE, then kvm_calc_cpu_role() will compute a role with 4 or 5 levels of paging, but shadow_mmu_init_context() will wire up the MMU to use the paging32 template, which maxes out its levels at 2. Note, the "real badness" is effectively the same as what happened with the nVMX bug fixed by commit 112e66017bff ("KVM: nVMX: add missing consistency checks for CR0 and CR4"). Unfortunately, the sanity check added by commit 72e2fb24a0b0 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if a vCPU ends up in long mode without PAE enabled") doesn't work for this case, since L2 state is active at the time of the page fault, but it's L1 that has the bad state.
CVE-2026-99344 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nSVM: Ignore EFER.LMA if EFER.LME=0 when preparing L2 state Force EFER.LMA=0 if EFER.LME=0 when preparing L2 state for VMRUN, i.e. mimic real hardware's behavior of ignoring EFER.LMA if EFER.LME=0. VMRUN unfortunately allows the nonsensical combination, i.e. doesn't fail, but KVM itself has an invariant EFER.LMA can be set et if and only if EFER.LME is set. Breaking that invariant can lead to a variety of issue, particularly in MMU code that keys off EFER.LMA when determining whether to emulate/virtualization 4/5-level paging versus PAE paging.
CVE-2026-99343 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if KVM attempts to walk more levels than the MMU has Extend the "EFER.LMA && !CR4.PAE" check, which exists largely to guard against KVM configuring a paging32 MMU with more than 2 levels of paging, with a very explicit check for exactly that: that KVM isn't trying to walk more levels of paging than the MMU template provides. I.e. harden KVM against all bugs that would cause KVM to generates accesses beyond the bounds of guest_walker's arrays, regardless of how KVM ended up with the misconfigured MMU. Note, don't use w->cpu_role.base.level directly as the paging64 template only provides two levels of page tables for PAE paging on 32-bit hosts, and handles the third level by manually emulating the PDPTR access.
CVE-2026-99342 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/xen: Enforce 4-byte alignment of vcpu_info registration Xen's map_guest_area() enforces that vcpu_info is aligned to sizeof(xen_ulong_t). KVM has no such check, allowing a guest to register vcpu_info at an arbitrary byte alignment. Enforce unconditional 4-byte alignment regardless of the current shinfo mode. This is sufficient because subsequent commits ensure that all locked atomic operations on vcpu_info fields use at most 32-bit accesses. Return -ENXIO on failure, matching Xen's map_guest_area() behaviour for unaligned requests. Originally observed in review of an unrelated patch: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260604193554.1BA311F00893@smtp.kernel.org/
CVE-2026-99341 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Request event processing for exception VM-Exits Request event processing whenever kvm_queue_exception_vmexit() queues an exception VM-Exit. Most callers reach the helper through kvm_multiple_exception(), which already sets KVM_REQ_EVENT, but nested asynchronous page faults call it directly. Without another event request, vcpu_enter_guest() skips kvm_check_and_inject_events() and re-enters L2. A subsequent VM-Exit can clear the pending exception while reconstructing vectoring state, losing the synthetic #PF VM-Exit. The APF reason remains PAGE_NOT_PRESENT and a later regular #PF can consume the stale value. Setting KVM_REQ_EVENT in the common helper ensures that L1 receives the queued VM-Exit before KVM re-enters L2.
CVE-2026-99340 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Take SRCU in kvm_zap_gfn_range() kvm_zap_gfn_range() walks memslots and rmaps and may drop mmu_lock to reschedule. Callers that do not already hold kvm->srcu (or slots_lock) can race with memslot deletion: synchronize_srcu_expedited() does not wait, kvm_free_memslot() frees the old slot and its rmap, and the zap resumes on freed memory. The VFIO noncoherent-DMA path hits this by zapping the entire GPA space without SRCU. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in slot_rmap_walk_next+0x82/0x1c0 Read of size 8 at addr ffffc900005c1008 Call Trace: slot_rmap_walk_next+0x82/0x1c0 __kvm_rmap_zap_gfn_range+0x17a/0x280 kvm_zap_gfn_range+0x2a6/0x6a0 kvm_vfio_set_attr+0x576/0x770 kvm_device_ioctl+0x1ff/0x3b0 Take SRCU inside kvm_zap_gfn_range() so every caller is covered. Nesting with an existing kvm->srcu critical section is fine; the helper uses a local index. Drop the now-redundant SRCU pair from __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit().
CVE-2026-99339 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Zero reserved synic flags when delivering message to avoid stack leak Ensure all reserved flags are zeroed when setting the msg_pending flag as part of SynIC message delivery, as setting only msg_pending can leak seven bits of kernel stack data to the guest. E.g. gcc typically uses a bitwise-OR to set the msg_pending flag, without initializing the on-stack variable. Precisely zero the flags, e.g. as opposed to zeroing the entire structure, to make it somewhat more obvious that the flags *need* to be zeroed. E.g. it would be quite easy to misread the initial read of guest memory and think that zeroing the entire structure is completely superfluous.
CVE-2026-99338 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: TDX: Enable Notify VM exit Enable Notify VM exit functionality for TDX guests. Notify VM exit is an existing feature supported by KVM. Userspace can enable Notify VM exit through KVM_CAP_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT when it's reported as supported. However, KVM reports the support of this CAP just based on the hardware capability but doesn't differentiate between VMX and TDX. This leads to the issue that userspace can enable this cap for TDX guests without getting an error, but the feature is not actually enabled because KVM doesn't call the TDX module API to program the relevant TD VMCS fields. Enable Notify VM exit for TDX guests by: - Invoking TDX module API calls to set NOTIFY_VM_EXITING and Notify Window in TD VMCS. It's done in tdx_vcpu_init() where other TD VMCS bits are set. Since TDX vCPU cannot be reset, it only needs to be configured once when initializing the TDX vCPU. - Adding corresponding exit handler for TDX Notify VM Exit. Notify VM exit can happen when executing the IRET instruction. If the IRET unblocks the NMI blocking state, bit 12 of the exit qualification is set. In this case, the VMM needs to restore the "blocked by NMI" state when it decides to re-enter the guest. For TDX, KVM cannot manage the GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO and it's TDX module's responsibility to handle it. Extract the common part without NMI blocking handling into a helper in common.h so that it can be shared between VMX and TDX. Note, KVM uses "pre-production" terminology for the feature formally called Notify VM-Exit. All public versions of the SDM refer to the feature as Instruction Timeout. This will be remedied in the near future, for now, use KVM's terminology for consistency. Note, #2, there is no enumeration bit for Notify VM exit by TDX module because all TDX modules support it, and allow to set the corresponding TD VMCS fields as long as the hardware supports the feature.
CVE-2026-99337 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: TDX: Enable Bus Lock VM exit Enable Bus Lock VM exit functionality for TDX guests. Bus Lock VM exit is an existing feature supported by KVM. Userspace can enable Bus Lock VM exit through KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT when it's reported as supported. However, KVM reports the support of this CAP just based on the hardware capability but doesn't differentiate between VMX and TDX. This leads to the issue that userspace can enable this cap for TDX guests without getting an error, but the feature is not actually enabled because KVM doesn't call the TDX module API to program the relevant TD VMCS fields. Enable Bus Lock VM exit for TDX guests by programming the BUS_LOCK_DETECTION control in the TD VMCS and by adding the exit handler. Note, there is no enumeration bit for this feature by TDX module because all TDX modules support it and allow to set the TD VMCS as long as the hardware supports the feature.
CVE-2026-99336 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: guest_memfd: take the invalidate lock when unbinding a dying file kvm_gmem_unbind() takes mapping->invalidate_lock only if the get_file_active() succeeds. When the guest_memfd file is dying, its reference count is already zero so get_file_active fails and the binding is removed without holding the invalidate lock. kvm_gmem_invalidate_{start,end}() checks f->bindings independently to decide whether to begin or end KVM MMU invalidation. So, the bindings must therefore remain stable between the two calls. Otherwise, unbind can remove a binding after start increments mmu_invalidate_in_progress, but before end finds the binding and decrements it. Example, unbind race with memory failure: CPU 0: memory failure CPU 1: memslot delete ---------------------------------- --------------------------- (guest_memfd file is dying) kvm_gmem_error_folio() kvm_gmem_invalidate_start() finds binding mmu_invalidate_in_progress++ kvm_gmem_unbind() get_file_active() fails removes binding kvm_gmem_invalidate_end() no binding found counter stays elevated mmu_invalidate_retry() then returns 1 forever, so guest page faults retry without ever installing a mapping and the guest hangs. Remove the distinction between live and dying files in the unbind path. Always use slot->gmem.file and take the invalidate lock when it's non-NULL. Normal unbind callers hold slots_lock, which prevents release from clearing the pointer or freeing the file state until unbind completes. Final VM teardown can only see a NULL pointer because guest_memfd pins the KVM until release has cleared all bindings.
CVE-2026-99335 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: guest_memfd: Establish memslot<=>guest_memfd bindings *after* memslot is ready Wait to bind a memslot to a guest_memfd instance until *after* the memslot is fully prepared, as creating the binding in guest_memfd will effectively expose the memslot to readers. As pointed out by Sashiko, binding the memslot before it's ready to be exposed to the rest of the world can break various memslot assumption and rules. E.g. x86 could observe a NULL rmap pointer if a PUNCH_HOLE hit the guest_memfd after the binding was created, but before KVM made it through kvm_prepare_memory_region().
CVE-2026-99334 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add preempt_disable() around virtual-mode HPTE bit-lock users kvmppc_hv_find_lock_hpte() requires virtual-mode callers to run with preemption disabled, because it can return with HPTE_V_HVLOCK still held until the caller later unlocks the HPTE. Existing virtual-mode callers in book3s_64_mmu_hv.c already follow that rule. Two virtual-mode call paths do not: 1. kvmppc_handle_exit_hv() calls kvmppc_hpte_hv_fault() for hash-mode data-side and instruction-side faults after guest exit, with preemption already enabled. kvmppc_hpte_hv_fault() calls kvmppc_hv_find_lock_hpte() directly. 2. kvmppc_pseries_do_hcall() executes virtual-mode handlers for HPT hcalls via kvmppc_pseries_do_hpt_hcall() with preemption enabled. The handlers for H_ENTER, H_REMOVE, H_READ, H_CLEAR_MOD, H_CLEAR_REF, H_PROTECT, and H_BULK_REMOVE spin on try_lock_hpte() or lock_rmap(), and H_ENTER also reaches kvmppc_do_h_enter(), which uses arch_spin_lock() on kvm->mmu_lock. That raw lock choice is intentional because kvmppc_do_h_enter() is also used by real-mode callers, so the correct fix is to establish the proper preemption context at the virtual-mode caller boundary. If a vCPU thread is preempted while holding HPTE_V_HVLOCK, any other thread on the same CPU trying to acquire the same bit-lock can spin indefinitely. The same applies to lock_rmap() users and to the H_ENTER path while holding the raw mmu_lock. Fix this by adding preempt_disable()/preempt_enable() pairs around the two kvmppc_hpte_hv_fault() call sites in kvmppc_handle_exit_hv(), and around the kvmppc_pseries_do_hpt_hcall() invocation in kvmppc_pseries_do_hcall(). Targeting only the HPT hcall helper avoids wrapping non-HPT hcalls (such as H_RTAS, H_CONFER, H_REGISTER_VPA) that perform page faults, blocking memory allocations, or context switches.
CVE-2026-99333 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-19 N/A
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: amd_sfh: Use report type from request node Use report type from request node while sending feature and input reports to HID core. The cli_data report type array is never assigned and feature reports are sent as input reports.