| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| NLTK versions before 3.10.0 default to ENFORCE=False in pathsec.py, causing all security validation functions to emit warnings instead of raising exceptions. Attackers can bypass path traversal and pickle deserialization protections by exploiting the disabled security controls that are only active when manually enabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: fix guest_memory_dirty bitfield clobbered as size
Two sites in vmwgfx_resource.c assign boolean literals to
res->guest_memory_size, which is an unsigned long allocation-size
field; the intended target is the adjacent res->guest_memory_dirty
bitfield. After the assignments the field holds 0 or 1 instead of
the resource's MOB allocation size:
- vmw_resource_release() writes 0 (false), and
- vmw_resource_unbind_list() writes 1 (true).
Subsequent revalidation paths read guest_memory_size when computing
the dirty page range (vmw_bo_dirty_transfer_to_res()) and the buffer
allocation size (vmw_resource_buf_alloc()), producing zero-length
walks or wrap-around ranges that read or write past the MOB bitmap.
The dirty-tracking intent of the original code (mark the resource as
dirtied since the last sync) is also lost, since guest_memory_dirty
is never updated.
Rename both assignments to guest_memory_dirty. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: validate external BO copy bounds for both stride paths
vmw_external_bo_copy() trusts caller-supplied offsets, strides, and
heights and operates on imported dma-buf vmaps:
- The equal-stride memcpy() bound was clamped after subtracting the
offsets from dst_size and src_size; an offset larger than the BO
size wraps the unsigned subtraction to a huge value and the
resulting memcpy() runs off the end of the vmap. dst_stride *
height is also a u32 multiplication that can overflow.
- The non-equal-stride row-by-row path had no bound at all. The
loop touches bytes through offset + (height - 1) * stride +
width_in_bytes, with only a WARN_ON(dst_stride < width_in_bytes),
and could likewise step past the end of either mapping.
The offsets and strides are derived from STDU/SOU plane state, so a
configured CRTC submitting a crafted atomic commit on an imported
framebuffer can reach this path.
Validate the exact row-copy endpoint against each BO's size up front
using check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow(). Use the bulk
memcpy() path only when width_in_bytes covers the whole stride;
otherwise copy one row at a time so partial-row updates near the bottom
of a framebuffer remain valid. Also reject zero strides and stride <
width_in_bytes, both of which the row-by-row path cannot represent
safely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in decompress_lznt
decompress_lznt() does not validate array index bounds before accessing
the decompression table. A corrupted NTFS3 image with invalid compressed
data can trigger an out-of-bounds read.
Add index bounds checking to prevent the OOB access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: core: Fix OOB read in hid_get_report for numbered reports
When a caller passes a size of 0 to hid_report_raw_event() for a
numbered report, the function originally called hid_get_report() before
performing any size validation.
Inside hid_get_report(), if the report is numbered (report_enum->numbered
is true), it unconditionally dereferences data[0] to extract the report ID.
With a size of 0, this results in an out-of-bounds read or kernel panic.
Fix this by moving the numbered report size validation check before the
call to hid_get_report(), ensuring that size is at least 1 before
dereferencing the data pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: flowtable: avoid num_encaps underflow on bridge VLAN untag
The DEV_PATH_BR_VLAN_UNTAG case post-decrements info->num_encaps
inside WARN_ON_ONCE(). num_encaps is u8, so if it's already 0 the
decrement still happens and wraps it to 255. The break only leaves
the inner switch -- a later path entry can set info->indev back to
a real device, and we end up returning with num_encaps == 255.
nft_dev_forward_path() then walks info.encap[] (size 2) up to
num_encaps, which means an OOB stack read and a bogus count copied
into the route descriptor.
Should only happen on a malformed bridge path stack, hence the WARN,
but worth handling sanely. Move the decrement out of the WARN.
[ While at this, remove the WARN_ON_ONCE since this can only happen
with a buggy bridge path stack --pablo ]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: validate individual TWT params before driver setup
ieee80211_process_rx_twt_action() only partially validates a received
S1G TWT setup frame before queueing it.
An individual agreement can therefore reach ieee80211_s1g_rx_twt_setup()
with twt->length too short for the full struct ieee80211_twt_params.
The individual path passes twt to drv_add_twt_setup(). Both the tracepoint
and the driver callback consume the complete parameters block, not merely
req_type. Do not pass a short individual agreement to the driver.
Broadcast agreements remain unchanged because they are rejected locally
after accessing only req_type.
[edit commit message to not overclaim lack of validation nor
understate driver impact] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
of: reserved_mem: prevent OOB when too many dynamic regions are defined
On boot, fdt_scan_reserved_mem() saves each dynamically-placed
/reserved-memory subnode into a local array of size
MAX_RESERVED_REGIONS.
If the device tree defines more than MAX_RESERVED_REGIONS
dynamically-placed regions, fdt_scan_reserved_mem() writes past the
end of the local array.
Add a bounds check that logs an error and skips the excess regions,
restoring the original behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_remove_refcount_extent
[BUG]
Unlinking a refcounted file whose refcount tree has leaf blocks
triggers a fortify panic due to an out-of-bounds write.
[CAUSE]
When the last leaf block is removed from a refcount tree,
ocfs2_remove_refcount_extent() converts the root back to leaf mode
with a bulk memset on &rb->rf_records. rf_records sits in an anonymous
union with rf_list. rf_list.l_tree_depth aliases rf_records.rl_count,
and is 0 for a single-level tree. With rl_count equal to 0, the memset
writes past the 16-byte declared size of rf_records, which the fortify
checker catches.
[FIX]
Replace the bulk memset on &rb->rf_records with a correctly-bounded
memset on rl_recs[] alone, after setting rl_count to the correct value. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: dat: acquire ARP hw source only after skb realloc
The pskb_may_pull() called by batadv_get_vid() could reallocate the buffer
behind the skb. Variables which were pointing to the old buffer need to be
reassigned to avoid an use-after-free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gro: properly validate BIG TCP aggregation criteria
When GRO attempts to aggregate packets beyond GRO_LEGACY_MAX_SIZE (64KB),
BIG TCP should only be permitted for plain IPv4 TCP and plain IPv6 TCP
(with sufficient MAC header room to insert the temporary HBH jumbo header).
However, commit b1a78b9b9886 ("net: add support for ipv4 big tcp")
loosened the check in skb_gro_receive(), leading to several issues:
1. skb_gro_receive() checked skb_headroom(p) instead of the actual space
before the MAC header (p->mac_header). Because skb_headroom(p) includes
mac_len, crafted frames (e.g. injected via AF_PACKET) can pass the check
with p->mac_header < 8 bytes. When ipv6_gro_complete() inserts the
temporary HBH jumbo header, the memmove() starts before skb->head,
causing an out-of-bounds write and wrapping skb->mac_header.
2. It allowed non-IP protocols such as software VLAN (ETH_P_8021Q /
ETH_P_8021AD) to aggregate beyond 64KB because
p->protocol != ETH_P_IPV6 was true.
3. It checked p->encapsulation instead of NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark,
allowing encapsulated flows (e.g. SIT / IPv6-in-IPv4) to aggregate
beyond 64KB.
Fix skb_gro_receive() to strictly enforce:
- NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->proto == IPPROTO_TCP
- Not encapsulated (!NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark && !p->encapsulation)
- Protocol must be either ETH_P_IP or ETH_P_IPV6
- If ETH_P_IPV6, p->mac_header must be at least
sizeof(struct hop_jumbo_hdr)
Returning -E2BIG from skb_gro_receive() ensures that packets which cannot
become BIG TCP are cleanly flushed at <= 64KB and delivered intact without
dropping.
This issue does not exist in mainline (7.0+) because the subsystem was
rewritten in commit 81be30c1f5f2 ("net/ipv6: Drop HBH for BIG TCP on RX
side"), making this fix relevant only for older stable branches like
6.18.y. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf sched: Fix register_pid() overflow, strcpy, and BUG_ON
register_pid() has several issues when processing untrusted perf.data:
1. Integer overflow: (pid + 1) * sizeof(struct task_desc *) can wrap
to a small value on 32-bit systems when pid is large (e.g.
0x40000000), causing realloc to return a tiny buffer followed by
out-of-bounds writes in the initialization loop.
2. Heap buffer overflow: strcpy(task->comm, comm) copies the
untrusted comm string into a fixed 20-byte COMM_LEN buffer with
no length check.
3. BUG_ON on allocation failure: perf.data is untrusted input, so
allocation failures should be handled gracefully rather than
killing the process.
4. Realloc of sched->tasks assigned directly back, leaking the old
pointer on failure; nr_tasks incremented before the realloc,
leaving corrupted state on failure.
Cap pid at PID_MAX_LIMIT (4194304, matching the kernel's maximum
on 64-bit), replace strcpy with strlcpy, guard against NULL comm,
replace BUG_ON with NULL returns using safe realloc patterns, and
add NULL checks in callers that dereference the result. |
| A weakness in the MongoDB C++ Driver's handling of caller-supplied namespace identifiers allows special characters embedded in those identifiers. An application that builds a namespace identifier from untrusted input without validating it may therefore have its operation directed at a different target than intended. This can result in limited unauthorized read and write access to data belonging to another logical tenant of the affected application. |
| PrivateBin is an online pastebin where the server has zero knowledge of pasted data. Prior to 2.0.5, Request::getRequestUri() in lib/Request.php passes $_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'] through FILTER_SANITIZE_URL, which does not remove quotation marks, angle brackets, or apostrophes, and Controller::_init() stores the attacker-controlled value in Controller::$_urlBase. Controller::_jsonld() in lib/Controller.php then uses str_replace() to insert that value without JSON escaping into js/types.jsonld, js/paste.jsonld, and the other JSON-LD templates used by /?jsonld= and /?pasteid. A raw quotation mark delivered by an HTTP client, proxy, or structured-data crawler that does not normalize the request target can break out of the JSON string and inject arbitrary key-value data into a CORS-open application/ld+json response. The jsonld branch in Controller::__construct() returns before _setCacheHeaders(), so the response also lacks X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, Content Security Policy, X-Frame-Options, and Referrer-Policy. Direct script execution was not demonstrated, but manipulated responses can affect structured-data consumers or combine with less strict clients. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.5. |
| eml_parser serves as a python module for parsing eml files and returning various information found in the e-mail as well as computed information. Prior to 3.0.2, the clean_found_uri function in eml_parser/parser.py validates potential URL strings before unescaping HTML entities used for colon, slash, or period characters. Valid encoded URLs and their host names are therefore rejected and omitted from the extracted URL and domain lists. Email security gateways and SOC pipelines that use those lists as indicators of compromise may fail to submit the hidden URLs to threat intelligence feeds, reputation services, or sandboxes, allowing malicious links to bypass inspection. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.2. |
| MariaDB Connector/R2DBC is a non-blocking MariaDB and MySQL client implemented in Java. Prior to 1.4.1, org.mariadb:r2dbc-mariadb encodes and decodes all character data under the assumption that the connection character set is UTF-8. A server can announce a mid-session change to character_set_client through the OK-packet session-state-tracking mechanism, including through SET NAMES executed by a stored routine or trigger, server configuration, or a hostile or man-in-the-middle server. If the new character set is not UTF-8, the driver continues to exchange UTF-8 while the server interprets the same bytes under a different encoding, causing silent data corruption and a client/server charset-confusion mismatch that can defeat byte-wise quoting or escaping. The fix accepts only utf8, utf8mb3, or utf8mb4 after initialization; any other value raises R2dbcNonTransientResourceException with SQLState 08000 and closes the connection. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.1. |
| MariaDB Connector/Node.js is used to connect applications developed on Node.js to MariaDB and MySQL databases. Prior to 3.2.4, 3.3.3, 3.4.6, and 3.5.3, MariaDB Connector/Node.js permits SQL injection when attacker-controlled Buffer parameters are escaped client-side under the big5, gbk, sjis, cp932, or gb18030 client character sets. PacketOutputStream.writeBufferEscape in lib/io/packet-output-stream.js escaped bytes without the charset-aware getMbRecognizer logic in lib/misc/charset-mb.js. The server SQL lexer runs my_ismbchar before escape processing, so an attacker-controlled lead byte can consume the inserted 0x5C backslash as a multibyte trail byte and leave the following 0x27 quote unescaped, terminating the string literal and allowing arbitrary SQL. The default utf8mb4 character set and parameters sent through the execute binary prepared-statement path are not affected. Successful exploitation can expose or modify data available to the database account. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.4, 3.3.3, 3.4.6, and 3.5.3. |
| NVIDIA OpenShell for Linux contains a vulnerability in its inference proxy, where an attacker could cause an improper encoding or escaping of output. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to information disclosure and data tampering. |
| Improper access control in debug and engineering interfaces in Danfoss iC7-Automation SP, iC7-Marine, and iC7-Hybrid GR3 allows attackers to gain read/write access to internal values, upload and execute unsigned applications, and upload unsigned EEPROM data and firmware via exposed service interfaces and software update mechanisms |
| LogTape is an unobtrusive logging library. Prior to 1.3.11, 2.0.14, and 2.1.5, the @logtape/syslog package's escapeStructuredDataValue() function in packages/syslog/src/syslog.ts does not neutralize C0 control characters from U+0000 through U+001F in structured data values, and formatStructuredData() inserts property keys without validating the RFC 5424 SD-NAME grammar. When includeStructuredData is true, an attacker-controlled newline can terminate an RFC 6587 non-transparent TCP syslog frame and make following bytes appear as a forged RFC 5424 record, while a key containing a closing bracket or other forbidden character can terminate or corrupt the structured-data element. Applications that forward attacker-controlled property values or keys can therefore allow forged records with arbitrary hosts, applications, process identifiers, facilities, or severity levels, undermining downstream collector and SIEM integrity. This issue is fixed in versions 1.3.11, 2.0.14, and 2.1.5. |
