| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Budibase before 3.40.0 contains server-side request forgery vulnerabilities in OpenAPI query import and REST query execution that allow authenticated builder-level users to bypass DNS pinning protections through DNS rebinding attacks. Attackers can configure hostnames that resolve to public addresses during validation but resolve to loopback or private addresses during actual connection, allowing access to blocked internal HTTP services. |
| Budibase before 3.40.0 fails to properly sanitize S3 object keys, allowing authenticated builders to upload files with traversal sequences that are preserved during export. Attackers can craft filenames containing .. segments that escape the temporary directory during workspace export, writing arbitrary content to any path writable by the Budibase process. |
| Budibase versions 3.39.4 before 3.40.0 contain an authorization regression in the S3 attachment upload endpoint that allows BASIC users to obtain S3 PutObject presigned URLs by sending POST requests to the attachments endpoint. The route was changed from a BUILDER permission check to a TABLE/WRITE check, which BASIC users hold by default. Attackers can specify arbitrary S3 buckets in the request body to generate presigned URLs for writing to any bucket accessible by the stored IAM credentials, enabling unauthorized file uploads. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, GET /api/users/metadata and GET /api/users/metadata/:id returned user objects processed by packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts without removing oauth2.accessToken or oauth2.refreshToken. A user with the POWER role could retrieve the identity-provider credentials of SSO-authenticated users and use the refresh tokens for persistent access to connected services. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.25. |
| Budibase before 3.40.0 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the chat-link handoff endpoint that allows attackers to bind an external chat identity to a victim's account. Attackers can craft a phishing page that auto-submits a POST request with a leaked confirmation token to bind their chat identity to a victim user's account, enabling impersonation within agent operations and inheritance of victim permissions. |
| Budibase before 3.40.0 contains an unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability in webhook-triggered automations with EXECUTE_QUERY steps. Attackers can POST attacker-controlled JSON to the webhook trigger endpoint to inject SQL payloads that execute with builder-configured database credentials, enabling data exfiltration, modification, and persistence in connected datasources like Snowflake. |
| Budibase versions before 3.40.0 contain an authorization/authentication bypass in the PUT /api/global/users/tenant/owner (changeTenantOwnerEmail) endpoint. On self-hosted instances (SELF_HOSTED or DISABLE_ACCOUNT_PORTAL set), the cloudRestricted middleware is a no-op and the route is protected only by a general authentication check, so any authenticated user — including a lowest-privilege BASIC app user — can reassign the tenant account-holder (top-privilege admin) email to an attacker-controlled address. The attacker can then use the public password-reset flow to take over the admin account, leading to full administrative access. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.32, GET /api/global/users/tenant/:id was listed in PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS in packages/worker/src/api/index.ts, and tenantUserLookup returned a full PlatformUser document. An unauthenticated caller could query an email or user identifier, distinguish existing users from missing users, and obtain tenant identifiers, user identifiers, email addresses, SSO identifiers, and document revision metadata. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.32. |
| Budibase Server before 3.40.0 contains a NoSQL injection vulnerability in the MongoDB query execution endpoint where user-supplied parameters are interpolated into JSON query templates without proper sanitization of JSON metacharacters. Attackers with query write permission can inject JSON structural characters to alter MongoDB queries, bypassing filters to read, modify, or delete arbitrary documents. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, POST /api/global/auth/:tenantId/login incremented the failure counter in packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/auth.ts only for existing users, while packages/worker/src/middleware/emailLockout.ts returned X-Account-Locked and Retry-After only for locked identifiers. An unauthenticated attacker could compare the response after repeated failures to enumerate valid email addresses and temporarily lock valid accounts. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.25. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.0, POST /api/v2/email on account.budibase.app accepted a client-controlled accountId without binding it to the authenticated session, while checking only currentEmail. An authenticated attacker who obtains a victim account identifier can start the email-change workflow for the victim, receive and submit the verification code through POST /api/v2/email/verification, move the victim email to an attacker-controlled address, and complete a password reset as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.0. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.4, uploadUrl in packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts used a bare server-side fetch for string attachment values passed by processAttachments in packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/helpers/rows.ts. A builder with the AI table-generation feature could cause an attachment value to reference an internal service or cloud metadata endpoint, and the response would be stored as an attachment without fetchWithBlacklist validation. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.4. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, packages/server/src/api/controllers/automation.ts returned automation test results containing trigger.outputs.user.oauth2, broadcast BuilderSocketEvent.AutomationTestProgress to the app room, and stored progress in packages/server/src/automations/testProgress.ts without user scoping. A co-builder could receive or poll another SSO-authenticated builder test and obtain OAuth2 access and refresh tokens. The fix adds sanitizeAutomationTestResult and isolates progress by user. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.25. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.1, RestIntegration._req in packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts attached credentials from getAuthHeaders and defaultHeaders without requiring the final request destination to match the datasource origin. An unauthenticated caller of a PUBLIC POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId query could supply an absolute or parameterized path to an attacker-controlled host and receive the stored bearer, basic, or static-header credentials. This issue is fixed in version 3.40.1. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.40.0, the MySQL integration component in Budibase is configured with multipleStatements: true, enabling execution of multiple SQL statements in a single query. Attackers can inject malicious SQL commands through user input fields, leading to complete database compromise. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.40.0. |
| Budibase before 3.38.1 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the REST datasource integration that fails to validate HTTP redirects against the IP blacklist. Attackers with Builder role can configure a REST datasource pointing to an external server that returns a redirect to internal IP addresses, bypassing blacklist protection to access cloud metadata endpoints and internal services. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.12, an unauthenticated visitor of any published Budibase app reads every document of the backing MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-PartiQL, or REST-with-JSON-body collection and, where the builder has published a PUBLIC write query, modifies every document of that collection with one HTTP request. enrichContext at packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts:121-138 substitutes parameter values into the raw JSON body of a query, then JSON.parses the result. The validator validateQueryInputs at packages/server/src/api/controllers/query/index.ts:61-71 rejects only Handlebars markers ({{, }}) in user input and does not escape JSON metacharacters (", \, }). A parameter value containing a closing quote and additional keys lifts attacker-controlled fields into the parsed filter object. For Mongo find, the parsed filter passes directly to collection.find() (packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:506-510). Duplicate-key JSON parsing overrides the builder's {name: "..."} with {name: {$exists: true}} and returns every document. The same primitive against an updateMany query (mongodb.ts:577-585) widens the filter scope to the full collection while the builder-controlled $set body runs against every matched document. The authorized middleware at packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:141-148 short-circuits when the query's role is PUBLIC. CSRF is not enforced on this path. POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId (packages/server/src/api/routes/query.ts:63) accepts the call with no session, only an x-budibase-app-id header that is public from the published-app URL. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.12. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, `GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff` is a public endpoint (no auth required) that performs a permanent, state-changing operation: it binds an external chat identity (Slack/Discord/MS Teams) to an authenticated Budibase user account, with no consent UI and no CSRF protection. The session token in the URL is created by the attacker (from their own /link slash command) and embeds the attacker's externalUserId. When an authenticated Budibase victim visits the URL, their account is silently and permanently linked to the attacker's Slack/Discord identity. The server responds with "Authentication succeeded." — no indication of what was linked. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, the webhook trigger endpoint in Budibase is publicly accessible and passes the full HTTP request body into automation execution parameters. A mass assignment vulnerability in externalTrigger() allows an attacker to overwrite the internal appId property by including it in the webhook POST body. When the automation is processed asynchronously (the default path for webhooks without a collect step), the worker executes the attacker-defined automation in the context of the victim's workspace, granting full read/write access to the victim's database. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9. |
| Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.0, an anonymous attacker who knows or can enumerate a workspace id (app_...) and an S3-source datasource id (ds_...) can call this endpoint with no auth and obtain a 15-minute pre-signed PUT URL minted on the victim's IAM identity. The endpoint also returns the publicUrl so the attacker knows exactly where their PUT lands. Because bucket is attacker-controlled, the attacker can write to any bucket those IAM credentials can write to, not only the bucket the datasource was configured for. The Budibase server route POST /api/attachments/:datasourceId/url (packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts) is registered with only the recaptcha middleware. There is no authorized(...) middleware in the chain. The controller (packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts::getSignedUploadURL) looks the requested datasource up, instantiates an AWS S3 client with the datasource's stored accessKeyId / secretAccessKey, and returns an AWS Signature V4 pre-signed PutObjectCommand URL for the caller-supplied bucket and key. The bucket is not pinned to the datasource's configured bucket. The workspace context required by sdk.datasources.get is sourced by getWorkspaceIdFromCtx (packages/backend-core/src/utils/utils.ts) from any of: the x-budibase-app-id header, the JSON body appId, a path segment that begins with the workspace prefix, or ?appId=. auth.buildAuthMiddleware([], { publicAllowed: true }) runs before any of this and explicitly allows anonymous requests. The currentWorkspace middleware's "deny access to dev preview" branch only triggers under isBrowser(ctx) && !isApiKey(ctx); isBrowser checks the parsed User-Agent for a recognised browser, so any non-browser client (curl, the supplied PoC, any tool not setting a browser UA) is neither and reaches dev workspaces too. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.0. |
