| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched_ext: Fix use-after-free of a destroyed user DSQ by a deferred reenqueue
A deferred reenqueue can read a freed user DSQ. The request stays on its
CPU's deferred list until run_deferred() takes it, and the RCU callback that
frees the DSQ assumes that the grace period has flushed it, so exit_dsq()
checks the per-CPU node without the deferred list lock. A grace period waits
for readers in flight, not for a pending run_deferred(). A run_deferred()
which starts after the grace period began can detach the request right
before the callback looks and then read the freed DSQ's id.
Cancel the pending requests before the grace period instead. The irq work
that frees the DSQ unlinks every CPU's request under the per-CPU deferred
list lock, and schedule_dsq_reenq() ignores a new request under the same
lock once the id is invalid. Only a run_deferred() that started before the
grace period can hold a request, and it runs with IRQs disabled, so the
grace period waits for it and nothing touches the DSQ after the callback. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Don't transfer shrinker pages for pinned bos on purgeable state change
Pinned bos have their pages removed from the shrinker's shrinkable /
purgeable counts on pin, and added back on unpin according to the
bo's purgeable state at that time.
However, xe_bo_set_purgeable_shrinker() unconditionally transfers
pages between the shrinkable and purgeable counts. If the purgeable
state of a pinned bo changes, for example by userspace madvising
DONTNEED on a VMA of a bo that is also pinned as a scanout buffer,
this underflows one count and, after unpin, leaves the other one
permanently inflated.
Only update the purgeable flag for pinned bos, and leave the page
accounting to unpin.
(cherry picked from commit afe6bc012034123fd838328668e609bf57e46bd3) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: avoid divide by zero in fib_rebalance
fib_rebalance() computes the total eligible nexthop weight in one pass
and programs upper bounds in a second pass. A concurrent change to
ignore_routes_with_linkdown can make the first pass return zero while
the second pass sees an eligible nexthop, resulting in division by zero.
If the first pass reports a zero total, set each nexthop upper bound to
-1 and skip the division. This matches the IPv6 fix in commit
d2c26c2911dd ("ipv6: avoid divide by zero in rt6_multipath_rebalance")
and preserves the lock-free rebalance path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: libiscsi: Validate the ITT reflected in a Reject PDU
A Reject PDU carries a copy of the header it rejects, and
iscsi_handle_reject() takes the ITT out of that copy to find the task to
clean up:
memcpy(&rejected_pdu, data, sizeof(struct iscsi_hdr));
...
task = iscsi_itt_to_task(conn, rejected_pdu.itt);
That value is whatever the target put there. iscsi_itt_to_task() bounds
the index against cmds_max and checks nothing else, so any task in the
pool can be named, and iscsi_nop_out_rsp() then completes it.
An index that has never been used gives a NULL task->conn: the pool is
zeroed at session setup and conn is assigned only when a task is
allocated. If the task was used and returned, iscsi_complete_task() hits
its WARN_ON_ONCE(task->state == ISCSI_TASK_FREE) and the refcount
underflows. An in-flight SCSI command is completed as successful - a 1
MiB read returned 1048576 with none of its buffer written and no
warning.
Validate the reflected ITT the way iscsi_itt_to_ctask() validates a
command ITT, and require the task to be in flight and not a SCSI
command.
[ 6.248477] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000c: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 6.249357] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000060-0x0000000000000067]
[ 6.249951] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-ISCSI1-gf5098b6bae76 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 6.250718] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 6.251616] RIP: 0010:iscsi_nop_out_rsp.constprop.0+0x46/0x160
[ 6.252043] Code: c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 08 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 f5 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 58 48 8d 7d 60 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 c0 00 00 00 48 8b 45 60 48 39 c3 74 50 48 b8 00
[ 6.252813] RSP: 0018:ffff88806c907b80 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 6.253042] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88800607e000 RCX: ffffffff8d571a25
[ 6.253345] RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: ffff88806c907c38 RDI: 0000000000000060
[ 6.253642] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff235a504
[ 6.253947] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 7463656e6e6f6320 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 6.254251] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88806c907c38 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 6.254549] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880d95bc000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 6.254887] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 6.255140] CR2: 00007fc393e8ffc0 CR3: 0000000005252006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 6.255439] PKRU: 55555554
[ 6.255564] Call Trace:
[ 6.255674] <IRQ>
[ 6.255768] __iscsi_complete_pdu+0x18bf/0x22a0
[ 6.256733] iscsi_complete_pdu+0x54/0xa0
[ 6.256905] iscsi_tcp_data_recv_done+0xf4/0x250
[ 6.257103] iscsi_tcp_recv_skb+0x31e/0xec0
[ 6.257680] iscsi_sw_tcp_recv+0x12f/0x390
[ 6.258061] __tcp_read_sock+0x1ab/0x810
[ 6.258853] iscsi_sw_tcp_data_ready+0x18b/0x510
[ 6.259808] tcp_data_queue+0x1f13/0x4cd0
[ 6.260567] tcp_rcv_established+0x8a5/0x3a00
[ 6.261931] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x449/0x960
[ 6.262269] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2245/0x3bc0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: xen/scsifront: Check for a NULL shadow entry on a backend response
scsifront_do_response() validates the rqid in a backend response against
VSCSIIF_MAX_REQS before using it to index info->shadow[], but then
dereferences the entry to test ->inflight without checking that the slot
is populated. Shadow slots are NULL before a command is submitted (the
host private area is zeroed at allocation) and are reset to NULL in
_scsifront_put_rqid() once a request completes, so an in-range rqid that
does not correspond to an outstanding request makes the frontend
dereference a NULL pointer.
A malicious or buggy backend can thus crash the guest by returning a
response whose rqid is in range but not in flight -- for example a
spurious response before any command has been issued, or a duplicate of
one already completed. The ring has only VSCSIIF_MAX_REQS (16) slots,
so before the first command every in-range rqid selects a NULL slot.
Reject a response whose shadow slot is not populated. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: st: Fix use-after-free race between st_remove() and st_open()
st_remove() drops the probe reference on the scsi_tape with kref_put()
and only afterwards removes its index from st_index_idr. If that was the
last reference, scsi_tape_release() frees the structure while it is
still published in the idr.
scsi_tape_get(), called from st_open(), looks up the tape in
st_index_idr and takes a reference under st_ref_mutex and
st_index_lock. remove_cdevs() does not wait for opens that are already
past chrdev_open(), so an open that is blocked on st_ref_mutex while
st_remove() holds it can take the mutex as soon as st_remove() drops it,
find the freed tpnt in the idr and call kref_get() on it:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in st_open
Write of size 4 ...
st_open (drivers/scsi/st.c:254 drivers/scsi/st.c:1291)
chrdev_open
...
Freed by task ...:
kfree
st_remove (drivers/scsi/st.c:4512)
Remove the index from the idr before dropping the reference, all under
st_ref_mutex. A concurrent scsi_tape_get() now either runs first and
holds a valid reference that keeps the tape alive, or runs afterwards
and finds nothing, so st_open() fails with -ENXIO.
This restores the ordering st_remove() had before the conversion to
st_index_idr, where the tape was unpublished from scsi_tapes[] before
the final kref_put(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: take invalidate_lock in ntfs_setattr_size()
ntfs_setattr_size() updates i_size and resizes the on-disk attribute
without holding mapping->invalidate_lock. Page faults take the lock
shared, so a fault racing the resize can resolve a VCN against the
transient runlist state of ntfs_non_resident_attr_expand() and fail
with a spurious SIGBUS, and can interleave with the size-change
epilogue (truncate_pagecache(), i_size_write(),
pagecache_isize_extended()).
Take invalidate_lock exclusively around the whole resize after
inode_dio_wait(), matching the fallocate path and other filesystems
such as xfs, which wraps truncate in its mmaplock (= invalidate_lock). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched_ext: Fix stall when a task enqueued with SCX_ENQ_LAST lands back on its CPU's local DSQ
With SCX_OPS_ENQ_LAST, the last runnable task on a CPU is passed to
ops.enqueue() instead of being kept running. Exiting tasks without
SCX_OPS_ENQ_EXITING, migration disabled tasks without
SCX_OPS_ENQ_MIGRATION_DISABLED and tasks on an offline rq skip ops.enqueue()
and go straight to the local DSQ. This happens in put_prev_task_scx() after
the pick has settled on idle, so nothing reschedules the CPU, which idles
with the task queued until an unrelated wakeup lands on it or the watchdog
fires.
scx_mitosis, which sets SCX_OPS_ENQ_LAST without SCX_OPS_ENQ_EXITING, hit
this during mass cgroup teardown: exiting tasks stuck in exit_mmap() for
over 40 seconds.
A task put on the local DSQ runs, as anywhere else. If the SCX_ENQ_LAST
enqueue left the task on this CPU's local DSQ, set need_resched on the task
being switched in, as proxy_resched_idle() does. resched_curr() would flag
the task being put instead, and __schedule() clears that right after the
pick. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix heap overflow in cifs_do_set_acl()
cifs_set_acl() validates ACL size using posix_acl_xattr_size():
4 + (count * 8) // 4-byte header + 8 bytes per ACE
cifs_do_set_acl() then calls posix_acl_to_cifs() to write the CIFS
wire format into the same buffer:
6 + (count * 10) // 6-byte header + 10 bytes per ACE
An ACL that passes the xattr-based check in cifs_set_acl() can
overflow the heap when posix_acl_to_cifs() writes the larger CIFS
format.
Validate the CIFS format size against the remaining buffer space and
USHRT_MAX before converting--data_count is __u16, so sizes above
USHRT_MAX truncate the on-wire packet length, causing the server to
apply a partial ACL. Replace MaxDataCount = 1000 with
min(CIFSMaxBufSize, USHRT_MAX). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/dmc: Harden DMC firmware payload parsing
Validate the conversion of the DMC firmware size from dwords to bytes
using check_mul_overflow() before calculating the firmware payload size.
Reject zero-length payloads and zero MMIO counts in the DMC firmware
header so malformed firmware is caught early. Also set dmc_fw_size only
after the payload allocation succeeds.
(cherry picked from commit efde6601a1f1daedfe3dcc2816c934ddb44e3eef) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/mmu: Cope with the SS bit being set in #NPF exit codes
When running Hyper-V from Windows 11, KVM is seeing the SS bit set
in nested page fault error codes produced for shadowed NPT. The AMD
manual is unclear about when SS is set, including whether it can be set
when SupervisorShadowStackEn (bit 6) is not set in the MISC_CTL field
of the VMCB.
Nevertheless, the unexpected SS bit causes out of bounds accesses in
permission_fault(), seen as either WARNs or UBSAN reports:
kernel: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h:225:27
kernel: index 34 is out of range for type 'u16 [16]'
(in this case, the page fault error code is 34*2=0x44, i.e. SS|U; the
report shows SS|U|W happening as well). Fix the handling of unknown
error codes by dropping SS and (with a WARN) any bits not among those
that permission_fault() expects to receive.
At the same time, given the uncertainty about when hardware sets SS,
follow the processor's behavior when constructing the fault's error
code, and preserve the SS bit as passed to FNAME(walk_addr_generic).
While the behavior is surprising, there's a possibility that Hyper-V
expects it (Hyper-V does not even enable CET unless it finds MBEC/GMET!),
so retain the information when reflecting the fault to L1 instead of
unconditionally discarding it.
Bisection shows that this started happening with commit 687ee95c1b6d ("KVM:
nSVM: enable GMET for guests"), even though SHSTK was available to guests
since Linux 6.18. However, this is not because bit 1 of MISC_CTL (GMET)
somehow enables reporting the SS bit; rather, it's simply that Hyper-V
never uses CET unless GMET is also present. The WARN is reproducible
even with gmet=0, with some hacking of kvm-unit-tests's cet.c testcase
to ensure that the first access to the shadow stack triggers a page fault. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/vmci: validate packet source for connected sockets
vmci_transport_recv_stream_cb() looks up sockets first by the full source
and destination tuple, then by destination only in the bound table. The
fallback can select a non-listening socket without checking whether the
packet came from its stored peer.
This was reproduced with two VMCI contexts. A RST from the context not
stored in a TCP_SYN_SENT socket reset that socket after it was selected by
the destination-only lookup.
VMCI can process notification packets in bottom-half context when the
socket is not owned by user context, or defer packets to a workqueue. Use
vsock_check_source() after taking the socket lock in the bottom-half path,
and recheck after lock_sock() in the workqueue path. Listening sockets
continue to accept packets from any source.
Reply with a RST addressed from the received packet before dropping a
source that fails validation. This preserves the existing reset behavior
for bound non-listening and concurrently closed sockets without directing
the reset to a connected socket's stored peer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: p54: validate firmware record lengths
The p54 firmware parser accesses component ID and component version
records without checking that their lengths cover the fields being read.
A malformed record can therefore make the parser read past the record.
Validate the component ID and component version record lengths before
accessing their data. The descriptor record is also checked against the
shortest descriptor length found in the supported firmware images.
Reject descriptor values that underflow the RX offset or produce an empty
RX range before updating the driver state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gud: validate GUD_ROTATION_0 is present in supported rotations
The rotation argument to drm_plane_create_rotation_property() is set to
DRM_MODE_ROTATE_0, and the device reported rotation bitmask is used as
the supported_rotations argument. The driver never validates that
GUD_ROTATION_0 is present, so a device that omits it from its
GUD_PROPERTY_ROTATION triggers the
WARN_ON(rotation & ~supported_rotations) in
drm_plane_create_rotation_property()
Fix this by skipping the creation of rotation property if the device
doesn't have the GUD_ROTATION_0 bit |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: propagate reparse index insertion failure
update_reparse_data() ignores the return value of
set_reparse_index(). When index insertion fails, the code removes
the just-written reparse data as cleanup but still returns 0, so
symlink(2) (and WSL special file creation) reports success while
no reparse data exists on disk. When there was no previous reparse
data (oldsize == 0), the failure was likewise silently ignored.
Propagate the error to the caller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/cirrus-qemu: Validate BAR0 size during probe
The `cirrus-qemu` driver relies on `CIRRUS_VRAM_SIZE` (4 MB) to validate
framebuffer sizes. However, during PCI probe, the driver mapped BAR0
without verifying that its size matches `CIRRUS_VRAM_SIZE`.
If a PCI device with a BAR0 smaller than 4 MB is bound to the driver, the
mapped VRAM will be smaller than expected. Because validation checks assume
4 MB VRAM, framebuffers larger than the mapped memory can be created.
When the display plane is updated (e.g. during release),
`cirrus_primary_plane_helper_atomic_update()` copies the framebuffer to
VRAM using `drm_fb_memcpy()`. Writing past the end of the mapped I/O memory
causes a supervisor write page fault:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc9000389c000
...
RIP: 0010:memcpy_toio+0x7c/0xe0 arch/x86/lib/iomem.c:110
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
iosys_map_memcpy_to include/linux/iosys-map.h:285 [inline]
drm_fb_memcpy+0x325/0x5d0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_format_helper.c:442
cirrus_primary_plane_helper_atomic_update+0x98a/0xb00
drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/cirrus-qemu.c:358
drm_atomic_helper_commit_planes+0x626/0xea0
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:3038
drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail+0x60/0x510
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:1989
commit_tail+0x2b1/0x3c0 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:2074
drm_atomic_helper_commit+0xa77/0xb10
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:2312
Fix this by validating in `cirrus_pci_probe()` that the PCI BAR0 resource
is not less than `CIRRUS_VRAM_SIZE`, returning `-ENODEV` if it is less. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
printk: Don't WARN on kthread_run failure.
Since __kthread_create_on_node() returns -EINTR upon SIGKILL,
we should not use WARN_ON() in order to catch kthread_run() failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
readdir: take no inode lock on an immutable directory
iterate_dir() takes the directory's i_rwsem shared and holds it across
->iterate_shared(). For a directory that never has an entry and is
never removed the lock keeps nothing still, it only orders every reader
and every writer of that inode behind each other.
For the directory of a nullfs instance that matters. The instance of
the initial mount namespace is the root of every empty mount namespace
and the private instance is the root of every kernel thread, so one
inode is shared across users who have nothing else in common. And a
reader can hold the lock for as long as it likes: back the getdents()
buffer with a mapping of a file on a FUSE mount of your own, let the
copy of "." and ".." fault and let the server wait. Queue an exclusive
taker behind it, a mkdir() in that directory goes through start_dirop()
before the read-only mount is reported, and from then on every lookup
that misses the dcache in that directory, every create and every mount
on it waits until the server answers. One user of an empty mount
namespace stalls all the others.
Add FOP_IMMUTABLE for the file operations of a directory that never
changes and is never removed and let iterate_dir() skip the lock for
it. The flag never changes for a file, ->f_pos is protected by
f_pos_lock since directories are FMODE_ATOMIC_POS, IS_DEADDIR can't be
set on such a directory and neither touch_atime() nor fsnotify take
i_rwsem. Set it on the nullfs directory. The placeholder directories of
libfs never have an entry either but their owners remove them, so they
keep the lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: serialize vblank counter reads against GPU reset
The vblank counter callback reads display registers and scanout
position without holding reset_domain->sem. During GPU recovery,
display commit work can call the callback while reset owns the
semaphore for writing. The hardware access then triggers the
lockdep_assert_held() in amdgpu_device_skip_hw_access() and sets
TAINT_WARN when lockdep is enabled.
Try to acquire the reset semaphore for reading before accessing the
hardware, and hold it across the counter and scanout-position reads.
If reset is already in progress, return DRM's cached software vblank
count instead. This avoids blocking behind reset and avoids accessing
display hardware while it is being reset.
The cached count is less accurate than the hardware count, but is
used only when reset prevents a safe hardware read. This addresses
the reset-time warning from this vblank path; it does not suppress or
fix unrelated lockdep warnings.
(cherry picked from commit 51a4359f7431a4be5e42803c8bdaf7e0e5be2934) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: patch: fix handling of bpf-jit execmem addresses
Commit 8718e5a3090b ("riscv: patch: skip fixmap mapping when kernel text
is already writable") gated the core_kernel_text() branch of patch_map()
on CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX, and explicitly left the vmalloc branch
unchanged. That branch has a separate problem.
That branch only creates a temporary writable fixmap alias when
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is enabled, and otherwise assumes the target is
directly writable and returns the address unchanged. That assumption no
longer holds: bpf_prog_pack_alloc calls set_memory_rox() on every pack
unconditionally in alloc_new_pack(), independently of any
CONFIG_STRICT_*_RWX option, so BPF text in the vmalloc area is read-only
regardless of what CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX says.
With CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=n, patch_map() returns the read-only
address directly, the subsequent copy_to_kernel_nofault() takes a
page fault and returns -EFAULT. bpf_arch_text_copy() turns that into
-EINVAL, which propagates through bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() to the
WARN_ON() in bpf_int_jit_compile() and leaves the program un-JITed.
Note that BPF cannot be fixed the way kprobes was in
commit bdc46e507b59 ("riscv: mm: make EXECMEM_KPROBES writable without
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX"). EXECMEM_BPF is already PAGE_KERNEL, i.e.
writable at allocation time; the read-only mapping is established
afterwards by generic code in alloc_new_pack(), which arch code cannot
influence. The only place this can be handled is patch_map().
This is the same problem that was fixed on arm64 by commit b1480ed230ac
("arm64: patching: fix handling of execmem addresses"), and the fix is
the same: CONFIG_EXECMEM is what actually tracks whether the vmalloc
area can hold executable memory that needs a temporary alias to be
written. CONFIG_BPF_JIT, CONFIG_KPROBES and CONFIG_MODULES all select
it.
Note that this is not limited to CONFIG_MODULES=n. Unlike arm64, riscv
selects CONFIG_ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX, so CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX can
be disabled with CONFIG_MODULES=y as well, and the bug is reachable in
that configuration too.
The !CONFIG_MMU build is unaffected: it has its own __patch_insn_set()
and __patch_insn_write() implementations and never calls patch_map(). |
