| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in libsolv. This heap buffer overflow occurs during the decompression of attacker-controlled compressed data within `.solv` files due to insufficient input validation. An attacker can provide a specially crafted `.solv` file, which, when processed by a vulnerable application, can lead to out-of-bounds memory access. This could result in information disclosure, alteration of program execution, or a denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator
A base inode's $ATTRIBUTE_LIST is sanity-checked by load_attribute_list()
only on the non-resident path; ntfs_read_locked_inode() copies a *resident*
attribute list into ni->attr_list with a plain memcpy() and no validation
at all. Every subsequent walk of ni->attr_list --
ntfs_external_attr_find(), ntfs_inode_attach_all_extents() and
ntfs_attrlist_need() -- then trusts the entries are well-formed and reads
attr_list_entry fixed-header fields
(lowest_vcn at offset 8, mft_reference at offset 16, and the name) with
bounds that assume validation already happened. A crafted resident
attribute list therefore reaches those walks unvalidated and can drive
out-of-bounds reads of the attribute-list buffer.
load_attribute_list() itself reads ale->name_offset (offset 7),
ale->mft_reference (offset 16) and the name length under only an
"al < al_start + size" bound, so its own validation loop can over-read the
fixed header of a truncated trailing entry by a few bytes.
Factor the per-entry validation into ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid(),
which requires each entry's fixed header (offsetof(struct
attr_list_entry, name)) to be in range before any field is dereferenced,
that ale->length is a multiple of 8 covering the fixed header plus the
name, and that the entry is in use and carries a live MFT reference.
ntfs_attr_list_is_valid() walks the buffer with it and checks the entries
tile it exactly. Use the list validator in load_attribute_list()
(replacing the open-coded loop, closing its own over-read) and on the
resident path in ntfs_read_locked_inode() (which previously skipped
validation entirely); patches 2/3 reuse the per-entry helper at the other
two attribute-list walks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array
idpf_get_reg_intr_vecs() fills the caller-allocated reg_vals[] array from
the VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply in adapter->req_vec_chunks, bounding
its inner loop only by the per-chunk num_vectors. The array is sized
separately: idpf_intr_reg_init() allocates
kzalloc_objs(struct idpf_vec_regs, total_vecs) from
caps.num_allocated_vectors and only checks the returned count after the
fill. The sum of per-chunk num_vectors is never reconciled against
total_vecs, so a reply with a small num_allocated_vectors but chunks
summing higher writes past the end of reg_vals[].
Impact: a control plane (a PF or hypervisor device model) that returns a
VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply whose per-chunk num_vectors sum exceeds
num_allocated_vectors writes struct idpf_vec_regs entries past the end of
the reg_vals kmalloc allocation (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write).
Bound the fill loop to the array capacity passed in by the callers,
mirroring the sibling idpf_vport_get_q_reg(). The existing
num_regs < num_vecs check then rejects an undersized reply without the
out-of-bounds write happening first. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: softing: fw_parse(): validate firmware record spans
fw_parse() reads a fixed record header, a firmware-provided payload,
and a trailing checksum without knowing the end of the firmware blob. A
truncated record can therefore make those reads exceed the blob.
The same record also supplies addresses and lengths for writes into
DPRAM. The generic loader uses wrap-prone mixed signed arithmetic for its
bounds check, while the application loader does not bound the staging
copy at all.
Pass the firmware end to the parser and validate the full source record.
Use a signed wide offset for generic DPRAM records and validate the
application staging span against the mapped DPRAM before copying. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/util: don't read __page_2 for order-1 folios in snapshot_page()
snapshot_page() currently reads __page_2 after checking nr_pages > 1, but
it should only do so when nr_pages > 2.
If an order-1 folio is allocated at the end of a vmemmap section,
__page_2 will not exist and reading it will cause a fault.
During DLPAR memory remove on a 22 TB ppc64le LPAR, snapshot_page() oopsed
on the page isolation path while reading an order-1 folio's __page_2 from
an adjacent absent section (unmapped vmemmap).
Fix this to avoid reading memmap that doesn't exist (e.g., a vmemmap
hole). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gro: properly validate BIG TCP aggregation criteria
When GRO attempts to aggregate packets beyond GRO_LEGACY_MAX_SIZE (64KB),
BIG TCP should only be permitted for plain IPv4 TCP and plain IPv6 TCP
(with sufficient MAC header room to insert the temporary HBH jumbo header).
However, commit b1a78b9b9886 ("net: add support for ipv4 big tcp")
loosened the check in skb_gro_receive(), leading to several issues:
1. skb_gro_receive() checked skb_headroom(p) instead of the actual space
before the MAC header (p->mac_header). Because skb_headroom(p) includes
mac_len, crafted frames (e.g. injected via AF_PACKET) can pass the check
with p->mac_header < 8 bytes. When ipv6_gro_complete() inserts the
temporary HBH jumbo header, the memmove() starts before skb->head,
causing an out-of-bounds write and wrapping skb->mac_header.
2. It allowed non-IP protocols such as software VLAN (ETH_P_8021Q /
ETH_P_8021AD) to aggregate beyond 64KB because
p->protocol != ETH_P_IPV6 was true.
3. It checked p->encapsulation instead of NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark,
allowing encapsulated flows (e.g. SIT / IPv6-in-IPv4) to aggregate
beyond 64KB.
Fix skb_gro_receive() to strictly enforce:
- NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->proto == IPPROTO_TCP
- Not encapsulated (!NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->encap_mark && !p->encapsulation)
- Protocol must be either ETH_P_IP or ETH_P_IPV6
- If ETH_P_IPV6, p->mac_header must be at least
sizeof(struct hop_jumbo_hdr)
Returning -E2BIG from skb_gro_receive() ensures that packets which cannot
become BIG TCP are cleanly flushed at <= 64KB and delivered intact without
dropping.
This issue does not exist in mainline (7.0+) because the subsystem was
rewritten in commit 81be30c1f5f2 ("net/ipv6: Drop HBH for BIG TCP on RX
side"), making this fix relevant only for older stable branches like
6.18.y. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dst_metadata: fix false-positive memcpy overflow in tun_dst_unclone
kmalloc_flex() in metadata_dst_alloc() sets __counted_by for the
structure to the options_len, which is then initialized to zero.
Later, we're initializing the structure by copying the tunnel info
together with the options, and this triggers a warning for a potential
memcpy overflow, since the compiler estimates that the options can't
fit into the structure, even though the memory for them is actually
allocated.
memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 104 byte write of buffer size 96
WARNING: CPU: X PID: Y at lib/string_helpers.c:1036 __fortify_report
skb_tunnel_info_unclone+0x179/0x190
geneve_xmit+0x7fe/0xe00
The issue is triggered when built with clang and source fortification.
Fix that by doing the copy in two stages: first - the main data with
the options_len, then the options. This way the correct length should
be known at the time of the copy.
It would be better if the options_len never changed after allocation,
but the allocation code is a little separate from the initialization
and it would be awkward and potentially dangerous to return a struct
with options_len set to a non-zero value from the metadata_dst_alloc().
Another option would be to use ip_tunnel_info_opts_set(), but it is
doing too many unnecessary operations for the use case here. |
| A buffer overflow vulnerability in the WatchGuard Fireware OS Management Web UI allows an authenticated administrator with network access to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition or potentially execute arbitrary code by sending specially crafted network traffic. |
| OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. Versions 3.3.0 through 3.3.12 and 3.4.0 through 3.4.13 contain a heap buffer overflow in PyOpenEXR triggered by a channel-name key collision between literal and prefixed RGB channels. When separate_channels=false, PyOpenEXR maps each physical channel name through channelNameToRGBA() and coalesces the results into a shared RGB array. A crafted flat scanline EXR that contains both a literal channel such as left and prefixed channels such as left.R, left.G, and left.B causes these names to collide, so the wrapper reuses an undersized two-dimensional NumPy array for the coalesced RGB slices and writes out of bounds when OpenEXR.File(path) decodes the pixels. This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.13 and 3.4.14. |
| SMM IHISI command handler, FMTSWriteUseIntelLib, for FMTS command 0x32, read and write data without checking buffer size and could cause buffer overflow. |
| CVE-2025-40843 https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5xf2-f6ch-6p8r was fixed by replacing unchecked strcpy() with a bounded safe_strcpy() helper.
At ldlogger-tool-gcc.c:129 the destination passed to that helper is fullPath + 2, but the size
passed down is the full PATH_MAX. safe_strcpy() is strncpy(), which NUL-pads the
destination out to the whole n, so this site writes 4096 bytes into the 4094 that remain — a
2-byte stack overflow on every invocation, independent of the input path's length.
This issue affects CodeChecker: through 6.28.2. |
| A flaw was found in FFmpeg. The tdsc_load_cursor() function writes beyond
the bounds of a heap-allocated buffer when processing crafted TDSC cursor
data. A remote attacker could exploit this by supplying a specially crafted
video file, potentially leading to a denial of service or arbitrary code
execution. |
| A stack-based buffer overflow in the epm (Endpoint Protection Manager) service used by the deprecated Mobile Security feature in WatchGuard Fireware OS allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code. |
| An integer overflow in the libtiff rgb2ycbcr utility's cvtRaster() function when computing strip buffer sizes can result in an undersized heap allocation and subsequent heap-based buffer overflow during YCbCr conversion of a crafted TIFF image |
| A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco IMC could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with admin-level privileges to execute arbitrary code as the root user. This vulnerability is due to improper validation of user-supplied input to the web-based management interface. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted HTTP requests to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the underlying operating system as the root user.
Cisco has assigned this vulnerability a SIR of High rather than Medium as the score indicates because additional security implications could occur when the attacker becomes root. |
| An integer underflow vulnerability in the WatchGuard Fireware OS iked process allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to create a Denial of Service (DoS) condition in VPN processing by sending specially crafted network traffic. |
| A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the WatchGuard Fireware OS iked process iallows a remote unauthenticated attacker to create a Denial of Service (DoS) condition in VPN processing by sending specially crafted network traffic. |
| An issue was discovered in Denx U-Boot before 2026.04. An integer overflow vulnerability in the ZFS filesystem support can be triggered by malformed on-disk metadata. The issue may result in incorrect memory allocation followed by out-of-bounds memory access, potentially leading to a crash or arbitrary code execution during the boot process. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: tas2562: Validate values for volume writes
tas2562_volume_control_put() does not do any validation of the control
value written by userspace, it uses it to look up a value in a fixed
size array which can easily be overflowed and then writes whatever value
it gets back to the device. Add validation that we are loading a value
we have in the array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
MIPS: mm: Fix out-of-bounds write in maar_res_walk()
maar_res_walk() uses wi->num_cfg as the index into the fixed-size
wi->cfg array, but checks whether the array is full only after it has
filled the selected entry. If walk_system_ram_range() reports more than
16 memory ranges, the overflow call writes one struct maar_config past
the end of the array before WARN_ON() prevents num_cfg from advancing.
Move the full-array check before taking the array slot and return non-zero
when the scratch array is full, so walk_system_ram_range() terminates the
walk instead of invoking the callback for further ranges. |
